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Preface 
"This (candidate recommendation committee) is one form of elec-
tion interference and may be considered an unconstitutional act leading 
to the appearance of a Diet hand-picked by the (Tojo) government."1 
Ozaki Yukio (1859-1954), the dean of prewar Japanese electoral poli-
tics, addressed that stinging assessment of the 1942 Japanese general 
election to then Prime Minister Tojo Hideki (1884-1948). The Ameri-
can Occupation authorities enthusiastically endorsed Ozaki's interpre-
tation by purging all recommended candidates from official life. The 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East accepted a similar 
evaluation and, even today, the 1942 election remains fixed in the 
popular imagination at the archetypical totalitarian style, rigged elec-
tion. 
There are two reasons the Japanese regard the 1942 general election 
as an electoral aberration. First, in the absence of political parties, a 
candidate recommendation committee nominated a slate of candidates 
for the election. Since approximately 80% of these so-called recom-
mended candidates ultimately won election, the impression exists that 
the election was merely a show election with predetermined results. 
Second, an election in Japan during the Pacific War (1941-1945) seems 
incongruous, moreso because the personification of Japanese militarism 
General Tojo Hideki was the prime minister. The assumption is that 
the successful candidates in this blatantly rigged election formed the 
basis of General Tojo's so-called wartime dictatorship. 
Consequently, both Japanese historians and American historians 
of Japan ignore the 1942 general election. Yet that election bridges the 
prewar and postwar eras in Japanese constitutional politics. Four post-
war Japanese prime ministers won election in 1942 and candidates 
active in 1942 still remain in the Diet today. Although the Occupation 
authorities purged all recommended candidates from official life, 
those same candidates quickly reestablished their preeminent positions 
in the Japanese political hierarchy as soon as the Occupation ended 
in 1952. The 1942 general election was, in retrospect, a transitional 
election that closed one constitutional era but still affects the present 
one. 
My purpose in writing this book is not to assign praise or blame 
to individual Japanese or to specific Japanese political and social insti-
tutions. Rather, based on available primary source Japanese language 
materials, this study will examine the 1942 Japanese general election 
chronologically in order to place that election in its historical context. 
A key contention is that the 1942 election does not represent an elec-
toral anomaly but that it does fit well within the context of traditional 
Japanese elections. 
I base the foregoing contention on the following types of materials: 
1. Unpublished official documents. These include prewar Home 
Ministry Police Bureau and Metropolitan Police Board records that 
are part of the Library of Congress, compiler, Microfilm Reproduc-
tions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other 
Government Agencies, 1868-1945. Additional police archives available 
as Library of Congress, compiler, Microfilm Japanese Rarities and 
Microfilm Orien Japan, cabinet records at the Japanese National Ar-
chives (Ko\uritsu \obun sho\ari)^ and classified records of the Imperial 
Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Political 
Structure Cooperative Council supplement the above documents. 
2. Published official documents. These include documents in the 
Gendaishi shiryo series, thought police reports, Imperial Diet proceed-
ings, contemporary election materials, and publications of various 
organs connected with the 1942 election campaign. 
3. Memoirs of candidates and of persons connected with the elec-
tion. This material ranges from court diaries to the self serving 
recollections of defeated candidates. 
4. Contemporary newspaper and magazine reports about the elec-
tion campaign. 
5. Interviews with former 1942 candidates, bureaucrats, and elec-
tion organizers. 
I have chosen to omit macrons for well known Japanese names like 
Tojo Hideki or Tokyo. 
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Politics of Disorder 
(1940-1941) 
Introduction: Japanese Elections and Japanese Politicians 
As long lines of Japanese voters formed queues before election 
polling stations on April 30, 1942, they were the latest participants in 
a half-century old tradition of popular electoral politics. The Meiji 
Constitution (1889-1947) guaranteed popular elections and elections 
became a part of the prewar Japanese political landscape. No one 
except the most conservative rightist questioned the legitimacy or the 
role of elections in the political process. Since the first Japanese gen-
eral election in 1890, electioneering had become increasingly complex 
and sophisticated. The government cautiously extended the suffrage 
and in 1925 granted universal male suffrage to its citizens. These 
peaks of electoral progress overshadowed valleys of election inter-
ference. 
The Home Ministry enforced election regulations but it quickly 
became apparent that police enforcement was susceptible to abuses 
because home ministers or powerful prefectural governors could order 
their subordinate police officials to intervene in election campaigns for 
a particular candidate's advantage. As the most powerful local official, 
the governor presided over a regional bureaucratic pyramid which 
rested on the petty bureaucrats and police who handled the day-to-
day administrative workload at the village level. He also depended 
unofficially on the cooperation of local leaders, the so-called meibo\a 
(lit. men of high reputation) or yuryo\usha (lit. influential men) to 
implement government policies. These community leaders, mainly 
landlords but also including local educational, civic, and financial 
leaders, guided unofficial village relations, acted as buffers between 
the local bureaucracy and the people, and served as filters for the two 
way flow of information from village to official and vice-versa.1 At 
election time, a governor might use his connections with the com-
munity leaders to gain their support for his candidate. 
1 
Candidates met the recurrent threat of campaign interference 
individually and collectively. Individually the professional politician 
developed a strong, dependable area of electoral support, his jiban. 
He organized his jiban around the community leaders for durability, 
but the more common jiban organized around a group of community 
leaders having no fixed attachment to any single politician. The 
politician's continued success depended on his ability to implement 
local aspirations to please the local leaders. For their part, the com-
munity leaders secured the votes necessary to elect the candidate, so 
campaigning and campaign oratory were not as crucial as local back-
ing, the direct or indirect support of prefectural officials, and agree-
ments between running mates not to encroach on each other's jiban.2 
In the 1942 campaign, for instance, veteran Diet incumbents with 
jiban like Maeda Yonezo (1882-1954) and Hatoyama Ichiro (1883-
1959) either campaigned by pamphlets or campaigned for their col-
leagues, but did not spend much time or energy campaigning in their 
own jiban. Similarly, Hatoyama and Tagawa Daikichiro (1869-1947), 
though party colleagues from Tokyo, carefully avoided each other's 
jiban when campaigning.3 
Collectively, the professional politician as a member of a political 
party took special care to obtain his share of pork barrel legislation 
for his district and jiban. In the early Twentieth Century, the political 
parties penetrated the bureaucracy, especially the Home Ministry, and 
developed a spoils system. Election preparations or changes in party 
cabinets meant wholesale shifts of governors, police directors, and in 
severely contested prefectures, even changes from the police director 
down to the sub-station level police inspectors.4 The governing party 
naturally wanted an election conducted under the auspices of its 
patronage appointees and a new cabinet naturally wanted the rascals 
out. By the early 1930's, this spoils system in local politics was a 
national disgrace. The government tried with new regulations to curb 
the worst abuses, but, in general, the political tactic of widespread 
personnel transfers and retirements accompanying cabinet changes con-
tinued unabated.5 
As political party influence in Japan declined in the 1930's, the 
Home Ministry looked for alternate methods to maintain and to 
extend its influence locally. Its bureaucrats led the Campaign for the 
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Economic Rehabilitation of Farming Villages (Noson \eizai \6sei 
undo), a local self-help movement directed by governors to alleviate 
the worst economic consequences of the depression in the farming 
villages, which by 1937 had committees in half of all Japanese villages 
and towns.6 Home Ministry officials also assiduously cooperated with 
the Election Purification Campaign {Sen\yo shu\usei undo) which 
was the brainchild of Home Ministry bureaucrat Tazawa Yoshiharu 
(1885-1944). Tazawa and career Home Ministry official Goto Fumio 
(1884- ) in 1935 organized a national campaign and established 
governor-supervised Election Purification Committees in each pre-
fecture. 
The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) opened another avenue for 
Home Ministry penetration of the villages through public mobilization 
to support the expanding war effort. Prefectural governors chaired 
prefectural committees composed of community leaders under the 
Central League for General Mobilization of the National Spirit 
(Ko\umin seishin sodoin chud renmei) and its successor the Central 
Headquarters for National Spiritual General Mobilization (Ko\umin 
seishin sodoin chud honbu). The Home Ministry's Regional Affairs 
Bureau Director Hazama Shigeru (1893- ) in 1939 planned another 
local reorganization based on the traditional village structure, the 
village {bura\u\ai) and town councils (chdnai\ai) and the neighbor-
hood association (tonari-gumi). According to his plans, a neighbor-
hood association system would be established in each village and town 
to cooperate with the central government by publicizing national 
policies like campaigns for spiritual mobilization by uplifting home-
front morale, by increasing production, by bond rallies, and by scrap 
metal drives.7 
Political party leaders recognized Home Ministry designs and they 
also knew their hard won status and prerogatives had steadily declined 
throughout the 1930's. Their own misdeeds, graft, corruption, and 
venality alienated prospective supporters. Political terrorism also 
exacted its toll among party leaders. Military influence in the govern-
ment expanded with the China War mainly at the expense of party 
influence. Party leaders believed that an attractive solution to their 
problems was the formation of a strong, new political party, dominated 
by them and committed to promoting national unity to overcome the 
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crisis confronting Japan. A new party, however, implied an end to 
traditional party factionalism. 
Factionalism plagued both major parties, the Seiyu\ai and the 
Minseito. Hatoyama Ichiro led the former's "orthodox" faction and 
Nakajima Chikuhei (1884-1949) headed its "reform" wing. The public 
identified Hatoyama as a "liberal" because he refused to support non-
party, national unity cabinets, maintained an anti-military posture, 
and prohibited Seiyil\ai members from joining any national unity 
cabinet. The party's poor showing in both the 1936 and 1937 general 
elections had undermined his leadership and forced Hatoyama into 
an alliance with Kuhara Fusanosuke (1869-1965) to hold his position. 
Only 66 of the 175 Seiyu\ai members belonged to the so-called Kuhara 
faction. 
Nakajima Chikuhei made his fortune as founder of the Nakajima 
Aircraft Corporation and then entered politics. His unilateral assump-
tion of the Seiyu\ai's directorship for its "reform" wing split the party 
open in 1939. Maeda Yonezo joined Nakajima in leading his 97 
member faction and both men consistently supported the idea of a 
new political party. Another proponent of a new party was Yamazaki 
Tatsunosuke (1880-1948), expelled from the Seiyukai in 1934 for 
accepting a cabinet portfolio. 
By mid-1940, the Seiyu\ai was the second largest Diet party with 
168 seats but factionalism lessened its ability to function as an effec-
tive, cohesive bargaining agent. Its members anticipated that a new 
political party would restore their fortunes in the political arena. 
The Minseito was the Diet's largest party with 169 seats and, while 
it was more cohesive than its Seiyukai rival, factionalism did exist. 
Nagai Ryutaro (1881-1944), controlling about 35 Minseito members, 
advocated a new party because he believed that as long as the parties 
represented special interests, national unity could not be achieved.8 
Machida Chuji (1863-1946) led the 130-man Minseito mainstream 
majority and opposed the formation of a new party as long as the 
Minseito was the largest organized group in the Diet.9 
The Diet's splinter parties like the right wing, nationalist Toho\ai 
(Eastern Society) holding 11 seats; the rightist, pro-army Ko\umin 
domei (Nationalist League) with 11 seats; the more moderate Sha\ai 
taishuto (Socialist Masses Party) commanding 37 seats; and the leftist, 
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antifascist Nikon musanto (Japan Proletariat Party) with three seats 
had little hope of ever capturing power in the existing Diet. This 
realization helps to account for the early and sustained enthusiasm 
their leaders exhibited for the formation of a new party. 
The Socialist Masses Party was originally an amalgamation of 
several moderate proletarian parties opposing capitalism, communism, 
and fascism but it gradually drifted to the right. By 1938 the party 
proposed a "national party" to prosecute the China War and tried the 
following year to unite with the Tohokai for that goal.10 The Toho-
kjiis leader was Nakano Seigo (1886-1943), a brilliant orator and 
political independent who believed that only a new party could break 
the privileged political elite's stranglehold on power. Nakano started 
the Tohokai in 1938 and hoped that a new party would totally reform 
the status quo bureaucracy making it responsive to the people's needs.11 
Imperial Rule Assistance 
Among all parties there was little commitment to the existing 
order. No leader appeared to champion the parties' cause against the 
burgeoning army and right wing ascendancy because party chieftains 
believed that compromise with these elements better served their in-
terests. The Nazi German war machine's smashing military triumphs 
in Western Europe appeared to confirm the effectiveness of a one-
party system to the already predisposed Japanese politicians.12 The 
embarrassing spectacle of the Japanese political parties, snared by the 
appeal of a new order, competing with each other to disband volun-
tarily surely showed the shallow roots of the party system in Japan. 
Such an assessment appeared confirmed with the founding of the 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), a curious amalgam 
that, whatever else it lacked, produced plangent rhetoric. 
Participation in Prime Minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro's (1891-
1945) so-called new order was the lure for party dissolution. Konoe 
himself convened a commission composed of representatives of the 
cabinet, both Diet houses, finance, academe, the right wing, the media, 
and the diplomatic corps to give shape to an all-encompassing national 
association to complement the new order. On October 12, 1940, this 
commission officially established the Imperial Rule Assistance Asso-
ciation following six acrimonious sessions and a series of compromises 
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involving the IRAA's leadership in local branch offices, its goals, and 
its political character. E. H. Norman, a student of the Japanese politi-
cal scene, probably best described the IRAA as an awkward mixture 
of various personnel types and trends with an even more confused 
platform.13 
Rather than an alleged monolithic, totalitarian style political party, 
the IRAA reflected the pluralistic Japanese state that had developed 
under the Meiji Constitution. According to that document, only the 
emperor, through the ultimate decision making authority which was 
his alone, could unify the entire structure. This forced the respective 
spokesmen of government institutions to compete for the imperial 
favor in order to legitimize their decisions. By 1940 an extremely 
complex, pluralistic system existed which meant that the unification 
of political power desired by "new order" proponents had to be ac-
complished in one of two ways. Either the constitution could be 
amended or a new, all-embracing political party to unite all the 
pluralistic elements in Japanese society could be created. Amending 
the constitution, because of the document's sacroscant character as a 
gift of the revered Meiji Emperor (1852-1912), would be difficult and 
possibly involve Use majeste (in fact not a single word of the consti-
tution ever was changed) as well as conflict with vested special inter-
ests in the social, political, and economic order. 
The creation of a supra-organization satisfactory to all colorings 
of political opinion was the lesser of two evils. Predispositions and 
preconceptions about the new order, exemplified by the scores of 
alternate proposals for its structure, should have warned Konoe that 
tampering with the status quo would produce an unlooked for 
reaction. 
The IRAA lacked unity. Too many diverse preconceptions about 
the new organization meant that no one wanted to give up their 
particular pet project for a new party, for national reform, or for a 
national defense state.14 It was not so much everyone trying to catch 
the "new order" bus as it was everyone trying to drive that bus. In-
stead of national unity and a totalitarian party, two contending camps 
appeared to do battle over the IRAA's future. The army, nationalist 
rightists, and pro-new party Diet leaders supported a strong, political 
IRAA. The Home Ministry, conservative rightists, the financial com-
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munity, and anti-new party Diet men preferred either a non-political 
association that they could control or one so weak that it would only 
minimally affect their activities. 
Major General Muto Akira (1892-1948), the War Ministry's Mili-
tary Affairs Bureau director, long advocated a "one nation-one party" 
form of government and had been in contact with Diet leaders like 
Maeda Yonezo about implementing such plans.15 Other Bureau 
officers who shared Muto's goals were Colonel Iwaguro Hideo (1897-
1970), the Bureau's Military Section head and a man with widespread 
contacts in the political and financial communities; Colonel Kawa-
mura Saburo (1896-1947), director of the Bureau's Military Affairs 
Section, and his subordinate Lieutenant Colonel Maki Tatsuo (1901-
1975); and Cabinet Planning Board member Colonel Akinaga Tsu-
kizo (1893-1949). Their ideas represented the culmination of a persis-
tent strain of the Japanese army's strategic thinking dating from 
World War One. Simply put, army planners believed that an essential 
ingredient for military victory in future wars was a united civilian 
homefront supporting the war effort. By 1940, they envisaged a Nazi-
like new order as the basis for Japan's national defense and planned 
to consolidate all national associations in a strong political structure 
to achieve national unification.16 
Army spokesmen Akinaga and Maki had participated in the IRAA 
preliminary meetings and argued that non-bureaucrats, i.e., new, re-
form oriented men, be made IRAA branch chiefs.17 The Military 
Affairs Bureau's goal was the creation of a regional basis of political 
support for army policies by extending its influence at the local level. 
They expected Reservist Association members to fill branch and com-
munity council executive positions and thereby form the nucleus of a 
new political order. This plan failed because the army divisional com-
manders, who would have the responsibility for administering this 
regional program, thought that the branches' nature and work made 
the prefectural governors the natural leaders.18 
Home Ministry bureaucrats thought likewise and they had fought 
the Military Affairs Bureau's attempt to take over their regional com-
munity council network. Former Home Ministry official Miyoshi 
Shigeo (1898- ) recalled that the ministry wanted its prefectural 
governors to serve as IRAA branch chiefs and the community councils 
7 
used as the lower administrative level of the new order's regional 
apparatus.19 Vice Home Minister Hazama Shigeru defended these 
positions throughout the IRA A preparatory meetings and the Home 
Ministry strengthened its own regional position when in September 
1940 it standardized and consolidated the community councils nation-
wide as well as established a council with subordinate tonari-gumi of 
about ten households in each village, town, and city.20 
Rightists who advocated sweeping national reform opposed these 
Home Ministry plans to appropriate IRAA branches for ministry 
advantage. This amorphous grouping, labeled by the police as "re-
formist," opposed the so-called corruption and decadence of the 
"old order," attacked the established political parties, and promoted 
its own schemes for national reorganization along state dominated 
lines. Among the prerequisites for any new order, reform rightists 
believed, were a state controlled economy and a monolithic political 
party. 
The other rightist grouping, the ideological or traditional right, 
traced its origins to the traditional ultra-nationalist patriotic societies 
like the Ko\uryu\ai (Amur River Society) and the Genyosha (Dark 
Ocean Society). Traditional rightists rejected the political party sys-
tem and the electoral process as Western imports unsuited for the 
Japanese and instead claimed that only the emperor had the power 
of political legitimization. Both factions lacked commitment to the 
status quo, but they perceived antipodal remedies for their dissatis-
faction. Reformists opted for an "advance" to what, they believed, 
was a more modern, i.e., totalitarian, form of government. Tradi-
tionalists chose a "retreat" to a golden age which they identified as 
synonymous with the pre-Westernization period. 
Traditional rightists, men like Kobayashi Jun'ichiro (1880-1953), 
Baron Ida Iwakusa (1881-1964), and the doyen of the traditional 
right Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro (1867-1952) demanded a non-political 
IRAA because they feared that a strong political party would lead to 
a strong cabinet that could usurp imperial prerogatives. Unlike their 
reformist counterparts and the Military Affairs Bureau personnel, they 
rejected as 2Jixi-\o\utai i.e., contrary to the special Japanese character-
istics derived from the Imperial institution, any totalitarian "fuhrer 
principle" leading to a "one-nation, one-party" system.21 Consequently, 
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they resisted the creation of IRAA nationwide cooperative councils.22 
Prime Minister Konoe tried to mollify these foes by replacing his 
Home and Justice ministers with Baron Hiranuma and Yanegawa 
Heisuke (1879-1945), a retired general with traditional rightist lean-
ings. 
So doing, Konoe lost support among reform rightists like Nakano 
Seigo, retired army Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro (1890-1957), a self-
styled expert on plotting abortive coups, and retired Admiral Suetsugu 
Nobumasa (1880-1944), a spokesman of the reform right. They pre-
scribed a thorough renovation of the existing status quo by the creation 
of a new, centralized political party that would exercise extensive 
powers over the national economy in order to establish a national 
defense state. The Cabinet Planning Board bureaucrats and army 
officers like Colonel Akinaga supported such economic thinking and 
had developed a master plan for a state run economy that would unify 
all economic controls under a single authority and divorce control 
over production from ownership and capital investment. Go Seino-
suke (1865-1942), the chairman of the Japan Economic Federation 
{Nippon \eizai renmei), typified the hysterical reaction of the finan-
cial chieftains when he denounced the Board's proposal as likely to 
obstruct industrial growth, divorce the nation from the principles of 
\o\utai, and probably cause the breakup of the Japanese family 
system.23 One suspects it might even reduce profits. A "red smear" 
campaign engulfed the IRAA causing its much needed monetary 
contributions from the large financial institutions, especially the 
Sumitomo and Mitsubishi banks, to dry up. The zaibatsu also in-
vested against the IRAA as the army learned when it discovered that 
zaibatsu funds underwrote the ferocious denunciations by traditional 
rightists of the IRAA.24 
Traditional rightists played on the communist phobia to oust the 
IRAA Secretary General Count Arima Yoriyasu (1884-1957) whom, 
despite his peerage, they regarded as a subversive because of his twenty 
year involvement with the agrarian guild movement. Allegations 
abounded that Arima had allowed "communists" (easily identifiable 
as "disguised" converts from socialism (ten\6) and as former Showa 
\en\yu\ai members) to infiltrate the IRAA. The sensation created in 
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March 1941 when the police arrested 17 Planning Board officials for 
communist activity seemingly confirmed the worst suspicions.25 
It also arrested the economic new order as the Planning Board 
underwent reorganization. Following Arima's resignation, the IRAA 
received a similar housecleaning. Home Ministry bureaucrats Hazama 
Shigeru and Kumagai Ken'ichi (1895- ) became the IRAA's new 
Organization and General Affairs Bureau directors respectively and 
prefectural governors assumed directorships of the IRAA's regional 
branches transforming that organization into a Home Ministry sa-
trapy. The IRAA lost at the national level; it lost at the prefectural 
level; and it even lost its financial shirt along the way. 
As the IRAA's prestige slipped away, so did the parliamentarians' 
self-induced euphoria about using the IRAA as a means to regain 
political stature. While a political party-less Diet promoting national 
unity by example might be desirable, without political parties to 
enforce in-house Diet control, the danger of chaos and legislative 
paralysis existed. The former party leaders faced the major adminis-
trative task of establishing in-house negotiating groups to govern 
committee assignments, to agree among themselves on joint action 
on votes on government proposed legislation, to allocate responsibility 
for questioning government officials, and to systematize the use of 
chambers by members.26 Though controlled by Diet men, the newly 
organized IRAA Diet Bureau did not have the constitutional sanction 
to participate in managing the Diet. To fill this administrative void, 
in late 1940 a Diet Members Club (Giin \urabu) was formed, based 
on universal Lower House membership. While ostensibly a voluntary 
club, incumbents either joined it or lost their opportunity to speak 
on the Diet floor.27 This at least provided a facade of political unity 
as opponents of party dissolution like Hatoyama Ichiro and members 
of the defunct Socialist Masses' left wing, purposely excluded from 
representation in the IRAA's Diet Bureau, joined the Club. Such 
nominal, disgruntled club members promptly began to question the 
Club's constitutionality because its officers concurrently served as IRAA 
Diet Bureau members. 
When the 76th Regular Diet Session (December 26, 1940-March 
25, 1941) reconvened after its New Year's recess, Kawasaki Katsu 
(1880-1949), a protege of Ozaki Yukio and a non-joiner of the Diet 
10 
Members Club, questioned the IRAA's constitutionality by contending 
that the constitution only authorized the Diet and ministers of state 
to discharge the exercise of imperial sovereignty.28 Ozaki himself 
demanded to know the legal basis for an organization in which the 
prime minister concurrently served as director. With these constitu-
tional points as an opening, Kawasaki spearheaded an assault to cut 
the IRAA's budget request then awaiting Lower House approval. 
Supporters of Prince Konoe who, nevertheless, favored different 
leadership in the IRAA, formed the Imperial Hotel faction around 
former Seiyukai Board of Director's member Hara Sobei (1891-1950), 
the pro-army, rightist sympathizer Tsugumo Kunitoshi (1893-1972), 
and former Minseito member Miyazawa Taneo (1887-1966). Alto-
gether 351 Diet members endorsed this aim, mainly from the defunct 
Minesito and Seiyu\ais Nakajima and Kuhara factions plus splinter 
parties. 
Those excluded from the Imperial Hotel faction, including all 
former Socialist Masses members, minority wings of both major 
parties, the rightist, one party advocate Akamatsu Katsumaro's (1894-
1955) followers, and followers of the right-wing socialist Kamei 
Kan'ichiro (1892- ), naturally gravitated to the Central Restaurant 
(Chud tei) faction. Kawasaki, army critic Makino Ryozo (1885-1961), 
and liberal Ashida Hitoshi (1887-1959) organized this group that 
eventually had 84 adherents. They opposed a politicized IRAA and 
instead proposed that the IRAA limit itself to non-political activities 
with an accordingly reduced budget.80 
Home Minister Hiranuma finally broke the budget deadlock in 
late February 1941 when he explained to Diet Budget Committee 
members that the IRAA simply was a public association to cooperate 
with the government and promised that the IRAA would be reor-
ganized immediately after the expiration of the current Diet session. 
A majority of members then defeated Kawasaki's proposed budget by 
259 votes to 54.31 
Hiranuma based his characterization of the IRAA as a public 
organization on the 1900 Public Security Police Law (Chian \eisatsu 
ho). According to that statute, all political associations, all persons 
holding public meetings with a political purpose, and all public or-
ganizations as well as assemblies had to register with the police to 
11 
insure security and order. The law forbid active duty servicemen, 
police officials, religious clergy, teachers, women, and minors from 
joining a political association. Police reserved the prerogative of dis-
banding any assembly, home ministers could forbid any association, 
and policemen who actually attended and supervised these assemblies 
could order them suspended.82 
This legislation's impact lay in its exclusiveness. When any asso-
ciation desiring legal status registered with the Home Ministry, it 
had to be classified either as a political or as a public association. 
That proviso made it impossible for the IRAA to mobilize a national 
organization outside the existing political parties in order to control 
the army and end the China War. If the IRAA went political, it 
excluded more than half the population as a potential base of support. 
If it went public, however, it could include those individuals, but 
only at the expense of being forbidden to engage in political activity. 
A public organization, in practical terms, could not campaign for 
the election of specific candidates, nominate or endorse the election 
of specific candidates, or act as an organization on behalf of specific 
candidates in election campaigns. 
Hiranuma's statement created a vacuum in the political world. 
No political parties existed to nominate and to campaign for candi-
dates, but no political association had yet replaced them. A general 
election would require a new, specifically political institution. The 
IRAA not only failed to attain national political solidarity, but its 
public status also complicated an already jumbled political scene. 
Election Reform Attempts 
Concurrent with the IRAA's formation, the Konoe cabinet tried 
to make a sweeping change in the election laws. The Meiji Consti-
tution specified that public elections (minsen) determined repre-
sentation in the Diet's Lower House. By 1940, the Japanese electoral 
system rested on the medium sized electoral district, a system that 
divided each prefecture into districts containing three to five seats 
and ranging in size from one district per prefecture in sparsely popu-
lated areas to seven in Tokyo. Nationally politicians contested 466 
seats in 122 electoral districts. Section 8, Article 78 of the election law 
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fixed the maximum tenure of members at four years from the previous 
general election. 
In the early 1930's, in response to questionable election practices 
and the spoils system, election reform plans gained momentum at the 
cabinet level. A significant reform occurred in 1934 when the cabinet 
established a public election management system for conformity in 
election campaigning and financing, defined the election campaign 
period and prohibited campaigning beyond that time, and reduced 
candidate expenditure per voter from 40 to 30 sen, about 15 cents. The 
latter would, in theory, enable more candidates to stand for election 
by reducing election campaign costs. Home Ministry bureaucrats 
enforced the new regulations thereby increasing their already sig-
nificant role in the administration of the electoral process.33 
Prince Konoe's new order rhetoric quickened the tempo of election 
reform proposals by those who favored facilitating the election of men 
committed to the ideals of a reinvigorated Diet to complement the 
new order. Suggestions included reducing Diet membership, en-
franchising only male household heads, nominating candidates by 
recommendation committees, redrawing the electoral districts, revis-
ing campaign regulations, and reforming the Diet system itself.34 
Not so curiously, Diet incumbents themselves, if not openly opposed 
to any reform, preferred cosmetic gestures that could not affect their 
positions within the legislative structure. Feeling ran high against 
such status quo thinking. Kido Koichi (1889-1977), just before be-
coming Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in June 1940, had informed 
Konoe that he could not support any new party movement that only 
realigned the established political parties. Instead, Kido believed, 
a new election law would allow a completely different type of candi-
date to emerge and replace the tarnished professional politicians.35 
One of the Konoe cabinet's highest priorities was election reform.36 
During the fall of 1940, the Konoe cabinet convened several 
conferences with the Home and Justice ministers, Cabinet Planning 
Board and Cabinet Legislative Bureau members to work out plans 
for electoral reform. They gave particular attention to a recommenda-
tion system for nominating candidates by special candidate analysis 
committees composed of community leaders not affiliated with any 
political party. Such a system, widely employed in Japanese munici-
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pal elections, would establish a parallel nomination system to con-
test the established political parties' traditional stranglehold on the 
candidate nomination process. 
The Home Ministry proposed a "pyramid" style recommendation 
system that would originate within the community councils, extend 
through a county and then a prefectural level committee supervised 
by the ubiquitous prefectural governor. These committees would rec-
ommend approximately twice the number of candidates relative to 
available seats, but independent recommendation groups would also 
be legally recognized. The Home Ministry planners hoped to break 
down the existing jiban network and to replace those politicians of 
the "old order" with political newcomers endorsed beyond the politi-
cal party councils. Given the ministry's penetration of the commu-
nity council system, the plan would have given the Home Ministry 
control of the election process from candidate nominations to ballot 
counting. Further conferences outlined an election law proposal using 
the prefectural size electoral district while reducing representatives 
from 466 to about 300. Candidate recommendation committees would 
form on the basis of the Home Ministry's proposal.87 
Proposals reducing their numbers and taking the nominating 
process out of their hands moved Diet men to produce their own 
election reform plan. Maeda Yonezo directed the IRAA's Diet Bureau 
and he instructed Kiyose Ichiro (1884-1967), formerly the disbanded 
Kokumin domeis chief secretary, to prepare comprehensive election 
reform proposals. Kiyose chaired the Diet Bureau's Extraordinary 
Election System Investigatory Department and its members produced 
a report rejecting the notion of reducing the Diet's size and proposing 
a recommendation system contingent on acquiring 100 voters' endorse-
ment in any electoral district. Maeda presented these self-serving 
designs to Konoe in late November 1940.38 
The following month at its Extraordinary Central Cooperative 
Committee Conference, the IRAA unveiled its ideas about election 
reform. Committee members rejected the prefectural sized district, 
favored increasing the number of representatives, endorsed a recom-
mendation system, and vigorously supported a proposal that enfran-
chised only male household heads.39 Former Showa \en\yu\ai direc-
tor Goto Ryunosuke (1888- ), now IRAA Organization Bureau 
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director, envisaged a recommendation system with the IRAA's re-
gional cooperative council network that could select capable candi-
dates both from among professional politicians and from other quali-
fied persons.40 Although never openly stated, these regional councils 
would neatly by-pass the Home Ministry dominated community coun-
cils as well as circumvent candidate endorsement by the political 
parties. 
By late December, meetings among Diet leaders, the Home, 
Justice, War, and Navy ministers and their attendent election experts 
thrashed out a plan to abolish universal male suffrage in favor of 
enfranchising only male household heads. They aimed not at reduc-
ing the electorate (although that was inevitable), but at establishing 
a suffrage based on the traditional Japanese familial system and pre-
sumably dominated by the Home Ministry. War Minister Tojo Hideki 
gave the army's support for such a plan and, following still more 
characteristically Japanese decision making, a January 20, 1941 cabinet 
decision set four main points for electoral reform. These would reduce 
Lower House membership to 400, adopt the prefectural size district, 
limit the franchise to male household heads, and abolish independent 
candidacies in favor of a system of recommended candidacies.41 The 
cabinet planned to introduce this legislation when the 76th Diet Session 
reopened on January 21 following the New Year's recess. 
All their efforts proved nugatory. As serious difficulties plagued 
Konoe's IRAA, factions re-formed in the Diet, and the prince's own 
popularity nosedived, he sacrificed all other controversial reforms. In 
a secret meeting among Konoe, Tojo, Navy Minister Oikawa Koshiro 
(1883-1958) and Diet members, the latter agreed to waive their right 
to interpellate cabinet ministers' Diet speeches and promised to adopt 
all resolutions unanimously. In exchange, the cabinet withdrew 
about a third of its scheduled legislative bills, including the contro-
versial election reform bill.42 
Stymied by the election reform compromise, in February 1941 
Konoe, referring to the tense national and international situation, 
unprecedently extended the tenure of all elected representatives—na-
tional, prefectural, and local—a full year. Home Minister Hiranuma, 
who seemed to relish relaying Konoe's concessions to the Diet, ex-
plained to the Lower House members that an election would adversely 
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affect government and popular efforts to consolidate a national defense 
state order.43 
Diet tenure extension meant that traditional election practices and 
the existing election law would continue unchanged. It represented 
a victory for the former party leaders because, despite backing for 
electoral reform by the powerful War and Home ministries and popu-
lar sentiment, exemplified by resolutions at the IRAA's cooperative 
councils' meeting, favoring reform, they had averted any meaningful 
reform detrimental to their established political positions. Rather than 
being forced to campaign for re-election under a radically revised 
election law unfavorable to them, former party leaders got the chance 
to reassert their own authority in the political party-less Diet. 
Re-Emergence of Diet Factions 
Diet Bureau director Maeda and the Diet Members Club tried to 
expand Diet influence by introducing the Diet system of committee 
decisions implemented by an administrative bureau into the IRAA. 
The IRAA's leaders rejected the proposal and opted instead to 
strengthen the IRAA's branch and bureau system to allow not only 
professional politicians but also any qualified man to advance within 
the IRAA structure.44 Nevertheless, even after the April 1941 IRAA 
reform, the Diet Members Club buzzed with rumors about a Diet-led 
IRAA reorganization and a bicameral Diet Club. Political maneuver-
ing lasted throughout the summer of 1941 but ultimately failed be-
cause of Konoe's unwillingness to support a new political party; 
because a majority in the House of Peers strongly opposed a single 
club, believing Lower House members would dominate it at their 
expense; and because the Diet Members Club directorate feared the 
plan might disrupt Club unity.45 
Dissatisfied with the Club leaders' vacillation, middle echelon Diet 
members (mainly younger third termers with some freshmen and 
second termers) tried to fill the Diet's political void by forming a new 
Diet negotiating association. Countering this threat to their positions, 
the Diet Club directorate, whose members were the former leaders 
of the defunct parties, appointed Maeda, Nakajima, and the former 
Seiyu\ai director Shimada Toshio (1898-1947) to devise a negotiating 
club as the basis of a new party thus stealing the initiative from the 
16 
younger members.46 The inevitable Japanese preliminary committee 
subsequently invited 349 of the 434 Diet members (32 vacancies 
existed) to join but, old enmities being stronger than new unity, 
excluded the former Hatoyama faction, Kawasaki Katsu's followers, 
and the left-wing of the former Socialist Masses Party. 
Altogether 303 members formed the Yokusan Diet Members 
League {Yokusan giin domei, hereafter Yokudo) on September 2, 
1941. To the chagrin of junior Diet members, the former party leaders 
continued their control by dominating the Yokudos decision making 
general affairs committee. Outmaneuvered by their political elders, 
the disgruntled young Turks lay in wait for pretexts to challenge 
again the Yokudo directors. 
Further factional bickering appeared against an international back-
drop. Following the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 and the 
steady deterioration in Anglo-American-Japanese relations, 27 Diet 
members wanted publicly to support the Axis against the Anglo-
American combination. In October the Yokudo leaders rejected their 
request as premature. Now 156 strong, the resolution's backers defied 
Yokudo orders and formed The League to Accomplish National Policy 
(Kokusaku \antetsu domei). Faced with this large-scale, open de-
fiance, the Yokudo directorate reversed itself and approved the League 
as a friendly society. League opponents correctly interpreted their 
inconsistency as weakness and non-Yokudo Dietmen used the episode 
to censure Yokudo leaders for promoting factionalism and reviving 
the abuses of power associated with the former party era. Yokudo 
weakness also encouraged opponents to exhibit greater independence 
by forming their own Diet negotiating groups. 
On November 10, Hatoyama Ichiro's, anti-military critic Ando 
Masazumi's (1876-1955), and Kawasaki Katsu's factions as well as 
Ozaki Yukio amalgamated as the Do\o\ai (Fraternity Association). 
Police political analysts described it as an anti-government party.47 
Two days later, National Policy League members and members of 
splinter parties organized the Asia Development Diet Members Asso-
ciation (Koa giin \ai) which the police dismissed as "a weak union of 
like thinkers." It signaled, however, the restoration of characteristi-
cally multifaction negotiating groups as in previous Diet sessions.48 
War Minister Tojo became Prime Minister Tojo that October and, 
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when he officially opened the 77th Extraordinary Diet Session (No-
vember 16-20, 1941), he had to work with a fragmented Diet repre-
sented by the Yo\udo, 334 members; Dokokjii, 35; Koa giin \ai, 26; 
Dojin \urabu (Comrades Club), 8; Giin \urabu (Diet Members 
Club), 11; and 19 independents.49 Controversy marred even this brief, 
four day session when during a Budget Committee session Yo\udo 
representative Miyazawa Taneo attacked budget opponents whose 
actions, he claimed, weakened war bond investment, interfered with 
material planning, and contributed to shortages. His cavalier impugn-
ment of their motives and honor infuriated Do\o\ai members and 
provoked Koa giin \ai adherents demanded his censure.50 Fifteen 
former Socialist Masses members withdrew from the Yo\udo over the 
affair and with Dojin \urabu followers formed another Diet nego-
tiating group, the Dai ichi hi\ae-shitsu (First Lobby) described and 
dismissed by police as not exceeding a confused jumble of splinter 
parties for the purpose of having the right to speak on the Diet floor. 
The episode graphically underlined that factionalism still existed and 
appeared to be growing more pronounced in the ostensibly party-less 
national unity Diet. 
On the eve of the greatest war in Japanese history, the civilian 
political sector appeared dangerously divided. The IRAA, despite 
superficial appearances reinforced by strident new order rhetoric, was 
not a locus of authority or even of significant influence. By directly 
challenging the existing political, administrative, and economic order, 
the IRAA had uncovered deep rooted disputes among the power 
sharers of Japan. Its reorganization simply papered over these cracks 
in the national unity frame by transferring top IRAA management 
personnel and depoliticizing that association. Similarly, dissolution of 
the established political parties did not really alter traditional political 
alliances in the Diet. The members of faction ridden parties recon-
stituted new factions by creating Diet negotiating groups. There had 
been no reform of the political world, no national election had estab-
lished a base of support for the new cabinet and its policies in the 
Diet, and no institution had satisfactorily mobilized the homefront 
to support the vast new war against the West. It fell to Prime Minister 
Tojo to resolve these problems. 
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Chapter II 
Organizing the Wartime Election 
The Homefront Faces a New War 
Pearl Harbor marked a momentous change in the United States 
from peace to total war but in Japan, at war with China since 1937, 
the transition was less apparent. Great initial excitement and appre-
hension quickly gave way to the daily routine. The battlefield tri-
umphs tumbled pell mell—Pearl Harbor, Wake, Singapore, Java— 
but these were really just abstractions announced by a fanfare of 
martial music and blared at the public by loudspeakers. Even passing 
interest in the war seemed to disappear after the February Singapore 
victory. Homefront Japan perplexed foreign newsmen still there 
and, detecting no major changes to accompany the new war, they 
complained about everything being so normal.1 
Changes of course did occur. Speculators hoping to turn a quick 
profit generated a runaway stock market that matched an engorged 
black market, indirectly fattened as the government announced food 
rationing measures. Clothes rationing lacked impact since the drab 
styles already testified to the success of the "Luxury is the Enemy 
Campaign." It did spark rumors that toilet paper, soap, and tooth-
paste would soon join the ration list prompting writer Nagai Kafu 
(1879-1959) to wonder if the winning side would have the dirtier 
women.2 Even so, urbanites were better off than their north-eastern 
country neighbors who spent their long nights in darkness because 
electric shortages and kerosene rationing restricted home lighting. 
The looser wartime atmosphere, and probably the darkened rooms, 
caused parents worries about their daughters' morals. Jingoism and 
chauvinism appeared more openly in the streets as professional agi-
tators like Akao Bin (1899- ) harranged passers-by against the use 
of English words or delivered philippics about America and Britain. 
Generally, life went on as before. When the government censors 
forbade the showing of American or British-made movies, movie 
theaters could replace John Ford's "Stagecoach" with Leni Riefen-
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stahl's Nazi paean "Triumph Des Willens." Beethoven or Bach con-
certs and recitals, the opera, live theater, and even the red light district 
operated as before Pearl Harbor. Prime Minister Tojo, never accused 
of frivolity, attended the January sumo matches where consecutive 
sellouts showed the taste for distraction and pleasures that the public 
masked only when the authorities demanded a martial and disciplined 
visage. 
Similarly no great changes had marked Tojo's ascension to Prime 
Minister. His was the tenth cabinet in the past five years and it prom-
ised to be no better or no worse than its predecessors. Tojo did hold 
three cabinet portfolios, Prime, War, and Home Minister, but he 
hoped to use the latter to eliminate mutual jealousy and overlapping 
functions between the civil and the military police thereby strength-
ening internal security.3 He depended on his hand-picked deputy 
Yuzawa Michio (1888-1963), a career Home Ministry bureaucrat, to 
guide him through that ministry's bureaucratic maze. Tojo also 
reorganized the IRAA leadership by replacing its vice-director Yane-
gawa, an old rival, with his trusted friend Reserve Lieutenant General 
Ando Kisaburo (1879-1954). Home Ministry domination of the IRAA 
continued as Hazama Shigeru and Goto Fumio retained their posts 
and high ranking police official Yokoyama Sukenari (1884-1963) be-
came its secretary general. 
Pearl Harbor did accelerate existing government imposed restric-
tions on individuals and on political institutions. A December 8 police 
dragnet swept up over 500 political dissidents, suspected spies, and 
left-wing sympathizers. That same month the 78th Extraordinary 
Diet Session (December 16-17, 1941) approved stringent new regula-
tions on speech and assembly, but not before it extracted Tojo's assur-
ance that the government designed the legislation to control groups 
which might obstruct the war effort and not political parties.4 The 
new law required all associations and publications to re-register with 
the Home Ministry. No longer was registration a pro forma exercise 
but one on which the continued existence of the association or the 
publication depended. Since all political and public associations had 
30 days to re-register with the police or face automatic dissolution, 
failure to report to the police reduced 200 political clubs to 43 and 
eliminated about half of the existing 800 public associations.5 
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The Tojo government also tried to capitalize on the initial public 
reaction to Pearl Harbor by promoting nationalistic, patriotic senti-
ments with radio broadcasts and mass public rallies like those of 
December 10 when Reservist Association members opened "Mass 
Meetings to Annihilate America and Britain" at eight Tokyo locations 
and drew 200,000 listeners. Propagandists did not need to improve 
on the continual battlefield victories but they did inflate personal 
exploits when war news was less spectacular. 
Election Spadewor\ 
By tapping the stimulated national morale, Tojo planned to use 
the upcoming election as an instrument to further the war effort. A 
national election, actively mobilizing the public by creating a height-
ened war consciousness, offered the chance to prepare the Japanese 
people psychologically for protracted total war. Such preparation 
would eliminate the possibility of a breakdown of civilian morale that 
Japanese military leaders believed responsible for Germany's World 
War One defeat. A major government goal then was for the election 
campaign to develop a vast, didactic, national unity campaign to 
promote homefront sacrifice for the war effort. 
As premier, Tojo faced the legacy of problems left by the IRAA; 
he had to restructure the domestic political framework by resolving 
the exact relationship among the government, the IRAA, and the 
Diet.6 Tojo could not just ignore the Diet because all government 
drafted legislation and appropriations, the latter vital given the mush-
rooming military budgets, had to be approved by the Diet. The 
reappearance of Diet factions disturbed Tojo not only because they 
openly divided the national representatives into cliques inimical to 
political national unity but also because he personally lacked the 
caliber of dependable Diet support that he deemed necessary for the 
war effort. 
A top secret Metropolitan Police Board evaluation of Diet repre-
sentatives rated 138 of 430 incumbents as having: 
. . . . a weak recognition of the situation, aimlessly adhering to the 
old state of affairs, and who are continually in their speech and conduct 
anti-national policy and anti-government or are recognized as personali-
ties who are ideologically unsuitable to serve as representatives. 
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These "unsuitables" included among others, all former Socialist Masses' 
members, Dokpkai leaders Hatoyama Ichiro, Ando Masazumi, Kawa-
saki Katsu, Ozaki Yukio, and liberal Ashida Hitoshi. Another 207 
members the police regarded as lukewarm opportunists who 
. . . take positive action sympathetic to the situation and are recog-
nized as personalities who support national policy and are not anti-govern-
ment in speech or conduct. 
First and second termers and middle echelon incumbents, who were 
the bulk of the former party leaders' followers, comprised this lot. 
This left only 85 members who enjoyed the government's complete 
confidence. One achieved this status by 
. . . complying with the situation, taking the initiative to set an 
example for the accomplishment of national policy, and having the ability 
to perform the duties of national representatives.7 
Loyal supporters, it turned out, were the former leaders of the 
disbanded political parties. New party advocates like Akita Kiyoshi 
(1881-1944), the ex-Communist and reborn right-winger Akamatsu 
Katsumaro, Maeda Yonezo, Nagai Ryutaro, Nakajima Chikuhei, Oasa 
Tadao (1889-1959), Okada Tadahiko (1878-1958), and Yamazaki 
Tatsunosuke were among the "reliable" 85. 
According to the constitution, the only way a prime minister could 
build a dependable, pro-government base of support in the Diet was 
by calling and winning a national election. In a move that followed 
practices of previous party governments, Tojo hoped that the general 
election would confirm his new cabinet's authority and create a basis 
of political support in the Lower House.8 The didactic election cam-
paign would complement political unity by promoting public support 
for the war effort and the election results would be the first step in 
the creation of a monolithic political party staffed by pro-Tojo func-
tionaries. For these reasons, Home Minister Yuzawa at a February 
cabinet meeting acknowledged that only an election could advance 
the war effort.9 
The cabinet resolved on February 18, 1942, that: 
The importance of this election is the opportunity to plan the eleva-
tion of a pure political consciousness, the renovation of domestic politics, 
and the establishment of a yo\usan Diet. . . . We believe that this priority 
should advance the great work of leading Greater East Asia.10 
22 
A yo\usan Diet, a catchphrase popularized by Konoe's new order 
campaign, meant a uniquely Japanese Diet that based itself on \o\utai 
principles and through which a national defense state to meet wartime 
requirements might to established.11 The Information Bureau wedded 
these themes when it distributed 60,000 wall posters depicting an army 
supply column struggling through the Burmese jungles and super-
imposed slogans like "The Election Builds East Asia and a New Diet" 
or "Nationally Build an Impregnable Fortress: Internationally Mag-
nificent War Victories." 
Diet renovation would be the first phase of political reform. Again 
to use contemporary jargon, Diet renovation meant that the elimina-
tion of "old order" abuses would enable "suitable new men of talent" 
to enter and to reform the political system. So-called new men (in 
the 1942 election this was the generic term applied to all first time 
national level candidates) being above regional and personal interests 
would presumably contribute all their energies to create a broad based 
national unity that would be the political component of the national 
defense state. Less abstractly, the destruction of the existing jiban 
system would allow younger men, more independent from local pres-
sures exerted by the community leaders-party politicians alliance, to be 
elected. 
Although the cabinet officially approved the general election in 
February, more traditional, prosaic election measures began as early 
as November 1941 when the IRAA prepared for the prime minister 
a Diet response document that provided answers for interpellations 
expected to arise at the 77th Extraordinary Diet Session (November 
16-20, 1941). This secret document's gist was that the IRAA as an 
organization should not participate in a national election campaign.12 
Election preparations continued in December as the police started 
their customary background investigations of likely candidates. Tojo's 
reshuffling of Home Ministry personnel was another traditional pre-
election maneuver. In mid-October 1941, the prime minister con-
ducted a small-scale reorganization by appointing career Home Minis-
try officials Tomeoka Yukio (1894- ), Imamatsu Jiro (1898-1967), 
and Narita Ichiro (1894-1959) his respective Tokyo Metropolitan 
Police Board, Police Bureau, and Regional Affairs Bureau directors. 
A few other minor transfers involving three governorships and three 
23 
police directorates also occurred. Yuzawa, Narita, and Imamatsu 
drafted the major January 1942 reorganization that reassigned 12 
governors and 31 of 46 police directors including police directors of the 
seven largest prefectures. These sweeping changes, the official com-
munique announced, would guarantee homefront order and prepare 
for the upcoming general election.13 
Military Affairs Bureau director Muto Akira and Major General 
Sato Kenryo (1895-1975), the Bureau's Military Affairs Section direc-
tor, provided an unlikely additional push for an election. According 
to Muto, the government anticipated a protracted war and believed 
that an election would exert a tremendous influence on national uni-
fication that was essential for fighting such a war. Muto's zeal for an 
election came from his conviction that the collapse of German home-
front morale caused German military defeat in World War One. An 
election could serve as the springboard for a new, monolithic political 
party that could properly guide Japanese homefront opinion and thus 
avoid a repetition of the German experience.14 The Military Affairs 
Bureau's planners' fundamental ignorance about national administra-
tion and the electoral system, however, caused fears that if they at-
tempted to try to run the election by themselves, Home Ministry 
officials might try to manipulate army instructions to their own ad-
vantage. 
In late December, Muto and Sato began meeting with Home 
Ministry representatives Yuzawa, Imamatsu, and Narita as well as 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hoshino Naoki (1892- ) to plan overall 
election strategy. Lacking detailed background knowledge about 
elections, Muto later admitted and Sato grudgingly confirmed, that 
they had no alternative but to listen to the Home Ministry experts' 
opinions.16 This resulted in the tactical implementation of election 
policy being entrusted to Hashimoto Seinosuke (1894- ), a long time 
associate of Election Purification Campaign promoter Tazawa Yoshi-
haru and Goto Fumio. 
At Goto's behest in early 1942, Hashimoto visited the Home Minis-
ter's residence where Yuzawa explained what the election planning 
committee wanted. The general plan favored a candidate recommen-
dation system but hoped to avoid the impression of a government 
rigged election because that would make the election worthless. 
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Hashimoto, Goto, Tazawa, and IRAA secretary general Yokoyama 
conducted additional election planning and consulted Yamazaki Tat-
sunosuke and Nagai Ryutaro. Both these Yokudo leaders thought 
that a new political organization especially created for the election 
might also serve as a stepping stone for a new political party. Hashi-
moto personally opposed such thinking and, backed by Yuzawa, his 
plan for a temporary political organization to nominate and to cam-
paign for candidates became the official policy. 
Tojo favored retired General and former Prime Minister Hayashi 
Senjuro (1876-1943) as the new organization's director, but Hayashi's 
previous run-ins with Diet politicians as the leader of the controversial 
"Eat and Run" cabinet of February to June 1937 made him unaccept-
able to the election planners. Eventually the choice fell on ex-premier 
General Abe Nobuyuki (1885-1953) who met important criteria. He 
had political experience and his relations with the Diet were better 
than the average general's although this was as much a function of 
his bland personality as of any political views. Abe had made his 
mark as an administrator, not a combat commander. Additionally, his 
eldest son married Privy Seal Kido's eldest daughter which provided 
Abe with entry into court circles. Abe was a political mediocrity, but 
he had fortuitous qualities that made him acceptable to diverse politi-
cal factions. 
Yuzawa, Tojo, and military representatives Muto and Sato ap-
proved Hashimoto's election proposal draft that contained the plans 
for committees of influential citizens in prefectural branches to rec-
ommend candidates for the election. This represented the fruition of 
a decade of Japanese political thought directed at circumventing the 
political parties' monopoly on candidate nominations. Moreover, 
despite the army's preponderant influence in national affairs, election 
planning and control remained in its traditional center, under Home 
Ministry auspices. 
With election planning well underway, the government slowly 
revealed its election policy. Initially Tojo spoke in generalizations 
such as hoping that an election would prove the chance to unite gov-
ernment and people to build a new order, a remark, incidentally, that 
drew applause in the Diet.17 Yuzawa revealed to Diet members, who 
naturally would be the most affected, that the government was con-
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sidering calling an election in April provided it did not provoke 
excessive disorder and Tojo announced that barring a change in the 
situation, he would not extend incumbents' tenure.18 By the end of 
January, Narita indicated to Diet members that a candidate recom-
mendation system might be used in an upcoming election.19 Another 
piece of election strategy was Yuzawa's promotion to Home Minister 
in mid-February because, as the official explanation read, the home-
front situation and forthcoming general election required a full-time 
Home Minister.20 These election preparations dovetailed with the 
military successes and, after the conquest of Singapore, the cabinet 
officially announced its election policy. 
At the February 18 cabinet meeting, Tojo officially announced the 
election's objectives as mustering total national power in wartime, 
solidifying homefront resolution for the war effort, and establishing 
a renovated Diet composed of capable, talented men. He added that 
the government hoped that the election would elevate homefront 
political awareness to rejuvenate both domestic politics and Greater 
East Asia.21 Again an election poster exemplified Tojo's appeal. A 
bust illustration of a young pilot, eyes heroically skyward, provided 
the backdrop for slogans exhorting "One Hundred Million En Masse 
Conduct a Proper Election." Almost as an afterthought, the artist 
inserted a miniaturized infantryman, slogging along in full field 
pack, in the lower left hand corner. A vicarious vote for the young 
pilot's bright face apparently had more appeal than one for a grimy 
soldier or grizzled political veteran's visage. 
Home Minister Yuzawa explained the basic election doctrine 
contained in the position paper entitled "The Outline of the Basic 
Campaign for the Accomplishment of the Yokusan Election" (Yo\u-
san sen\yo \antetsu \ihon yokp)?2 Successful prosecution of the 
Greater East Asia War through the creation of a "fresh, powerful" 
Diet was the election objective. The election itself, Yuzawa continued, 
represented the opportunity to raise homefront morale, to harden the 
public will for victory, and, by eliminating all "evil past practices," to 
provide the chance for suitable qualified men to enter the Diet. One 
surmises that the "suitable qualified men" would also have the good 
sense to support wholeheartedly the Tojo cabinet. A non-political, 
didactic or "enlightenment" (keimo) movement would accompany 
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and complement the election campaign by mobilizing public associa-
tions like the IRAA and the neighborhood associations to participate 
non-politically in the election. All orders would come from above as 
regional governments would implement locally the cabinet's election 
campaign guidelines. 
A didactic election campaign was the ideal objective. By participat-
ing properly in a mass participation election, voters would demonstrate 
the popular consensus behind the To jo government.23 In such a show 
election, however, the "us versus them" distinction is crucial to insure 
proper voting for the proper candidates. The call to eliminate past 
abuses, an indirect but transparent criticism of the jiban system, cer-
tainly implied that incumbent politicians would be replaced by "suit-
able, talented men," the so-called "new men." This impression created 
the dichotomy between old (incumbents) and new (political neo-
phytes) in the public mind and thereby generated the overriding 
tension of the entire campaign, a tension conspicuously absent in typi-
cal show elections. 
An "enlightenment" campaign would rally all citizens in a 
national unity crusade. Being non-political, the "enlightenment" 
campaign neatly circumvented the Public Security Police Law's re-
strictions. That enabled the government to mobilize all citizens and 
public associations for its homefront solidarity campaign either di-
rectly, through proper political participation in the election campaign, 
or indirectly, by non-political participation in its "enlightenment 
portion." 
The Imperial Rule Assistance 
Political Organization Council 
The government could not legally nominate an election candidate 
slate because the Meiji Constitution required public elections (rninsen), 
making government recommendations (kjinsen) illegal. The dis-
banded political parties had previously conducted this election pre-
requisite. To fill the political void, Tojo, acting on the advice of the 
election planning committee and after careful screening, invited 33 
prominent leaders of the public and private sectors to his official resi-
dence and requested their assistance in forming a new political asso-
ciation. 
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Police analysts regarded all seven selected Lower House members 
(six Yo\udo), as fully sympathetic to cabinet policies.24 In addition 
to Yo\udo leaders Maeda, Nagai, and Yamazaki, former Minseito 
members Katsu Masanori (1879-1957) and Oasa Tadao plus former 
Seiyu\ai members Okada Tadahiko and Ota Masataka (1886- ) were 
selected. Both Oasa and Okada served on the Yokjudos general affairs 
committee while Ota affiliated himself with the pro-army Giin \urabu. 
Six businessmen lent their expertise to the committee. They were 
the Oji Paper Company owner and Mitsui banking tycoon Fujiwara 
Ginjiro (1869-1960); Hirai Hachisaburo (1866-1945), Kawasaki ship-
yards and steamship lines president and the director of the Greater 
Japan Industrial Patriotic Association; Ogura Masatsune (1875-1961) 
of the sprawling Sumitomo concern; the financier and cabinet advisor 
on economic policy Baron Yabuki Seizo (1883-1950); Yuki Toyotaro 
(1877-1951), Director of the Bank of Japan; and Fujiyama Aiichiro 
(1897- ), Japan Chamber of Commerce director and an entrepreneur 
holding business interests in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria. 
Former Home Ministry officials dominated the bureaucrats called 
together by Tojo. IRA A officials Yokoyama Sukenari and Goto 
Fumio, both Home Ministry almuni, joined with ex-Home Ministry 
bureaucrat Endo Ryusaku (1886-1963) and Count Kodama Hideo 
(1876-1947), the Home Minister for the Yonai cabinet. Ishiguro 
Tadaatsu (1885-1970), an Agriculture and Forestry Ministry bureau-
crat who now chaired the Agrarian Patriotic League, rounded out 
bureaucratic representation. 
Five retired military officers, including former premier Abe, reform 
rightist Admiral Suetsugu, and IRA A vice-director Ando Kisaburo 
joined the assemblage. The other two officers were General Koiso 
Kuniaki (1880-1950), who never let involvement in two abortive 1931 
coups interfere with a rewarding career capped by the premiership in 
1944, and a political non-entity, selected to balance army-navy repre-
sentation, Admiral Takahashi Sankichi (1882-1966). 
Besides Suetsugu, two traditional rightist conservatives, former 
Ko\uhonsha (National Foundation Society) member Ota Kozo 
(1889- ) and Baron Ida Iwakusa gained representation. Other mem-
bers included Godo Takuo (1877-1956), the naval ordnance expert 
and Ko\usa\u \en\yu\ai member; Okochi Masatoshi (1878-1952) 
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president of the Scientific Research Center; Count Saki Tadamasa 
(1893-1971) Imperial Agriculture Association chairman; Sengoku 
Kotaro (1874-1950) Industrial Patriotic Association Central Committee 
chairman; Shimomura Hiroshi (1875-1957) IRAA official, Ko\usa\u 
\en\yu\ai member, and Asahi newspaper vice-president; Taki Masao 
(1884-1969), involved with the Ko\usa\u \en\yu\ai and Showa 
\en\yu\ai; and two journalists, Japan Newspaper Association presi-
dent Tanaka Tokichi (1877-1961) and the legendary Tokutomi Soho 
(1863-1957) still active at 79 as owner-manager of the Ko\umin news-
paper. 
This was the cream of the Japanese civilian elite and a who's-who 
among the non-governmental wartime leadership. Graduates of the 
most prestigious Japanese universities, 15 from Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity alone, they had risen to the pinnacle of their chosen professions 
as 16 of the 33 were former cabinet ministers while 18 held peerages. 
Despite the group's diverse expertise and background, their salient 
feature was conservatism. 
The government made no attempt to balance reform and status 
quo aspiration as had been done for the 1940 IRAA preparatory com-
mittee members' selection. The 26 member IRAA group had two 
businessmen while the 1942 committee had eight. Similarly, seven 
had Home Ministry connections in 1942 but only two in 1940. Some 
overlap between the two committees existed as eight men served on 
both. Most notably absent in 1942 were the hard-line national reform 
advocates like Arima Yoriyasu, Nakano Seigo, Hashimoto Kingoro, 
and Akita Kiyoshi. The five retired servicemen (only one in 1940) 
represented both a concession to wartime exigencies and an attempt to 
capitalize on the military's prestige. The election planners took the 
IRAA lesson to heart and minimized reform, likely to stir disorder, 
by selecting men with similar idological perspectives. The rubric, 
after all, was homefront national unity. 
Home Minister Yuzawa explained the cabinet's election policies to 
the assemblage and then government representatives withdrew from 
the conference room so that the chosen might deliberate "free" of 
official influence.25 After a short conference, the members unanimously 
vowed "to devise suitable methods to anticipate the establishment of 
a strong yo\usan Diet structure in order to prosecute successfully the 
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objectives of the Greater East Asia War."26 They organized the Im-
perial Rule Assistance Political Organization Council (Yokusan seiji 
taisei kyogikai) or Political Council and inevitably named General 
Abe its chairman since he was the senior statesman present. 
Abe designated a sub-committee to prepare the Council's election 
plans. Working rapidly, that committee resolved to use a candidate 
recommendation system for the election and to establish a national 
headquarters in Tokyo with prefectural branches to conduct the rec-
ommendations. The Political Council's first general session convened 
on February 28 and approved these proposals and also decided that 
prefectural branches would have from 15 to 20 members who would 
select branch chiefs from among their members. Branches would 
forward their unofficial candidate recommendations to the national 
headquarters where the ultimate selection of candidates would be 
made. Both would cooperate in campaigning for the recommended 
candidates. 
The Council's aim, expressed in its charter, anticipated that the 
national candidate recommendation system and campaign would 
produce a yokusan Diet.27 Contrary to Yo\udo leaders' hopes, the 
same document declared that the Political Council would dissolve 
immediately after the election's completion. Subsequent sessions 
ironed out remaining administrative details. 
The Second General Session held March 4 in Tokyo unanimously 
approved the draft resolution declaring that branch members should 
be men from diverse backgrounds, above sectional interests, of good 
character, and with enthusiasm for a yo\usan Diet. National chairman 
Abe had the authority to decide who might be branch members, name 
the branch director, and even send national headquarters' personnel 
and other "suitable" persons to staff local branches if the latter failed 
to employ such edifying men. 
Prefectural governors recommended branch members and chiefs 
whom the national headquarters then approved.28 The Home min-
ister previously had notified the governors that Reservist Association 
personnel were suitable for prefectural branch membership and in-
structed the governors to consult with the local regimental com-
manders in selecting the best reservists for their branches.29 By March 
20, the Political Council had decided on membership for all its local 
31 
affiliates with branches ranging in size from 21 members (Hokkaido 
and Shimane) to 13 (Miyazake and Mie). A typical prefectural branch 
might include three or four local IRAA officials, two or three Greater 
Japan Assistance Adults Association {Dai Nippon yo\usan sdnendan) 
members, two or three businessmen, two or three prefectural assembly-
men, and perhaps a high ranking retired serviceman, journalist, or 
local official.30 Budgets, defrayed by members' donations and contribu-
tions, ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 yen ($5,000-15,000).31 The Political 
Council completed its administrative requirements when Chairman 
Abe submitted an official request for political status to the Home 
Minister who promptly granted his permission.32 
Tojo's claim that his cabinet had no direct involvement in these 
affairs because the Council represented a spontaneous response to a 
government request was false. The Political Council owed its exist-
ence, its organizational structure, its recommendation system, and its 
chairman to the clandestine government election planning committee. 
Nevertheless, for its brief two and one half month existence, the Coun-
cil was not merely a government puppet for it had already compro-
mised itself by allowing former party leaders into its membership. 
Reactions to the Political Council 
The former party leaders quickly realized that any candidate rec-
ommendation system threatened their very existence. Furthermore, 
Yo\udo leaders, who regarded themselves and their followers as the 
Diet's pro-government party, saw the election as yet another chance 
for them to snare the elusive new party chimera. The previous De-
cember, the Yo\udo had already established a Political New Order 
sub-committee chaired by Yamazaki Tatsunosuke to study the possi-
bility of a new party uniting the government, Diet, and IRAA.33 
Reporters picked up these maneuverings and rumors of a Yo\udo 
organized new party gained circulation.34 At the February Yo\udo 
general meeting, Yamazaki presented the members his draft proposal 
calling for the creation of a national political association, distinct from 
the non-political IRAA, that would work for the smooth functioning 
of Diet affairs.35 Yo\udo officials recognized that as their first step 
in realizing their long term goal they had to neutralize a potentially 
hostile candidate recommendation system. 
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Gaining representation on the national Political Council was a 
giant stride in counter-balancing the recommendation system. Maeda 
and Oasa gained admittance by intimating to Home Ministry bureau-
crats the adverse international effects should incumbents, despite 
government interference, defeat recommended candidates. Subse-
quently the seven Diet representatives were added to the Political 
Council.36 The spectre of professional politicians entrenched in jiban 
deliberately disrupting the national unity election certainly troubled 
the government, but the Yoftudos accommodation by the Political 
Council was more a mutually expedient compromise. The Yo\udo 
leaders offered a regional political organization locked into the jiban 
network that the newly minted Council lacked; they offered the 
basis of a post-election pro-government Diet party; they offered elec-
toral expertise from the candidate's side that was so essential for 
electing newcomers. The government simply had no reason needlessly 
to alienate such a powerful and willing ally. 
On February 27, the Yokudo membership approved the recom-
mendation system and allowed four Special Executive Committee 
members, Oasa, Okada, Nagai, and Yamazaki, to act as liaison agents 
between it and the Political Council.37 Other Diet factions, however, 
refused to follow suit. The anti-government Dd\o\ai, for example, 
after its February general meeting, announced its, concern over the 
recommendation system producing a government-rigged Diet {kjznsei 
gi\ai) thus violating the spirit of the Meiji Constitution.38 Through-
out the election campaign, Do\6\ai members consistently criticized 
the recommendation system and the Tojo cabinet's political as well 
as domestic policies. 
The reform rightist Tdho\ai held only 11 Diet members, but it 
had a national network of 300 branches with 200,000 members. Its 
leader, Nakano Seigo, disgusted by the IRAA's political impotence, 
had left it to reconstitute the Tohokai as a political party.39 After 
the party's general meeting, Nakano announced that while Tdho\ai 
members fully supported the Tojo cabinet's war effort, all its electoral 
candidates would be recommended in Nakano's name.40 Nakano 
personally believed that the war gave new relevance to his reform 
program and that the election provided the chance to increase the 
Tohokais Diet strength making it possible, in coalition, to implement 
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such reforms. He consequently regarded the Political Council as an 
obstacle to his plans because he was unable to influence its nomination 
process. Toho\ai ambitions were revealed when it endorsed 47 candi-
dates and expected to elect at least 20.41 
Among Diet splinter factions, internal dissension racked the Koa 
giin \ai (27 members) and the fragmented First Lobby (36 independ-
ents), dissolved itself in late March. The pro-army Giin \urabus 
15 members rallied to the recommendation system but only because 
their own Ota Masataka sat on the Political Council. These Diet atti-
tudes ranging from outright support to outright rejection of the cabi-
net's election plans showed that not even superficial Diet unity existed 
on election eve. 
Mobilizing the Vote 
Various government ministries did try to counteract the former 
party leaders' presence on the Political Council and the contradiction 
that their presence seemed to represent for the government's election 
policies. Their chief method was repetition designed to implant 
election aims firmly in the public awareness. 
Police Bureau director Imamatsu and Regional Affairs director 
Narita, for instance, issued instructions to all prefectural governors 
that reiterated the February 19 Basic Outline and summed up police 
attitudes about the nature of the election.42 As a homefront mobili-
zation campaign, the election would enlist the cooperation of the 
IRAA, Adults Association, Reservist Association, industrial and agrar-
ian unions, and the Greater Japan Women's Association (Dai Nippon 
fujin\ai) with local authorities to conduct an enlightenment cam-
paign promoting homefront unity between government and governed. 
While the police recognized that the campaign should be con-
ducted according to constitutional provisions, it still offered voters 
the chance to "sweep away" candidates "clinging to the old state of 
affairs" or those having "dishonorable connections" that hindered the 
war effort. Police made every effort to insure mass participation as 
they warned that persons who advocated an uncontested election or 
suggested a limitation on candidates would not be tolerated. In order 
to increase voter participation, the government increased polling sta-
tions and asked employers to give their workers time off for voting. 
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A high voter participation ratio would reverse the 1930's growing 
voter absenteeism trend and "prove" the election's success.43 
Additionally, on February 19, the government promulgated elec-
tion themes it believed worthwhile. Surely a little imagination might 
have produced something better than the stereotyped trumpeting of 
"the Japanese mission to drive Western aggressors from Asia as a step 
in constructing a new East Asia for a new world order" or the joyless 
admonition to citizens to endure protracted warfare.44 
That same day, after a liaison conference among Home, Justice, 
and Education ministry officials, Cabinet Information Bureau, IRAA 
and Election Purification personnel, the cabinet distributed directions 
that divided specific election campaign functions among specific minis-
tries, bureaus, or non-political associations.45 The IRAA, Election Puri-
fication League, and Cabinet Information Bureau, for example, would 
produce and distribute sound films for the campaign. Predictably, the 
Home Ministry enjoyed the greatest role and it joined with the Infor-
mation Bureau to decide and to disseminate election guidelines for the 
neighborhood association network. 
The early February cabinet decision on March neighborhood asso-
ciation general meeting discussion topics set government policy for 
the activation of the neighborhood units for the election. With little 
imagination and less sensitivity, it decided that topics would include 
the previously announced election themes such as raising national 
morale, sacrificing for victory, and establishing a yo\usan Diet through 
the elimination of past election abuses. These lackluster subjects reap-
pear verbatim in the Cabinet Information Bureau's March 4 issue of 
Shuho (Weekly Report), the official guide for neighborhood associa-
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tion meetings. 
The government also scheduled a special national neighborhood 
association session for 7:30 p.m. on April 1 to listen as a national radio 
broadcast would kick-off the election campaign (officially to begin 
April 4). To try to insure a large captive audience, the Regional 
Affairs Bureau notified all governors that "influential members of the 
regular meeting had to attend" the special meeting, although it sug-
gested no coercive means to insure their participation.47 Following 
this broadcast, each neighboorhood association head would lead a 
guided discussion about election policy and would ask members simple 
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questions about election goals. The ministry recognized human fail-
ings by even providing easy sample questions for the unusually stupid 
or lazy neighboorhood leader. In Tokyo, Police Director Tomeoka 
Yukio instructed neighborhood meetings to discuss topics like pre-
vention of voter absenteeism and the war effort. It was a wonder that 
anyone attended such meetings. 
In conjunction with neighborhood association mobilization, the 
police, according to traditional custom, prepared election pamphlets. 
The one especially designed for the neighborhood associations cau-
tioned its members against discussing specific candidates and encour-
aged them to talk about desirable qualities for suitable candidates.48 
Exactly how to discuss an election without mentioning live candidates 
was left to the members' imagination. The nebulousness irritated local 
neighborhood association, IRAA, and Adults Association officials who 
demanded that the police provide specific standards to judge candi-
dates.49 The best the police could offer was an invitation to drop by the 
local police station's election information center or else pick up a free 
election information handbook. Bureaucrats seemingly designed this 
latter item to terrify conscientious citizens through an enumeration of 
an array of potential election law violations that might befall the 
unwary citizen.50 
A basic government assumption was that the election campaign 
would be conducted with a minimum of disruption. That made am-
biguity, represented by appeals for homefront unity and patriotism, 
most desirable for it would not upset any vested interest group. This 
intentional ambiguity backfired by either causing exasperation among 
those clamoring for definite candidate criteria or implicitly confirming 
the preconceptions of persons who took government rhetoric about 
cleaning out the Diet seriously. The IRAA, the right wing, and the 
Adults Association all believed, and from the government's standpoint 
even worse still, acted on the implications of the cabinet's election 
policies. 
Getting in Step 
Invitations for the IRAA's Second Extraordinary Central Coopera-
tive Committee meeting announced that the main discussion topics 
would be strengthening and renovating the domestic political system 
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through a yo\usan election.51 Prime Minister Tojo's salutatory ad-
dress acknowledged the IRAA's ineligibility to participate directly in 
the election campaign, but he requested their cooperation anyway to 
develop a national movement in concert with the election. Yuzawa 
recapitulated cabinet election goals, especially the need to renovate the 
Diet by electing suitable candidates. 
Delegates took both ministers literally and the subsequent session's 
minutes seethed with contempt for incumbent politicians. The existing 
election law, it seemed, had allowed an unsavory type of professional 
politician to seize control of the Diet. Electing "new men" would 
resolve this deficiency and, although members argued over how many 
new men should be elected, most agreed with Kikuchi Kan (1888-
1948), the founder of the popular monthly Bungei shunju, that a 
majority of incumbents were "worthless."52 
The incumbents and their jiban preserve had little support in IRAA 
councils because delegates pejoratively identified them as purveyors 
of Western (American and British) ideas in the Diet. This meant 
politicians ignored the national interest and instead pandered to local 
aspirations just to get re-elected. IRAA delegates paid the former 
parties a back-handed compliment by regarding party dissolution as a 
sham since party influence still existed and these despicable professional 
politicians would surely turn the recommendation system to their 
advantage by manipulating the inexperienced Political Council ama-
teurs or by stealthily infiltrating and then dominating local candidate 
recommendation committees.53 All this two years after the political 
parties officially dissolved. 
Assuming that an enlightenment campaign would "wipe out" anti-
Axis and pro-Anglo-American ideologies and thus rid the Diet of 
such pernicious influences, members wanted specific candidate recom-
mendation standards. Election law, however, forbade such specifics 
so they had to be content with shibboleths like "a patriot" or "a home-
front wartime leader" as the ideal candidates. Some unenlightened 
members even suggested an uncontested election believing that an elec-
tion in wartime was a waste of time anyway as it interfered with 
important matters like increasing production.54 
IRAA delegates exhibited generally great enthusiasm for an elec-
tion because they believed that the election and enlightenment cam-
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paigns could eliminate the old political order's regional stronghold, 
thereby renovating the Diet and the nation. They never suspected that 
the election campaign would ultimately eliminate the IRAA's regional 
influence. Then again, no one foresaw the major election role that the 
Greater Japan Assistance Adults Association would play at the IRAA's 
expense. 
The Adults Association, established only on January 16, 1942, was 
the finished product of over ten conferences among the IRAA, War, 
Navy, Home and Education Ministries. The prime minister ex officio 
and vice-director Ando Kisaburo directed this hierarchical organiza-
tion that stretched from the ward to village to county to prefectural 
to national level.55 Only the name was new since adults' clubs 
(sonendan) had been founded in 1929 to combat the spread of social-
ism in the farming villages. By 1941, there were over 1500 branches 
with 1.3 million members but these had developed unevenly in rural 
Japan and hardly at all in the cities. In those prefectures where adult 
clubs did tap community support and lay a firm foundation, however, 
the Adults Association, as their heir, became identified as an ardent 
political force for change.56 
Getting out of Step 
Since the IRAA's depoliticization, the Military Affairs Bureau chief-
tains had been casting around for another base of support for a new, 
monolithic and pro-army political party.57 Originally, they favored 
a Nazi-like SA or SS style elite vanguard since a mass membership 
association might prove difficult to control properly. In September 
1941, however, Military Affairs Branch director Colonel Sato Kenryo 
instructed Reservist Association members to cooperate actively and 
join the new mass membership association that eventually became the 
Adults Association. 
The Home Ministry had tried to check this latest army attempt to 
create a regional support base by proposing that prefectural governors, 
as the IRAA prefectural branch chiefs, also direct prefectural Adults 
Association branches. A compromise between the Home Ministry and 
the Military Affairs Bureau resulted in Adults Association branches 
being established parallel to the IRAA's regional organization with 
governors as honorary directors. Colonel Sato then agreed to a mass 
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membership association and, by encouraging reservists to join en masse, 
tried to dominate prefectural branches.58 
Planning called for Adults Association units in every prefecture, but 
by the February 1942 Association's Prefectural Directors' Conference, 
only 34 of 47 prefectures were able to send delegates. Although pre-
liminary committees had targeted completion of regional units in time 
for the upcoming general election, the remaining branches were not 
fully organized until late March and consequently were unable to 
play major roles in the April general election.59 The Adults Associa-
tion itself was incapable of a nationwide, coordinated effort in the 1942 
election because it was simply organized too close in time to take such 
an effective role.60 However, where the Adults Association did have 
deep roots in the local community, it launched fierce attacks against 
the political status quo. 
The Adults Association traced its radical bent to its memberships' 
comparative youth, the reformist direction legacy from the adults clubs, 
and the regional reform sentiment stirred up by the 1940-1941 new 
order movement. Limited evidence indicates that the community 
leaders of the traditional village order monopolized IRAA village 
leadership but that technicians like union directors or agrarian guild 
leaders dominated Adults Association councils. While coexisting in 
each village, the IRAA branch symbolized conservatism but the Adults 
Association symbolized reform, a perception in accord with contempo-
rary assessments.61 A leading opinion journal characterized the IRAA 
as representative of a bureaucratic or "old style" power while the Adults 
Association appeared as a reformist association committed to meaning-
ful national reform.62 
For the Police Bureau, the Adults Association indeed was too radi-
cal. Members of the League for the Construction of a Cooperative 
Order in the Farming Villages (Noson \yddotai \ensetsu domei), 
whom the police considered Marxist sympathizers and znxi-kpkutai, 
not only flocked to the new Adults Association but also managed to 
become prefectural directors in Shimane, Hokkaido, and Fukushima.63 
Taking no chances, the Police Bureau's Security Section issued a Feb-
ruary 10 nationwide warning to all police directors to take steps to 
prevent the infiltration of the newly formed Adults Association by 
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communists who, according to police information, had designs against 
certain Adults Association branches.64 
Meanwhile, government election rhetoric itself reinforced the Adults 
Association members' self-perception as reform vanguards. Newly 
promoted Major General Sato Kenryo told delegates at the associa-
tion's branch chiefs Tokyo conference that only they could perform 
"political work" like improving economic shortcomings, guaranteeing 
national livelihood, and expanding production. Ando Kisaburo said 
he expected the Adults Association to be the election's prime mover 
for political reform.65 
Their mandate clear to themselves from these ambiguous speeches, 
Adults Association branch chiefs promptly went on record as the only 
association unwilling to help "unsuitable candidates."66 Keeping such 
persons out of the Diet would rid it of Western ideas like individual-
ism, liberalism, and democracy. Only by the elimination of traditional 
election abuses and the destruction of jiban, the old order's principal 
prop as well as greatest hindrance to reform, could new men be 
elected. The enlightenment campaign had to censure "unsuitable" 
candidates identified as those running for regional and sectional inter-
ests or faction and clique members, those who built jiban through cor-
ruption, and those only "interested in personal gain," specifically 
incumbents. 
Such was the litany of sins of the former political parties recited 
with increasing fervor by the anti-party faithful. The Adults Associa-
tion clearly planned to use the national election, not for national unity 
with professional politicians, but to promote a drastic reform of the 
status quo and to expand its own nascent national influence. 
The government also found itself contending with fractious asso-
ciations and individuals who displayed almost a peevish perversity in 
not participating properly in the election. 
Reform rightists comprised such a radical group that expected 
to play a prominent 1942 election role chiefly because of their 
self-satisfying assumption that as the prime movers of the Greater 
East Asia War they should be rewarded by the enactment of their 
varied domestic reform schemes.67 Whatever rightists expected from 
the To jo government, it soon became apparent to them that the new 
government would continue its predecessors' policies and ignore right-
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ists' programs but carefully watch rightists' activities. Similarly, while 
the idea of a new Diet appealed to those "double patriots," their 
attitude toward the election became increasingly bitter, especially after 
the government announced the Political Council's membership.68 
Only three of the 33 Council members, Ida Iwakusu, Ota Kozo, 
and Suetsugu Nobumasa, could be considered right-wing members in 
good standing. The Council's seven Diet and six business representa-
tives were more threatening for both were traditional rightist foes. 
Yet openly defying the government's election policies did not appeal 
to these chauvinists of the reform right who operated on the premise 
that they should exercise self-restraint when they critized the election 
in order to avoid domestic friction in wartime. Alarmed at the tradi-
tional direction the election seemed to be taking, their chauvinism 
forced them into a quandry.69 
Director Sasagawa Ryoichi (1899- ) of the Kokusui taishuto 
(National Essence Mass Party) attempted compromise right-wing 
style when he sent a list of candidate qualifications to the Prime and 
Home ministers and both services Military Affairs Bureau chiefs that 
urged avoidance of recommending former Seiyukai or Minseito poli-
ticians, those over 65, communists, socialists, or those who had under-
gone tenkp. Sasagawa identified suitable candidates as consistent sup-
porters of national policy since the China War and those connected 
with the "patriotic reform camp."70 The recipients predictably ignored 
these self-serving suggestions to clone rightist candidates. 
Sasawaga then joined with Akao Bin's Ken\o\u\ai (National 
Founding Society) and splinter reform rightist groups to form the 
Patriotic Associations Council for General Election Measures (So-
senkyo taisakjt ai\o\u dantai \yogi\ai) which sponsored a rally at 
Tokyo's Hibiya Park on February 24 to announce rightist election 
policy. Denounce might better describe the proceedings since the rally 
quickly turned into a foray against the Political Council because it was 
incapable of creating a yo\usan Diet. Such statements underscored 
the activist right wing's grave fears that the Political Council would 
just serve as a vehicle for the defunct political parties to ride to 
revival.71 Assassin Mikami Takashi's (1904-1971) Kodo yo\usan 
seinen renmei (Imperial Way Assistance Youth League) exemplified 
anti-party phobia at its extreme when it denounced the election as a 
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Diet and big business plot to resurrect the defunct political parties. 
In language reminiscent of rightist anti-election diatribes from the 
1930's, Mikami assailed the election for hindering a Japanese renova-
tion {ishin) and giving the "pro-American and pro-British status quo 
faction" a lease on life.72 Mikami perceived that politically not much 
had changed despite party dissolution and the war and neither had the 
Metropolitan Police Board's attitude about rightists changed. Officers 
at the rally warned Mikami against any such future outbursts and con-
fiscated an issue of the League's journal, Yo\usan undo (Imperial 
Rule Assistance Movement).73 
The greater a particular rightist group's election expectations, the 
greater their bitterness when their self-deluding prophecies proved 
barren. Undercover police reported that Akao Bin's Ken\o\ukai 
members had great election hopes and were actively collecting cam-
paign contributions to prepare for campaign rallies and pamphlets. 
Hashimoto Kingoro not only expected his Dai Nippon Se\isei\ai 
(Great Japan Sincerity Association) to enter 30 candidates but also 
anticipated 10,000 yen ($5,000) to cover expenses. Never a wallflower, 
Hashimoto even counted on the military assisting his election cam-
paign. Another retired officer, Lieutenant General Ishiwara Kanji 
(1886-1949) was indifferent about the election. Ishiwara, however, 
was the Toa renmei doshikai's (East Asian Comrades Association) 
chief advisor and his noncommittal attitude disconcerted members 
who planned to run 34 candidates and also to support desirable in-
cumbents.74 The militant Nichiren religio-political Ri\\en yosei\ai 
(Society for the Cultivation of Constitutional Justice) had even 
greater ambitions, expecting to enter 50 candidates nationally. Battle-
field victories surely nutured such grandiose schemes. 
Resentment began to build toward the election as the reform rights' 
fertile plans withered after the government's icy reception. The 
reform-rightists, in common with the IRAA and the Adults Associa-
tion, believed what the government rhetoric promised. They all feared 
that political party leaders presence on the Political Council might 
lead to a revival of the hated political parties or to the creation of a 
strong new party that would be dominated by former party leaders 
at their expense. 
To Major General Sato all of the prewar political and social divi-
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sions that he detested seemed to be reasserting themselves in anti-
government or anti-election forms. Around the end of February, he 
expressed his concern to Tojo that the election campaign might de-
generate into an anti-government, anti-military one and disrupt home-
front morale. Sato wanted to call off the election. Tojo, however, was 
aware that the Home Ministry had thoroughly prepared for the elec-
tion and, although police intelligence did report some unrest, he be-




The Home Ministry Prepares 
Investigations and Investigations 
Since the Home Ministry supervised election laws and regulations, 
the police were always active in Japanese elections. The First and 
Second General Elections in 1890 and 1892 respectively established 
antipodal precedents for future Japanese elections. The Home Minis-
ter recognized that the former would be precedent setting and ordered 
the police to enforce impartially election regulations. In the latter, 
the Home Minister directly ordered the police to intervene against 
opposition candidates to prevent their election.1 Like a pendulum 
keeping proper time by extreme variations, so extremes between 
strictest neutrality and open interference generally marked patterns 
in Japanese elections. 
By 1942, three different civil police types and the military police 
regulated elections. The most fearsome was the special higher police 
(to\\d) officer. Commonly known as thought police, he combated 
the perceived communist menace and preserved national ideological 
purity from contamination by extremists of either right or left. He 
hunted for subversives, but he hunted in plainclothes and tried to 
mingle with his prey. At election time, he might attend campaign 
rallies to listen to speeches or check campaign materials to insure that 
no candidates spread ideological poison. 
The secret police (kpto \eisatsu) dated from 1881 and, although 
the 1935 election reform act technically abolished them, their organi-
zation continued under different designations. In the Police Bureau, 
it became the Security Section's Crime Prevention Department {bo-
han\a)\ in the Metropolitan Police Board, the Intelligence Section 
(jdhoka), and in prefectural police directorates, the secretariat (sho\i-
shitsu). The secret policeman's job never changed. He collected 
political intelligence and supervised election campaign rallies, speeches, 
and political associations.2 The political parties intricate development 
magnified secret police functions because the Home Ministry had a 
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vested interest in election personnel transfers and wanted to be on the 
winning side. The intelligence data that the secret policeman collected 
during an election campaign could, of course, be put to good use by 
the party in power and, for that reason, opposition candidates regarded 
his work as a form of election interference.3 
Ordinary neighborhood policemen, both the uniformed patrolman 
and his plainclothes vice-squad counterpart, carried the main burden 
at election time. The ward patrolman, an intimidating figure in his 
para-military dark blue uniform, with high button tunic and narrow 
visor hat, only reinforced that imposing presence with the short 
sword he carried. He openly circulated through election campaign 
rally crowds searching for violations and sometimes trying to intimi-
date opposition candidates' potential supporters. His plainclothes 
counterpart normally worked on the vice squad stamping out social 
evils like unlicensed prostitution, underage drinking, and, from 1938, 
rounding up truant students. At election time, he turned his talents 
to candidate vice. These three types of police might be augmented by 
a military policeman who turned up at campaign rallies increasingly 
since 1936, ostensibly to protect military and national security secrets. 
Police activity in the 1942 election followed traditional practices 
when the Home Ministry ordered Tokyo prefecture police chiefs to 
initiate background checks of possible candidates and to recommend 
potential candidates for a general election.4 The Home Ministry nor-
mally ordered police to conduct such investigations prior to general 
elections in order to uncover fraudulent candidacies. Furthermore, 
as election campaign costs mounted in the 20th Century, weaker candi-
dates resorted to corrupt tactics like vote-buying or bribery to try to 
insure their election and to justify their huge campaign expenses. The 
police, who regulated such abuses, became quite sophisticated them-
selves at undercover investigations to try to control such violations. 
Two examples of vote-buying incidents in the 1942 election campaign 
reveal the complex machinations that the police had to trace. But 
the limits of legal police investigation of a candidate's campaign and 
illegal police interference in that campaign remained subjective. This 
made it extremely difficult to determine whether or not ordering the 
police to enforce election laws strictly necessarily meant ordering them 
to interfere in election campaigning. 
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The 1942 pre-election candidate background investigations, rather 
than an attempt to influence candidate selection, might be regarded 
as traditional forms of police activity. Records of previous investiga-
tions into the careers and past life of candidates exist that indicate the 
1942 variety were not a wartime innovation.5 
Police conducted the 1942 pre-election candidate background in-
vestigations 
because of the many qualified persons crowding onto the election stage, 
it was necessary to investigate before the fact suitable persons for Diet rep-
resentatives from among those expecting to become candidates and those 
desiring to stand as candidates. F r o m last December, various preparations 
went forward and by January 20 of this year, respective police chiefs 
completed those investigations in their jurisdictional areas. . . .6 
On January 12, 1942, the Metropolitan Police Board issued detailed 
instructions to ward police chiefs on investigation results reporting 
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procedures.7 Police should base their investigations on potential candi-
dates' "purity of motive" (koketsu), intelligence, ideological impar-
tiality, and enthusiasm for the war effort. These "strictly confidential 
investigations" of persons "recognized as suitable as wartime repre-
sentatives" would be forwarded to the Intelligence Section in two 
reports, one for anticipated and one for aspiring candidates. 
Ward police chiefs submitted 133 names including 42 businessmen, 
35 IRAA officials, and 15 rightwing activists from which the Intelli-
gence Section eventually culled 46 names and apportioned them among 
Tokyo's seven electoral districts as "suitable" candidates. The Police 
Board revised a final list of "persons suitable as candidates" for a 
March 18 report to the Police Bureau's Police Affairs Section. It 
reported 28 men, 12 of whom had participated in the 1937 general 
election, considered "suitable" to stand as recommended candidates 
for Tokyo's 31 Diet seats.8 
Circumstantially it seemed that a direct, causal connection between 
police recommendations and the Political Council's recommendations 
existed, since the Council did ultimately recommend 16 police selec-
tions. Of these 16, however, eight were incumbents and one a former 
Diet member defeated for re-election in 1937 at least suggesting that 
half the so-called "police selections" may have been recommended 
simply on the basis of their incumbency. Surely, if a direct relation-
ship existed between police choices and the final selection of recom-
mended candidates, the Tokyo police, in an election billed as promoting 
opportunities for "new men" to enter politics, could have done better 
than recommending a total of seven newcomers, five of whom lost. 
The exact criteria the police used to conclude that 10 incumbents 
possessed "suitability" as recommended candidates remains unclear. 
It may be surmised that they weighed incumbent's support of national 
policies in the Diet and found it wanting. Police probably believed 
that ex-Socialist Masses or Proletariat incumbents might lessen respect 
for \o\utai and thereby hinder the war effort. For example, ex-
Socialist Masses member Miwa Jyuso (1894-1956) received police en-
dorsement, possibly because he was the IRAA's Organization Bureau 
Liaison Department director, but his five former Socialist Masses col-
leagues did not. Similarly, the police ignored Tokyo's three Dd\o\ai 
members, most likely because of the party's anti-government attitude. 
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While these documents do show police contempt for incumbents, they 
do not reveal any direct police influence over the Political Council's 
decisions.9 
Together with these investigations, the Police Affairs Section or-
dered all prefectural police chiefs to upgrade police training for elec-
tion control. Stressing the election's wartime significance and that it 
was the first general election in five years, police chiefs designed 
courses to refresh the patrolman's understanding of election laws 
and the use of such laws and "other forms of regulation" to pre-
vent disorder and allow the "most important" candidate to win 
election.10 In late February and early March, the Intelligence Section 
conducted lectures on election law enforcement and the Justice Ministry 
superintendents received similar lectures. The Intelligence Section 
also edited and distributed 5,500 election handbooks to police officers 
as well as providing educational and lecture materials.11 
At the national level, the Police Bureau helped local police con-
tingency election planning by publication of a primer to aid officers 
in detecting election violations. This pamphlet, based on factual 
examples, emphasized that time and again the lowly patrolman's 
persistence, alertness, and suspiciousness resulted in the arrest of de-
vious election law violators like election "brokers" (men controlling 
blocs of votes who illegally bargained with candidates) and vote 
buyers.12 
In mid-February, the Police Affairs Section standardized, in theory, 
the pre-election campaign period reporting format. Local neighbor-
hood police would compile a list of aspiring candidates, to include 
all Diet members, and provide details on potential supporters and 
jiban. These weekly reports commenced during the first week of 
March. In mid-March, however, a Home Ministry telephone instruc-
tion altered the reporting format to include the candidates' age, politi-
cal affiliation, possibility of being elected, and jiban resources, mention-
ing such matters as influential supporters, anticipated votes, and, if 
applicable, vote totals in previous elections.13 Ward police precincts 
all responded to the standardized format, but, within that framework, 
the election intelligence materials submitted varied greatly. Tokyo's 
Takemoto Kuramae Station was a model of reporting clarity with its 
detailed situation reports, graphs, and charts. Other stations, however, 
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contented themselves and their superiors with the briefest possible 
reports of information apparently gleaned from the morning news-
paper. 
The well kept records of Kuramae, located in one of Tokyo's 
commercial districts, provided a glimpse at an example of well or-
ganized police control. Kuramae's chief divided his patrolmen into 
two "reconnaissance units." These two units operated independently, 
in effect checking on each other's work, and investigated economic 
and organizational candidate resources as well as the candidates' 
political "tendencies." A "special" reconnaissance section joined these 
officers in order to scout election related traffic in their area and its 
section leader kept track of candidates' campaign finances. An inspec-
tion chief relayed patrolmen's reports about neighborhood candidate 
analysis committees' candidate selections to the precinct chief. Their 
plainclothes subordinates watched customers in restaurants, teashops, 
and machiai (meeting places) because the police long regarded such 
public places as convenient locations for illicit election campaigning 
or to bribe voters. Apparently plainclothes officers acted conspicuously 
enough to touch off rumors of an imminent round up of restaurant 
patrons.14 
While Kuramae was a model of election organization, the 88 other 
Tokyo stations and almost 1200 nationwide repeated similar activities 
in equal or lesser degrees. Each station cast its nets around a neighbor-
hood to snare political tidbits for their superiors. One unforeseen 
effect of this police election preoccupation was an increase in thefts 
reported by customers at public baths.15 
Conferences 
As neighborhood patrolmen conducted their investigations and 
hovered around teashops scaring off customers, top level Home Minis-
try bureaucrats applied the finishing touches to their election canvas. 
A series of national conferences from mid-February to mid-March 
shaped the ministry's national election policy. The Prefectural Police 
Affairs Section Chiefs meeting of February 14 launched these sessions. 
Imai Hisashi (1902- ), chief of the Police Affairs Section, told dele-
gates about the importance of crowd control in wartime and then a 
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Military Affairs Bureau representative provided a lengthy explanation 
about regulation of public meetings.16 
On February 26, the Prefectural Promotion Branch {shin\6-\a) 
directors met. Home Ministry bureaucrats expected these directors to 
implement the yo\usan election campaign because of the intimate 
connection between themselves and the neighborhood associations. Re-
gional Affairs Bureau director Narita explained, in a manner fast 
becoming de rigueur, the election's objectives and stressed the need 
for a national campaign uniting government and people.17 
The March 4-7 National Governors' Conference filled in these 
election policy sketches. This annual policy meeting was the first 
since the massive January transfer of governors and set election policy 
guidelines for these key prefectural authorities. Tojo himself gave 
the opening address and, reminding the assembled governors of their 
serious wartime responsibilities, he requested their cooperation with 
the national government to promote a national unity campaign for 
the war effort.18 The keynote speaker, however, was the new Home 
Minister Yuzawa Michio. 
Yuzawa attached so much importance to the speech that he drafted 
it himself although the minister normally delegated such work to the 
Personnel Affairs Director.19 In protracted warfare, Yuzawa an-
nounced, the government hoped that the election would provide a 
chance for the public to demonstrate their zeal for the war effort. The 
Home Minister himself desired an impartial election, but he would not 
tolerate the disclosure of state secrets, speeches to disrupt public opinion 
or likely to foment domestic discord.20 That encapsulated the gov-
ernment's conception of the election; a show election to prove that 
the public was solidly behind the war. 
According to a Home Ministry pamphlet, governors could imple-
ment these goals by "carefully guiding and encouraging" election 
related activities and remaining alert for omissions in election duties. 
Governors, because of their "insight" into local popular sentiment, 
would be able to detect any "gaps in national policy" and correct 
them. Their prompt action to arrest and to prosecute election offend-
ers would "cut away" the "poisonous weeds" of the election world.21 
These duties represented the growing responsibility of the governors 
for maintaining homefront wartime order. Their enforcement became 
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the topic of the March 13-14 National Police Chiefs' Conference in 
Tokyo. 
Yuzawa presented the opening address and he told his audience 
that, beyond their normal tasks, he wanted the police to prohibit 
strictly any speeches or publications likely to obstruct the war effort 
as well as to control completely any opinions liable to disrupt home-
front unity.22 Police Board director Tomeoka seconded that theme 
when he told the police directors that they must be vigilant against 
any election arguments or pamphlets apt to divulge state secrets, 
disrupt public opinion, or foment homefront discord.23 A Police 
Bureau pamphlet explained that by increasing patrolmen's election 
consciousness and cooperating with the Justice Ministry's Procurator's 
Office, officers would be able to thwart illegal activity, to exert "proper 
control and guidance" of the election, and to concentrate on the 
elimination of election brokers' "breeding places."24 
Chief Procurator Matsuzaka Hiromasa (1884-1960), the Justice 
Ministry's representative at the conference, supplemented those in-
structions as he explained that even in the absence of the established 
political parties, the election campaign might easily give rise to cynics 
who questioned the election's fairness. Not only must the police 
control such miscreants, but also they must act sternly to regulate any 
arguments or speeches critical of Japanese immutable national policy, 
economic controls, or that might cause popular unrest.25 
On April 4, higher law courts presidents and chief procurators 
gathered in Tokyo to listen to Justice Minister Iwamura Michiyo 
(1883-1965) encourage them to exert their efforts during the election 
to insure "perfect discipline" among the people. He also desired an 
impartial election, but the accumulated past political evils had to be 
eradicated. Despite political party dissolution, there remained many 
electoral districts where the candidate numbers exceeded available 
seats. Severe competition in such districts might foster election viola-
tions or complaints about government election interference. Judicial 
and police officials had to make special efforts to prevent such "ground-
less denunciation" of wartime policies. Chief Procurator Matsuzaka 
concluded this conference by advising procuratorial officials that "they 
could not be too severe" when dealing with subversive campaign 
speeches and literature that could retard the war effort.26 
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Opposition meant subversion, dissidence meant treason, and criti-
cism meant anti-war sentiment. These were certainly the ingredients 
for a show election, but could they be applied to a voting public who 
had a tradition of wide-open election campaigns ? Formulating official 
policy and executing that policy lost something in the transition. 
Neighborhood police actually were impartial in the sense that they 
trusted no one and watched everyone, even recommended candidates. 
Several days after the Police Chiefs' conference, the Police Affairs 
Section ordered precinct chiefs to forward local intelligence about the 
Political Council branches' candidate recommendations, decisions on 
such recommendations, and, weekly after April 10, detailed reports on 
each candidate's election campaign within their respective jurisdic-
tional areas. Required information included each candidate's antici-
pated votes, election forecast, and observations on the neighborhood 
response to candidates' campaigns.27 
The Police Board had Tokyo patrolmen investigate and report, 
while "avoiding direct confrontation with the candidate or his cam-
paign workers," the strength of each candidate's supporters, his antici-
pated votes, financial connections, and comment on the candidate's 
main strength. When the election campaign officially opened on April 
4, the policeman also investigated campaign conditions but had to be 
"especially discreet in speech and conduct when gathering informa-
tion."28 Headquarters insistence that officers base their required weekly 
reports on "factual information" probably left many a patrolman at 
loose ends by Friday afternoon. Doubtless the police did gather some 
election related political intelligence this way, but it seems more 
likely that most of the hearsay and gossip swirling around any neigh-
borhood involved, not the election, but immediate daily concerns like 
complaints about food or clothing shortages. 
At the lower judiciary reaches, for instance the case of Iwai Police 
Station located in Tottori Prefecture's northeast corner, the ideological 
offenses procurator ordered his subordinates to supervise election laws 
and also to control ideas "desecrating the Holy War" so that a true 
yo\usan Diet might emerge. With all citizens performing their duty 
as loyal subjects of the emperor, the election could serve to advance 
the war effort. Just to make sure that no heretic blasphemed the 
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sacred war, he ordered strict control of candidates' election speeches 
and pamphlets.29 
No matter how severe these restrictions, by themselves they do not 
constitute a rigged government election. Missing from all these orders 
and conferences are any direct orders to the police to intervene in 
election campaigns in favor of specific candidates. The omission is 
important. In the case of the 1892 election, Home Minister Shinagawa 
Yajiro (1843-1900) directly ordered governors in writing to work for 
pro-government and against anti-government candidates. No such 
orders appear in 1942. In the 1928 election, Home Minister Suzuki 
Kantaro (1867-1948) ordered the police not just to restrict campaign 
rally topics but to enforce strictly these regulations and any other sus-
pected election violations against his Seiyu\ais opponents. Again, in 
1942 no such orders have yet come to light. One reason may be that 
the Tojo government expected the restrictions on the press and on 
public speech would suffice for an orderly election allowing recom-
mended candidates to be elected.30 
Wartime Censorship 
Press control arrived early in Japan. The government promulgated 
a press code in 1875 and, eventually during the latter years of the 
troubled 1930's, the cabinet formed the Cabinet Information Commit-
tee as a state information agency to coordinate news dissemination and 
established a government news agency, Domei Tsushinsha (Domei 
News Agency). Following the outbreak of the China War in 1937, 
a Cabinet Information Department held monthly or bimonthly con-
ferences with the publishers of leading Japanese newspapers and 
magazines. It relayed official warnings about "undesirable" editorials 
or articles that the government judged adversely affected public 
opinion and detailed forbidden topics for publishers.31 The four 
major popular monthly magazines, Chuo \oron, Kaizo, Nippon 
Hydron and Bun get shuju joined this conference and formed the Yon-
sha\ai (Four Companies Council). 
In December 1940, the Cabinet Information Bureau altered its 
existing censorship policy from post- to pre-censorship. This meant 
that all materials for public consumption had to be submitted in ad-
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vance to the Bureau for review and prior censorship, thereby making 
Bureau approval mandatory before the fact for all publicly expressed 
opinions.32 A government organized Japan Publishers Cultural Asso-
ciation {Nippon shuppan bun\d) controlled paper distribution and 
uncooperative editors quickly discovered their paper supply reduced. 
In May 1941, the Bureau attached an official censor to each newspaper 
company and that December Koron and Gendai, right wing journals 
promoting militarism and emperorism respectively, joined the Four 
Companies Council. With bureaucratic precision, the name changed 
to Six Companies Council (Ro\usha\ai). Home Ministry, Cabinet 
Information Bureau, Procurators Bureau, and Thought Police per-
sonnel also participated in the expanding censorship function.83 
The day after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Information Bureau's 
Fourth Branch, Second Section (Censorate) delineated the govern-
ment's published materials policy for editors and publishers. Edi-
tions should design "positive" articles to guide public opinion by 
stressing the justice and unavoidable nature of the war, raising morale, 
strengthening homefront resolution for protracted war, and increasing 
hatred of the Americans and British. "Negative" articles like anti-
war, anti-government, or subversive stories should be avoided.34 The 
Police Bureau's Peace Preservation and Censorate Sections together 
with the Metropolitan Police Board Thought Police enforced these 
latest restrictions. 
The Police Bureau Director supplemented this already rigid frame-
work for public expression on February 28, 1942 when he nationally 
dispatched specifically election related regulations for published arti-
cles.35 These regulations simply forbid publication of any articles that 
might disrupt public opinion, be overly critical of the election, oppose 
the general election, or intentionally try to lessen public zeal for an 
election. By providing examples of what it considered unfavorable 
criticism, the Tojo cabinet revealed its fears that the public might 
think that its election policies violated the spirit of the constitution 
by suppressing independent candidates as a conspiracy to elect a pro-
Tojo Diet or that it was a rigged election. Convinced of the desira-
bility of a consensus of suppression, the Information Bureau relayed 
an edited version of these police instructions to editors in early March.36 
These election coverage standards warned editors against criticizing 
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the election or the Political Council's recommended candidates. It 
cautioned them neither to be negative about the election nor to suggest 
that an election at this time was not appropriate, nor to argue that 
the election denied the universal male suffrage principle, nor to criti-
cize the Political Council as unconstitutional, nor to attack directly 
its membership, nor to hint that the electorate should abstain from 
voting. Additionally, the police forbid the use of blank spaces to replace 
censored articles. The blank column tribute to the censor's zeal no 
longer stood out like an island in a printed sea and that perhaps 
represented a victory for superficial homefront unity. 
The government used censorship coercion to try to enforce favor-
able election campaign reportage by the printed media, but coercion 
alone does not fully explain the sympathetic treatment accorded the 
election in print. Newspapermen voluntarily restricted their coverage 
of sensitive topics as their contribution to the war effort and, at least 
a year after Pearl Harbor, many public opinion spokesmen (genron-
sha) actively cooperated with the government in the war effort 
because they felt a responsibility to do so.37 It is true that the govern-
ment blacklisted writers it considered "uncooperative," but they repre-
sented a stubborn minority. The majority either willingly complied 
with official proscriptions on free expression and portrayed the election 
restrictions as "being natural in wartime" or explained that whether 
one liked it or not, restrictions on campaign literature and rallies were 
as necessary for the war effort as restrictions on gasoline.38 If cars 
could keep going, so, apparently too, could politicians. 
More critical and imaginative journalists warned that such restric-
tions might impede political newcomers trying to make themselves 
known through extensive campaign rallies or advised the government 
to enforce impartially regulations for recommended and independent 
candidates alike.39 Newspaper editorialists also cautioned that over-
managing campaign rallies might cause the election campaign to 
wither away and admonished the government that it would be "suici-
dal" to interfere in the election because such action would besmirch 
the election's constitutional character and arouse public mistrust.40 
Even these journalists restrained themselves because they felt that their 
unfavorable reporting might be turned against the Japanese by their 
enemies. They cooperated as much from patriotism as from coercion. 
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Home Ministry bureaucrats, one feels, would have liked to stand-
ardize all public and private thoughts. This being impossible, they 
settled for the best alternative—restricting campaign rally topics. The 
Police Bureau's top secret Instruction 14, issued to all governors on 
March 26, 1942, set standards for the "control and guidance" of 
election campaign rallies.41 Four days later, the Home Ministry Secre-
tariat notified all police directors of the same orders and instructed 
them that campaign rallies should serve as "positive methods" of 
raising morale as part of the overall effort to unify wartime public 
opinion.42 Instruction 14's sweeping provisions were the most candid 
government expression of its official election policy. 
The opening paragraph expressed government election philosophy 
as it described the campaign rally as a tool to unify public opinion 
by the use of "appropriate" police guidance and regulation of cam-
paign rallies. Circulating these rally standards to candidates or their 
campaign managers would make them aware of (and responsible 
for) the exact limitations imposed on their campaign rallies. Police 
officers also had to "anticipate thoroughly and to correct by guidance 
before-the-fact serious points concerning matters that could result in 
cautionings or suspensions" of rallies. This type of censorship was 
pre-publication censorship's illogical conclusion. The patrolman as-
signed to supervise campaign rallies became responsible for surmising 
controversial statements by candidates even before candidates uttered 
them. If the officer suspected, or even intuited, that a candidate's 
campaign speech "deviated," to use the police vernacular, he had the 
authority arbitrarily to caution the candidate, warning him not to 
continue on that topic. Should the candidate brazenly ignore repeated 
cautions, and it was not unusual that in the excitement of the moment 
he did, the policeman could order the rally suspended. 
The neighborhood patrolman, because in most cases he was the 
official on the scene, used a type of sixth sense to prevent "deviation" 
and perfect homefront unity. The system probably led inevitably to 
abuses. The policeman had to show his dedication to his superior's 
orders and issuing warnings and suspensions at campaign rallies did 
tangibly display his enthusiasm. Besides, the officer could get into 
trouble for a remark a candidate made, but never for one that was 
not made. Rather than take the chance on the innocence of a candi-
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date's remarks, it was easier to assume no remark harmless. A dra-
matic upsurge of cautions and suspensions issued by Tokyo police 
during the 1942 campaign when compared to those issued in the 
previous 1937 election provided quantitative evidence of this policy's 
harsh enforcement at campaign rallies. 
In 1937, as in 1942, Home Ministry and military police officials 
issued orders to regulate campaign rally speeches strictly, especially 
speeches likely to agitate the masses, slander the military, or suggest 
a popular front.43 In Tokyo Prefecture, police issued 891 cautions, 
ordered 128 suspensions, and made three arrests during the 1942 
general election campaign that involved 4,353 campaign rallies con-
ducted by 99 candidates. In contrast, during the 1937 general election 
campaign, 68 candidates held 3,209 rallies and police cautioned candi-
dates 259 times, suspended 39 rallies, but made no arrests.44 Simple 
extrapolation to compensate for the fewer candidates and rallies 
would raise the cautions to between 350-375 and suspensions to be-
tween 53-56, still dramatically below the 1942 figures. 
Police ordered these cautions or suspensions based on six categories 
of election speech standards similar to the December press guidelines. 
Category One, premised on protracted warfare, made impermissible 
any speech likely to influence adversely homefront morale to endure 
total war. The Tojo cabinet's paranoia about the possibility of a 
breakdown of civilian morale resulted from their understanding (or 
misunderstanding) that attributed German defeat in World War One 
not to military factors, but to a collapse of the German homefront.45 
The government's election cornerstone was that the election would 
ratify the war effort by bolstering homefront determination to see 
the protracted war through and endure all the accompanying priva-
tions for the sake of victory. 
Potentially appealing campaign topics, the government paradoxi-
cally prohibited. Everybody knew about the spectacular battlefield 
victories, but who knew about Japanese administrative and economic 
policies in the newly conquered Southern Front areas? Who knew 
enough to even be likely to cause confusion about the Tojo cabinet's 
Greater East Asia statesmanship? Yet police had orders not to allow 
discussion of such topics. These proscriptions hit reform right wingers 
especially hard since they advocated that the Southern Front areas 
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serve as a cornucopia to alleviate homefront material shortages and 
that zaibatsu interests be excluded from these areas. Also forbidden 
was any description of the Greater East Asia War in racial terms, 
another reform right staple. Still, that was not as sweeping as the 
police forbidding speeches likely to create doubts in public confidence 
about the government's ability. 
Under the rubric of foreign affairs, the second category excluded 
any campaign oratory that might offend Japan's German or Italian 
allies or other Axis powers. This ban muzzled "liberal" elements like 
the Do\6\ai and former political party men (stigmatized as pro-
American or pro-British sympathizers anyway) who might criticize 
fascist and totalitarian regimes. However, to their dismay, traditional 
rightists found any suggestion that the Japanese should attack the 
Soviet Union banned and even the discussion of matters that might 
needlessly irritate the USSR proscribed. 
Domestic items subjected to proscription formed the third category 
and included subjects like intentionally or abusively criticizing the 
government, its policies, or creating suspicions about its sincerity. 
Former Socialist Masses and Japan Proletariat Party members dis-
covered that denouncing or abusing the nation's upper classes or 
encouraging homefront class rivalry were forbidden. 
A national unity election did not require a particularistic appeal 
to workers or to farmers; it required national unity chants and slogans. 
It also neatly excluded any reform minded candidate from the Toho-
\ai or Adults Association from building his campaign based on dis-
contented workers. Official concern about anti-military or pacifist 
speeches, displayed by the military police during the 1936 and 1937 
elections, resurfaced as a strict prohibition against the discussion of 
military matters. Likewise, discussing material shortages, inciting 
discontent over the supply and demand of goods, kindling public 
discontent by exaggerating material shortages, or insinuating that 
black market scandals involving high government officials existed was 
taboo. This emphasis only indicated the government's awareness that 
increasingly widespread shortages existed and these generated both 
public anxiety and dissatisfaction. 
Shortages of fuel, rubber, spare parts, trucks, draft animals, and 
electricity plagued rural areas.46 Even after all the military triumphs, 
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no relief from such cutbacks was in sight as strikingly exemplified 
by long lines of customers waiting patiently to buy such diverse 
scarcities as shoes and fresh vegetables. Opposition to government 
economic policy and controls or creating worries about inflation, how-
ever, were similary forbidden. Tohokai and Ken\o\u\ai candidates 
generally ignored these proscriptions at their rallies and police ordered 
scores of cautions and suspensions for such lapses. 
As for the general election, Category Four, government policy 
aimed more at independents and the reform or traditional rightists; 
those who might oppose or lessen zeal for an election or even inten-
tionally distort the true government motives for calling an election. 
It was impermissible to criticize the Political Council or otherwise 
create a lack of confidence in the government. Categories Five and 
Six, even more general in nature, banned spreading "wild rumors" 
or discussing military, foreign policy, or economic state secrets. The 
1942 variety "wild rumor" played on the food shortages with lurid 
descriptions of mothers killing their children because of the lack of 
food, cannibalism, and the outbreak of food rioting.47 
Not satisfied with merely regulating what was better left unsaid, 
Police Bureau Instruction 14 also offered a "guidance section" of what 
it considered edifying topics. These pedantically stressed the war's 
just nature and portrayed the Japanese leaders as long-suffering and 
patient but finally forced to arms for the Empire's prestige and national 
survival. Victory meant the eradication of American and British mili-
tary and economic pressure and that meant that the public had to be 
physically and psychologically prepared to persist in their homefront 
labors for a total war effort. Elevating national morale would elevate 
the gross national product. Lastly, candidates might compare front line 
soldiers' sacrifices to the safe, secure homefront's as examples to exhort 
citizens to buy war bonds, to perform homefront patriotic service, and 
to participate in the election. By encouraging proper participation in 
a didactic election campaign, these guidelines would cement homefront 
unity. 
Incredibly, the Political Council supplemented these police re-
quirements with its own. The Council issued to each recommended 
candidate an Outline for Guiding Public Opinion (Genron shido 
yoryo) because it believed that the establishment of a yo\usan Diet 
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reflecting the unification of government and public opinion required 
such guidance.48 Divided into five parts, this outline covered topics 
like homefront morale, Southern Front economic policy, and home-
front economic conditions. Recommended candidates, by clarifying 
the "true nature" of the homefront and international situation, could 
smash enemy "demagoguery, propaganda, and rumors." Lofty cam-
paign themes would focus on sustaining an indomitable homefront 
morale and reducing the chance for "ideological plots." Gunma First 
District recommended candidate Nakajima Chikuhei's \oho (official 
statement of candidacy) probably best mirrored these guidelines. It 
exhorted the Japanese people to accomplish their wartime missions 
as a race descended from the gods personified by a divine emperor in 
what literally was a holy war against the lesser breeds.49 
The protracted war bogey appeared in Political Council instructions 
to its candidates to tell voters that they must prepare for a long war 
and not underestimate the enemy. The Southern Front was important 
in strategic military terms and no sustenance to relieve domestic priva-
tion from those areas should be encouraged. Instead, those resources 
would be used to perfect an invincible defense ring and to prevent 
vital raw materials from reaching the enemy. Domestic economic 
messages centered on encouragement to work harder, to produce more, 
to cooperate with the government to reorganize industry, to buy war 
bonds, to save more, to restrict purchasing power, in short, to do more 
and to enjoy less to support the massive war effort. 
It was to be an election campaign devoid of political issues. The 
Council even advised recommended candidates to be "discreet" when 
arguing about ideas since introducing "enemy ideas" at campaign 
rallies could have a "reverse effect" on the unification of homefront 
opinion. Japanese spirit, a popular catchphrase connoting the superior-
ity of the spiritual over the material, the Council warned its candidates 
should not be over-emphasized nor should natural science be ridiculed. 
As a concession to the Twentieth Century, a candidate might explain 
that Japanese spirit could even encompass scientific culture. 
As severe as all of these restrictions on campaign oratory were, 
however, they were not an innovation for the 1942 election. They 
represented a lamentable continuation of the existing policy of re-
striction of speech, publication, and assembly, now enforced in the 
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name of the war effort. Campaign restrictions merely updated already 
established government censorship policy and applied it to candidates. 
Superficially, such sweeping restrictions seemed to ensure the success 
of the homefront unity election. Most Japanese apparently accepted 
these restrictions as their contribution or sacrifice for the war effort. 
The election campaign requirements did not break new ground in 
the steady encroachment on civil liberties. They merely served as an 
occasion for existing specific regulations to be applied. Such regula-
tions drained the lifeblood from any dynamic, hard hitting campaign. 
If candidates totally adhered to such rules, and if the police totally 
enforced them, the government's didactic election campaign would 
become reality and the citizen would not only participate, but would 
have no choice but to participate properly.50 Instead of a collision 
between an immovable force and an unmovable object, however, the 
electioneering resembled a sumo wrestling match with technique 
pitted against strength. The more experienced veteran political cam-
paigner's technique could often overcome the seemingly insurmount-
able strength of Tojo's police power. 
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Chapter IV 
The Candidate Recommendation System 
and Its Critics 
Initial Reactions 
The Tojo cabinet and the Home Ministry seemed to have con-
cocted a rigid election campaign framework and candidate recom-
mendation system designed to insure a didactic election. From its very 
inception, however, the presence of former party leaders on the Politi-
cal Council promoted dissent and disillusionment. The recommenda-
tion process itself generated further widespread public dissatisfaction 
chiefly because the Council endorsed the former party leaders as 
recommended candidates. Criticism echoed throughout society, ap-
peared in the contemporary press and magazines, and eventually 
resounded in the Imperial Diet. 
Ironically, Political Council Chairman Abe started public criticism 
rolling when he announced to reporters at a March 9 press conference 
that, although attempts would be made to comply with regional 
conditions and aspirations, the fundamental principle for recommend-
ing candidates was the candidate's likelihood of being elected.1 This 
so-called "election first philosophy" touched off the campaign's first 
genuine excitement. 
Iwabuchi Tatsuo (1892- ), one of Japan's foremost political com-
mentators, caustically observed that such an attitude gave an unfair 
advantage to seasoned political veterans with jiban and a Yomiuri 
correspondent reported widespread public dissatisfaction with the 
"election-first" philosophy. The Hochi reporter shared such views and 
wrote that Abe's remark gave "old order" politicians an unfair advan-
tage because, though they obviously lacked the "talent" for imperial 
rule assistance, they had the connections and the money to get elected.2 
Home Minister Yuzawa, during a Kobe speech, tried to retrieve 
the situation by explaining to reporters that Abe really meant that 
no matter how talented a man, if unelectable, his recommendation had 
no value. Nevertheless, Yuzawa conceded, that the statement had 
caused a great deal of inconvenient misunderstanding.3 Abe himself 
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backtracked and admitted his error, and, in a hauntingly familiar 
political ploy, blamed the press for distorting his meaning. The Politi-
cal Council later reprinted this exclusive interview as a campaign 
pamphlet and distributed 10,000 copies.4 
Actually, Abe merely recognized the gulf between the cabinet's plan 
for an ideal election infusing new blood into the Diet and the need 
to compromise with former party leaders to conduct an election. What 
seemed to critics like a cynical reassertion of the jiban dominated politi-
cal party standards that placed personal advancement above the com-
monweal was an acknowledgement of the fundamental and specialized 
role political parties (even when ostensibly dissolved) played in elec-
tions. Accommodating such tradition, though, hit hardest at political 
newcomers from the reform right, the Adults Association, and the 
IRAA who advocated, after all, a Diet renovation by ridding it of 
traditional incumbent politicians. Their outraged screams naturally 
reverberated the loudest since without recommendations these political 
newcomers would be very hard pressed to defeat incumbent Dietmen 
and renovate the Diet. 
Reformists reviled no abuse of the preceding political party era 
more than the jiban since it remained the cornerstone of the political 
status quo. Cabinet election rhetoric calling for the "sweeping away 
of past abuses" seemed to point the way for jiban destruction. The 
Home Ministry certainly fostered a similar impression by constantly 
reiterating the need to eliminate traditional election abuses and to 
mobilize "suitable talent" for the Diet.5 
While predictably a reform rightist periodical thundered against 
jiban, surprisingly so did more moderate journals that wanted to "root 
out" jiban in order to destroy any of the former parties' latent popu-
larity. Adults Association vice director Ando Kisaburo endorsed that 
opinion when he told a national radio audience on April 1 that the 
election could destroy the jiban and factionalism characteristic of the 
former political parties.6 
Despite such vociferous reactions, the Political Council and the 
cabinet could no more ignore the existing jiban coterie than a ship in 
treacherous waters could sail without charts. The Home Ministry 
knew the politician's jiban's complexity and tenacity as well as the 
enormous difficulty involved in uprooting all jiban.7 The Tojo cabinet 
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never wanted all incumbents defeated, only those it identified as 
opponents and the police evaluation of all incumbents ironically 
showed the former party leaders as the most consistent government 
supporters. Election rhetoric glossed over the embarrassing fact that 
the scapegoats of the 1930's turned out to be the Tojo cabinet's strong-
est allies. That would have been difficult to explain to anti-party 
groups like the Adults Association whom the Tojo cabinet also wanted 
solidly backing its policies. The Adults Association, IRAA, and reform 
rightists believed the campaign rhetoric they heard and planned to 
act on it for national political reform. This tension between "old style" 
jiban dominated politics and the new politics predicated on regional 
reformist aspirations threatened to erupt and to shatter the homefront 
unity facade that Tojo hoped to make substantive, not merely cosmetic. 
Diet Criticism 
A second major source of criticism directed against the constitu-
tional and legal propriety of using a recommendation system in a 
national election unfolded in both Houses of the Imperial Diet during 
the 79th Regular Session (December 26, 1941-March 25, 1942). In the 
Lower House, the Dokpkai spearheaded the assault and the Upper 
House's Viscount Okochi Kiko (1885-1955) bedeviled Tojo and Yu-
zawa. The Imperial Diet did not just rubber stamp the cabinet's 
election policy and candidate recommendation system. Instead, in a 
manner that cannot be associated with any known "militarist" or 
"totalitarian" regime, Diet members spoke out against the election, 
asked tough questions about election policy, challenged the election's 
constitutionality, and came close to forcing a governmental crisis. 
On March 19, Do\o\ai member Ando Masazumi, seconded by the 
other 36 Dokpkai members, launched a devastating attack on the 
candidate recommendation system.8 His interpellation rudely dispells 
the misconception that the Diet docilely knuckled under to every 
cabinet demand. Ando demanded that Tojo dissolve the Political 
Council because it violated the spirit of public elections specified in 
the constitution. Wasn't the presence of a majority of House of Peers' 
members (18 of 33) on the Political Council a violation of the consti-
tutional spirit of separation of Diet Houses? What exactly were the 
standards for selecting Political Council members ? Could these mem-
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bers select the most suitable candidates? Tojo, Ando hoped, would 
provide a clear answer about the election in order to dispel popular 
suspicion about the election's fairness. 
The Tojo cabinet, Ando persisted, claims that it wants a true 
yokusan Diet, but since the China Incident the present incumbents 
have "cooperated assiduously" with the government in all national 
policy matters, more so since the outbreak of the Greater East Asia 
War. Where, Ando wondered, did the government find defects in the 
present Diet?9 How did the cabinet feel about popular reaction to the 
Political Council that recognized it as a government fabrication de-
signed only to produce pro-government Diet lackeys? Additionally, 
government activities such as spreading innuendo that independent 
candidates hindered the war effort and prohibiting the publication 
of criticism of the election or its recommended candidates actually 
amounted to election interference and violated the constitution and 
election laws. 
Six days later, on the session's final day, Tojo submitted his reply 
to those most embarrassing questions. Evasion characterized his an-
swers, but this should not diminish the important fact that he did 
reply. The pattern of so-called analogous regimes like Nazi Germany 
or Fascist Italy ignored such questions (if anyone asked them at all), 
branded the questioner a traitor and arrested or otherwise harassed 
this kind of miscreant. Accordingly, other potential dissenters would 
rethink the wisdom of protest. In 1942 Japan this did not happen. 
The constitutional tradition and the Imperial Diet's development of 
parliamentary procedures like the interpellation function forced Tojo 
to either answer such interpellations or ignore parliamentary custom 
and the rule of law. Choosing the latter course would deny his own 
cabinet's legitimacy by placing it beyond the Diet and outside the 
constitution. 
Tojo re-stated the official reasons for an election and he explained 
how the government had requested aid from influential persons of all 
professions to try to achieve election objectives. The Political Council 
resulted and, acting independently of the government, it adopted a 
candidate recommendation system. Since the government did not 
participate in that body's formation or its management, Tojo con-
tended that the Council was constitutional. Peerage was not a cri-
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terion for selection. Only fortuitously had Tojo picked 18 peers and 
he did not attempt to evade the spirit of a bicameral legislature. 
While there had been criticism of the Council's members, Tojo be-
lieved that their experience would ultimately prove the most valuable 
in selecting the most suitable candidates. 
Tojo defended calling the election on constitutional and legal 
grounds because incumbents' tenures already had been extended a 
full year past their limit. Ando's charge that most people thought 
that the government rigged the election and the Council, Tojo equated 
with slander (which is what Ando intended) since a majority, ap-
parently silent, understood the government's true motives for calling 
an election. Tojo admitted that the police forbid certain campaign 
topics but this was natural to preserve "law and order" in a "total 
war" system. 
Tojo then dealt with Lower House critical interpellations by means 
of time-honored parliamentary techniques such as prevarication, tech-
nicalities, and evasions, but not with rubber truncheons. Although 
strict wartime controls existed on freedom of expression, dissent, as 
exemplified by Ando's questions, was possible. While the former 
political parties had unquestionably declined in prestige and authority, 
the Diet itself had not necessarily atrophied into a moribund condi-
tion. As an institution it still commanded respect and government 
critics in that body did not just vanish into "the night and the fog."10 
Instead, embarrassing Diet interpellations caused political turmoil in-
dicating that the cabinet and Diet members recognized such queries 
as important elements of the political process. 
On March 25 in the final House of Peers' Plenary Session, Viscount 
Okochi requested Tojo to clarify his government's election policy.11 
The viscount sarcastically noted that taking all the various standards 
for recommending candidates into consideration, the criterion for a 
suitable representative was patriotism. No Japanese lacked that quali-
fication, so there had to be more specific standards. Okochi doubted 
that the Political Council members could be neutral and unbiased 
when selecting candidates and he reiterated Ando's contention that 
the recommendation system was unconstitutional. After all, Okochi 
wondered, wasn't the recommendation system just legalized govern-
ment election interference? It was also a dangerous precedent, he 
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argued, to allow titled peers to recommend Lower House candidates, 
peers themselves not being enfranchised. This might also destroy the 
traditional noninterference policy between Diet chambers. No Jap-
anese, he concluded, would censure the war effort and Tojo's pretext 
that he needed censorship to maintain law and order amounted to an 
easy way for him to stifle public opposition and criticism of his cabi-
net's policies. 
Again the weight of tradition forced both Tojo and Yuzawa to sit 
silently through this withering attack on the cabinet's election policies. 
Then Tojo stood and explained that because the government had no 
connection with the Council it had no influence whatsoever over 
candidate recommendations. The electorate had the final vote on 
whether or not to elect recommended candidates, so the government 
could not rig the election. He concluded by expressing his opinion 
that a blantantly government-fabricated election would only have 
adverse effects on the government's public opinion leadership. 
Next Yuzawa explained that since both nationally and interna-
tionally all eyes focused on the Japanese election, the enemy could 
be expected to try to exploit any public discord for their own ad-
vantage. Consequently, the best possible election had to occur and, 
for that reason, the Home Ministry had to control strictly speeches 
and actions that might create doubts among the public. 
Okochi's interpellation sent shock waves through the Tojo gov-
ernment. If Tojo opted not to answer Okochi, adjourning the House 
of Peers was the sole legal maneuver open to him. That morning 
Privy Seal Kido Koichi received a telephone call from a frantic Cabi-
net Planning Board Director Suzuki Teiichi (1888- ) informing him 
that, due to Okochi's embarrassing questions, the need could arise to 
petition the emperor to recess the House of Peers. Baffled by this 
sudden political whirlwind, Kido hurried to report to the emperor 
at the palace. When he returned from his imperial audience, more 
trouble awaited him as Suzuki called again to notify the court that, 
although the Peers session had just adjourned, with the growing 
anxiety about the Lower House situation where Tojo was replying to 
Ando Masazumi's interpellation, the cabinet was seriously considering 
Lower House dissolution.12 
The entire affair proved fleeting, but it illustrated that Diet obsti-
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nacy and critical interpellations caused Tojo sufficient embarrassment 
to make him consider the drastic step of Lower House dissolution. 
This was especially significant because such an act would have trans-
formed the election into a direct vote of confidence in the Tojo cabinet. 
The 1937 general election, contested on similar grounds, had ended in 
government defeat. 
Tojo's trials with Diet members did not end with the 79th Session. 
A week after the Diet's normal recess, Do\o\ai member Ozaki Yukio 
wrote an open letter to Tojo that denounced the IRAA's and the 
Political Council's "unconstitutional" election activities. These abuses, 
Ozaki believed, would lead to a government fabricated election and 
he advised Tojo to respect the Imperial constitution by abrogating all 
Political Council candidate recommendations as well as by avoiding 
election interference in all its forms.13 The reform rightist camp 
showered even more vituperative and unabashed invective on the 
Political Council and its recommendation system. 
Rightists and Recommendations 
On March 12, a cloudy, overcast day, the Kodo renmei, already under 
police scrutiny for its February polemics against the Political Council, 
opened its Conference to Establish a Clean Election (funsei sen\yo 
\isei \yogi\ai) where members openly maligned zaibatsu and former 
political party leaders' influence in election campaign planning. Akao 
Bin's Ken\o\u\ai issued national instructions to destroy the "old 
political order," although Akao was not especially clear on how to 
accomplish this. Se\isei\ai, Kodo renmei, Tohokai, and Kinno ma-
\oto musubisha (Association of True Loyalists) members joined 
forces for an "Election Purification" evening rally on March 27 in 
Tokyo. Before a crowd of about 100, speakers berated "old order poli-
tics," the zaibatsu, and Tojo's election plans. The police cautioned a 
Kinno speaker for saying Tojo's election plans were unclear and, as 
effectively as the cold March wind, dispersed the rally with a suspen-
sion order after a Tohokai speaker told the crowd that the recommen-
dation system was a means to manipulate the electorate.14 
The police might attempt to stiffle such dissent, but they never 
completely eliminated it. The reform right, although never regarded 
as totally legitimate politically by any prewar Japanese government or 
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by the mainstream party leaders, could voice its radical and even 
outrageous opinions in the streets. At the Diet level, members from 
both chambers asked tough, probing questions about election policies. 
Even after a decade of decline, the Tojo cabinet could not ignore the 
Diet because of the latent political power and the traditional legisla-
tive functions vested in that institution. In sharp relief to other "to-
talitarian" regimes, much as people like General Sato Kenryo might 
have wanted, the Tojo government imposed no Draconian penalties 
on dissenters in the 1942 election campaign. 
Recommending Candidates 
In this milieu of increasing criticism of the Political Council, the 
National Conference of Prefectural Political Council Branch Chiefs 
convened in Tokyo on March 22. They represented nearly 800 hastily 
selected branch members who composed the Council's expedient rec-
ommendation committees' regional network. General Abe told the 
delegates that the recommendation system differed from political 
party endorsement since its standards did not restrict the Council like 
a single political party, but made it national in scope.15 He asked 
the branch chiefs, accordingly, to recommend candidates for the 
prescribed number of Diet seats in each constituency, but if difficulties 
in selection arose, an additional name exceeding the limit of seats 
might be added to their recommendation registers. 
Publicly the recommended candidates should be men of "wide 
experience" who understood \o\utai principles, above regional inter-
ests, and zealous about creating a yo\usan Diet.16 A second, classified 
criteria, however, was the real measuring rod and excluded five types 
from recommendation consideration. 
1. Those who cause fears that lessen national awareness of \o\utai. 
2. Those whose words and deeds are likely to cause confusion in home-
front unity and, thereby, hinder the prosecution of the Holy War. 
3. Those whose words and deeds are likely to cause a decline in public 
trust and confidence in the Political Council. 
4. Persons who have committed crimes or who have a contemptuous 
attitude toward the nation. 
5. Persons who have an insolent attitude toward national affairs. More-
over, any person already rejected by the conference will, of course, be 
excluded from a recommendation.17 
The Political Council headquarters expected its branches, in short, not 
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to consider government opponents and critics for a recommendation 
when they forwarded their unofScial candidate recommendations to 
Tokyo by Tuesday, March 21. 
General Abe also established a special 22-member headquarters 
executive committee to analyze and to select recommended candidates 
both from among branch suggestions and on their own initiative. This 
important committee included all the Lower House representatives on 
the Political Council, namely Katsu Masanori, Maeda Yonezo, Nagai 
Ryutaro, Oasa Tadao, Okada Tadahiko, Ota Masataka, and Yamazaki 
Tatsunosuke.18 Council critics widely regarded their selection as 
"proof that the former party bosses exerted overwhelming influence 
in Council decisions. Opponents insisted that these incumbents really 
joined the Council as Yo\udo representatives in a plot to manufacture 
a new political party following the election.19 
Grounds existed for such allegations. Ota Masataka later claimed 
that he and the other six incumbents on the Council made the final 
selection of recommended candidates.20 He exaggerated since the 
police traced right wingers' recommendations to rightist leaders on 
the Council, but the Diet men did exert influence beyond their num-
bers during candidate selection.21 They held two trumps; a cohesive-
ness of purpose and an indispensable knowledge of the regional and 
national political scene, a knowledge that the Council desperately 
required. 
The antagonism that their presence on the Council caused among 
IRAA and Adults Association members did not offset these advan-
tages but it created endless possibilities for disagreement. The prefec-
tural Political Council branches' membership included an absolute 
majority of IRAA, Adults Association, and Reservist Association 
affiliated individuals.22 This meant that "old political order" opponents 
would regionally endorse candidates who had to be in turn approved 
by the "old order" politicians who dominated the national Political 
Council. Locally the nod went to political newcomers while the 
national level, given the predominate incumbent influence, favored 
the former political party members.23 
At the prefectural level another element juxtaposed to the former 
parties' influence was that of the local army regimental commanders. 
As army representatives, the regimental commanders tried to impose 
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their will on the prefectural governors during the selection of candi-
dates. The army's degree of influence on the recommendation process 
varied from prefecture to prefecture according to the regimental com-
mander's political consciousness, the local governor's strength and 
political convictions, and the candidate standards employed in a par-
ticular region. 
In Gunma Prefecture's case, the regimental commander applied 
significant pressure on the Political Council branch to recommend the 
army's hand-picked candidates. In a showdown between the civilian 
and military prefectural authority, Governor Murata Goro (1899- ), 
utilizing to advantage his role as the man who selected the branch 
members, exerted sufficient leverage on them so that they endorsed 
his candidate selections. Murata chose his candidates after consulting 
with the local community leaders. His simple recommendation cri-
terion was that the candidates not embarrass Gunma Prefecture, mean-
ing that, if recommended, they would be elected. In an interesting 
comment on the regimental commander's political savy, Murata 
remarked that the army's candidates could never be elected.24 In 
nearby Chiba Prefecture, though, the governor chose recommended 
candidates based on their patriotism and on their lack of previous 
connections with the former political parties.25 
Nationally conditions greatly varied but in the prefectural recom-
mendation committee sessions themselves there seems to have been 
no direct army input by the Military Affairs Bureau via the regimental 
commanders. However, indirectly, Reservist Association and Adults 
Association members serving on the Political Council branches rep-
resented the Bureau's opinion about men "suitable" as recommended 
candidates. A former, high ranking military police officer claims 
that Reservist Association recommendations in branch sessions proved 
decisive in "many" cases.26 Generalization about the local branch 
recommendation process remains difficult however since the motif 
was variation, not conformity. 
Based on the records of the Tokyo Prefectural Council, members 
screened perhaps three or four times the number of possible candi-
dates relative to available Diet seats in a particular prefecture. No 
direct link between the previously described police investigations of 
suitable candidates and prefectural council deliberations exists. In 
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Tokyo, for instance, committee members considered candidates for 
recommendation who spanned an ideological gamut from rightist 
rabble rouser Akao Bin to Do\6\ai leader Hatoyama Ichiro. A bench-
mark was previous political experience (this in an election for new 
men) since 51 of the 108 men considered had been municipal or 
prefectural assemblymen.27 
Surprises awaited the national Political Council when prefectural 
branches submitted their candidates. Six branches endorsed Tohd\ai 
or Dd\d\ai members as suitable recommended candidates, even in-
cluding Fukuoka Prefecture's favorite son, and Tojo's bete noir, 
Nakano Seigo.28 It is true that the Council accepted 14 prefectural 
branches' recommendations without amendment but breakdowns 
plagued the system exemplijfied by the Council's rejection of 96 men 
endorsed regionally by the remaining 33 branches, about one of every 
five recommendations. 
Rectification of these differences created in turn further problems. 
It naturally upset branch members when the national Political Council 
judged 62 locally recommended political newcomers as lacking enough 
support to be elected and thus refused to approve their recommenda-
tions. If, conversely, a prefectural branch endorsed mainly incumbents 
for recommendations, it ran the risk of a local backlash. The Tochigi 
Prefectural Branch recommended six incumbents and provoked a 
"fierce reaction" to these selections by the local Adults Association's 
chapter leaders who perceived incumbents as pillars of the "old order" 
inimical to reform. In Nagano's Second Electoral District, where the 
branch endorsed three incumbents for the constituency's three seats, 
the Adults Association "exploded" in dissatisfaction against recom-
mended candidates. Similar Adults Association resentment over pre-
fectural recommendations flared in Yamagata and Iwate Prefectures.29 
Elsewhere, indicative of the wide divergence in candidate standards, 
the "new men" endorsed for recommendation turned out to be from 
the prefectural assembly ranks which prompted allegations that their 
selection occurred on regional not national considerations.30 Other 
branches, trying to short-circuit the "old order" jiban system, recom-
mended new men at incumbents', especially Yo\udo members, ex-
pense. This happened in Kumamoto's First Constituency where 
members bypassed Oasa Tadao and replaced the district's five incum-
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bents with four new men and a former Diet member. The national 
Political Council rejected four of these selections and awarded Oasa 
a recommendation. 
Another branch ploy involved nominating junior Yo\udo mem-
bers ("second class personalities" according to the press) instead of 
the former party leaders.31 In Fukuoka, for instance, the branch did 
recommend Yo\udo members but not Katsu Masanori and a similar 
case occurred in Tochigi. Once again, the national Political Council 
reinstated the senior party man. 
The candidate recommendation system exacerbated the existing 
political tensions. Endorsing incumbents for recommendations caused 
reformists to grumble and vice versa. Awarding "new men" recom-
mendations sparked anger among incumbents who rightly felt their 
careers threatened. Harmony between national and regional councils 
proved exceptional. This merely portended more angry howls when 
the Political Council announced its officially recommended candidates. 
Political Council headquarters finally completed its official recom-
mendations when it publicly endorsed 466 candidates including 235 
incumbents (208 Yo\udo), 18 former Diet men, and 213 so-called 
"new men." In 10 constituencies, however, the Council named one 
more recommended candidate than available seats, but in 10 other 
districts it chose one less candidate relative to available seats.32 In the 
latter instances, the Council regarded incumbents like Mie's Second 
District Ozaki Yukio as simply too strong for any recommended candi-
date to dislodge. 
The 306 member Yo\udo lost almost 100 members (51 retirees 
included) but there remained a .marked continuity of the former 
major political party leaders.33 The Council recommended all former 
Seiyu\ai and Minseito leaders, excluding the Do\d\ai's Hatoyama 
Ichiro. If defunct parties' board of directors membership may be used 
to measure political importance, only three established former party 
figures, the Seiyu\aifs Kumagai Naota (1866-1945) and Takami Yuki-
michi (1880-1962) and former Minseito official Yagi Itsuro (1863-1945) 
failed to receive recommendations. 
Among the remaining 27 recommended incumbents, 10 came from 
the Giin \urabu, four from the Koa giin \ai and 13 were inde-
pendents. Ota Masataka helped to secure recommendations for his 
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own Giin \urabu members. The Council recommended only four of 
the 37 former Socialist Masses Party incumbents and no Do\6\ai or 
Toho\ai affiliated Dietmen. 
Yo\udo leaders sacrificed first and second term Diet members to 
insure that the Political Council recommended its own mid and upper 
echelon members, namely the disbanded parties' former leaders and 
their trusted lieutenants. These men would form the backbone of any 
new, post-election political party. The Political Council's lack of any 
substantive regional organization made such a compromise possible.34 
The Council's jury-rigged prefectural branches were a stop-gap meas-
ure. As the Miya\o grudgingly recognized, only compromise and 
cooperation with the established Diet influences could create a political 
power base for the war effort.35 In such a symbiotic relationship, the 
Council benefited from the incumbents' political expertise and regional 
jiban connections to conduct an orderly election campaign that would 
provide a favorable external appearance. Conversely, the Yo\udo 
needed the Council's blessing to baptize its "old order" politicians with 
the recommendation waters of political rebirth as new order repre-
sentatives. 
Yo\udo leaders did take care of their own. Among the 208 rec-
ommended Yokudo members, almost all had served at least three 
terms. A comparison of respective candidates age groups well illus-
trated this phenomenon. Almost 70% of recommended candidates 
were over 50 years of age, but only 49% of independents were over 50.36 
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All recommended candidates over 70 were Yo\udo members, 
including Machida Chuji at 80. Newspapers reflected the disappoint-
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ment over such recommendations by lamenting that the candidates' 
age lacked the "expected freshness" that the ballyhoo about building 
a new Diet seemed to have promised. The Nichi Nichi newspaper 
regretted that recommended candidates were older than the public 
expected.37 
Only a few prominent Diet figures were non-recommendation 
casualties. Perhaps the best known was Yo\udo member Kazami 
Akira (1886-1961), a key promoter of Konoe's new order. The 
Ibaraki Prefectural Branch did recommend him, but the national 
Political Council vetoed the endorsement.38 Other nationally known 
incumbents either retired from Diet politics, like the Yo\udos Adachi 
Kenzo (1868-1948), or ran unsuccessfully as independents, like the 
Giin \urabus Akamatsu Katsumaro, when they did not receive recom-
mendations. 
Yo\udo leaders used their positions on the Political Council's na-
tional recommendation committee to turn the recommendation system 
into a patronage operation. So doing enabled them to extend and to 
enhance further their own Diet authority and personal control. Simul-
taneously, by withholding recommendations from freshmen and soph-
omore Diet members who, after all, had tried to wrest control of the 
Diet's management from the former party leaders in 1941, the Yo-
\udo chiefs removed the Young Turks who briefly had threatened 
their powers. "New men" would be easier to deal with than proven 
foes. 
A composite, candidate drawn from the 213 so-called "new men" 
probably had some connection with the IRAA or Adults Association 
as 158 "new men" did. However, since such membership was non-
exclusive, the candidate's vocation probably was politics because 59 
"new men" were prefectural or municipal assemblymen. There was 
one chance in six that he was a landholding "agriculturalist," but only 
one in 20 that he was a retired military officer. Bureaucrats like Com-
merce and Industry Minister Kishi Nobusuke (1896- ) and Agri-
culture and Forestry Minister Ino Hiroya (1891- ) did garner many 
recommendations.39 That 29 Political Council regional branch direc-
tors or members resigned their positions in order to become candidates 
and 24 of them, all new men, received recommendations suggests that 
plain, old fashioned connections helped in getting a recommendation.40 
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Applied to recommended candidates then, the euphemistic term 
"new man" really designated a candidate who had not previously 
stood for office in a national election. In that restrictive sense, the 
recommended "new men" were old wine rebottled; they were influ-
ential community leaders or prefectural and municipal assemblymen 
who had clear political party lineages. Council opponents interpreted 
such selections as political patronage and thus believed that such candi-
dacies might be exactly like the former political party men whom they 
were supposed to replace.41 Typical was the reaction of the Miya\o 
reporter who complained that the presence of so many regional 
property owners among the recommended candidates made politics 
a game only for the rich. He illustrated his point with the telling 
historical analogy that had the Meiji Restoration leaders been alive in 
1942, they would not have been able to become recommended candi-
dates since they came from society's lower classes.42 
Reactions 
Regionally, the Adults Association led the angry outburst directed 
against the Political Council's recommended candidates. Members 
opposed these selections because they represented the notorious "elec-
tion-first philosophy" and made it inevitable that the Political Council 
recommended "old order candidates." This in turn forced Adults 
Association members to perform their election responsibilities under 
the Political Council's unreasonable orders.43 
General Abe lacked the politician's touch when he candidly ad-
mitted Political Council shortcomings. Abe's mood matched the 
dismal rainy day as he vented his personal frustration at an April 6 
press conference postmortem of the candidate recommendation results. 
He complained about the lack of time to complete proper election 
preparations, having only eight days from branch formation to candi-
date recommendation. Furthermore, potential candidates were un-
evenly distributed, some places having a surplus and others a scarcity 
of suitable political talent. The latter condition forced the Council to 
endorse unsatisfactory candidates. On the positive side, the Council 
had tried its best and henceforth it would help inexperienced "new 
men" it had recommended to get elected.44 What Abe meant was 
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that the Political Council failed to achieve its homefront unity objec-
tives. 
Although the Yo\udo dominated the recommendation process, the 
remaining 231 Diet seats represented a rich prize. No single group 
in Japan believed themselves more deserving of all of these recom-
mendations than reform right wingers. They overestimated their 
strength based on their conviction that they were the prime movers of 
the Pacific War and the electorate would repay them at the ballot 
box. Although rightists apparently never tired of streetcorner ha-
rangues, seemingly no one was listening since collectively rightists had 
witnessed a decline in popular support for their programs and they 
believed that the Political Council and the Tojo government were 
ignoring them.45 That last assumption was among their most accurate. 
Reform and traditional factions fared poorly in Political Council 
deliberations. The Political Council recommended only 28 reform 
rightists but the police classified only two of nine incumbents and 11 
of 19 "new men" as activists, the remainder being nominally rightist. 
Most prominent among the "new men" were Hashimoto Kingoro 
and Shiratori Toshio (1887-1949), the retired diplomat who had been 
a leading proponent of an Axis alliance. 
Still, it perhaps was better to be ignored than to be banned. That 
March the Home Minister, based on the December laws, did refuse 
the Ri\ken yosei\ai permission for political status because: 
The Nichiren religio-political organization's avowed aim being a po-
litical dictatorship by 1947 profanes respect for \o\utai. Under total war 
it has an evil influence on the public's ideas and the association is anti-
national policy in its speech and activities.46 
The organization's size, 650 branches with 200,000 members, probably 
concerned Tojo and the Home Ministry more than its philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the Home Ministry did allow Society members to stand 
for election provided they did so as individuals and not as Ki\\en 
yosei\ai members. Ri\ken yoseikai Director Tanaka Sawaji (1887-
1955) promptly took advantage of that loophole in the Police Security 
Law to run 37 candidates, ostensibly as unaffiliated independents. 
Traditional rightist associations never displayed much enthusiasm 
for the election since they regarded elections as merely Western cor-
ruptions that obstructed the true manifestation of direct imperial 
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rule.47 Police did identify, however, 29 recommended traditional 
rightists, but described 17 incumbents or former Diet members as just 
nominal rightists.48 Political Council member Ida Iwakusa, an official 
of the anti-communist Mizuho \urabu (Japan Club), secured recom-
mendations for a politically obscure quartet of his Club's members. 
Ida also worked with Ota Kozo to obtain recommendations for three 
Kokusai han\yo renmei (International Anti-Communist League) 
members, including retired army Lieutenant General Shioden Nobu-
taka (1879-1962), the notorious anti-Semite.49 
The reform and traditional right's failure to establish political 
respectability made their candidates unacceptable to the Political Coun-
cil. Popular sentiment regarded the right as irresponsible and outside 
the electoral process, especially after rightist violence during the pre-
ceding decade. Rightists themselves believed that their rejection was 
due to the former party leaders' influence on the Political Council. 
Convinced that the electorate would support them, 168 reform right-
ists still stood for election, an increase of 130 candidates over 1937.50 
About 60% came from the Tohokai (45), Ri\\en yoseikai (37), and 
Sefyseifyi (17). The remaining 69 candidates represented a hodge-
podge of insignificant rightist splinter groups. Police analysts dismissed 
the 20 traditional rightist independents as inactive rightist sympa-
thizers.51 If the reform rightists, hoping to capitalize on wartime emo-
tions, stumbled over each other hurrying to the campaign trail, a 
majority of non-recommended incumbents opted not to run for re-
election. 
The Do\6\ai and the former Socialist Masses Party members' 
inability to secure recommendations discouraged them from again 
standing for office. Seven Dd\d\ai members retired and two others 
defected from the party in hopes of receiving Political Council rec-
ommendations although neither did.52 The party endorsed no "new 
men" and only 28 of its 37 incumbents ran for re-election. Similarly, 
only 40 former Socialist Masses Party members became candidates as 
compared to 66 in 1937. Leading figures of the disbanded party like 
Miwa Jyuso and Asanuma Inejiro (1898-1960) decided not to run for 
re-election. Ironically, the police evaluated both men as "suitable candi-
dates" most likely because of Miwa's IRAA office and Asanuma's 
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Diet vote supporting Saito Takao's (1870-1949) censure for a 1940 Diet 
speech that criticized the Japanese army's China policy.53 
Candidate Motivations 
While a majority of non-recommended incumbents decided not to 
seek re-election, just the opposite held true among independents. The 
entry of 384 unaffiliated candidates into the election race was a genuine 
surprise but one that seemed to negate the Political Council's raison 
d'etre. Without political parties to restrict candidacies, political com-
mentators expected the Council to prevent "riff-raff candidates" from 
disrupting the election.54 Legally, however, the Council could not 
prohibit qualified persons from standing for election and ultimately 
a record number of 1,079 candidates contested the Diet's 466 seats in 
1942.55 The Home Ministry labeled 645 of these "new men," with 213 
recommended candidates, 39 Tdhd\ai, and nine from other reform 
rightist political parties (Ko\usui taishuto, five, Dai Nipponto (Great 
Japan Party), three, and Ken\o\u\ai, one). 
The Political Council inhibited incumbents but apparently few 
others since 418 men filed their candidacies on April 4, the first day 
to do so, compared to just 63 at the comparable point during the 1937 
election. Their numbers bewildered political commentators who 
incorrectly predicted that a considerable number of these new, inde-
pendent candidates would quit the campaign by the April 19 deadline 
for filing a candidacy or for withdrawing from the campaign without 
forfeiture of the required 2,000 yen election bond.56 That prediction 
ranked with those of a self-styled diviner who told the Peers Club in 
January that there would be an armistice by 1944 and no problems 
for Prime Minister To jo. 
These independents, while younger than their recommended op-
ponents, were not necessarily political newcomers since 106 came from 
prefectural assembly ranks. A complete occupational candidate break-
down was lacking, but among all independents there were more 
writers (56 to 12 recommended), newspapermen (26 to 12), and law-
yers (76 to 21) than among recommended candidates. Conversely, 
more recommended candidates had IRAA affiliations (247 to 108) 
than independents.57 Candidate motivations were as diverse as their 
backgrounds. 
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According to General Abe, the favorable public reaction to the 
Tojo cabinet's pre-election campaign rhetoric generated the motivation 
for a record number of new men to stand for office.58 Prime Minister 
Tojo's publicly expressed wish for a fresh, new Diet indicated an 
attitude of respect for the Diet and that in turn encouraged candi-
dacies.59 So-called new men reasoned that, as political newcomers un-
tainted by the old political order's abuses, their election would cleanse 
the Diet reputation stigmatized by the professional politicians. 
Political parties' absence also enhanced newcomers' chances to be-
come viable candidates because parties could no longer monopolize 
the election process by their stranglehold on the candidate nomination 
system.60 Ideally, their nonexistence precluded deals on jiban areas 
and it was even possible, in theory, to destroy the hated jiban web. 
Such reformist sentiments bore the imprint of Prince Konoe's new 
order movement that had politicized the younger generation. Altru-
ism, expressed as a desire for political reform, provided a strong moti-
vation for becoming a candidate.61 
The concept of Diet renovation by reformist newcomers als6 
swelled candidate ranks. It was the first general election in five years 
and probably created a feeling among newcomers that this was their 
best, and perhaps only, chance for election to the Diet. The extraordi-
nary length of time between general elections whetted the political 
appetites of these lean and hungry newcomers and made them unusu-
ally eager to run for office, although their appetites usually proved 
better than their digestion. Reform rightists exemplified those who 
perceived the Greater East Asia War as justifying their claims for 
just rewards from the Japanese political system. Moreover, the rhe-
torical emphasis on rebuilding East Asia and on the war entering 
a new, constructive stage seemed to imbue the election with a historic 
significance that helped to attract candidates who wanted to partake 
in that glorious enterprise. 
All candidates did not, naturally, run for altruistic motives. Among 
independent candidates, and definitely among Tdhd\ai, Ri\\en yosei-
\ai, and reform right splinter parties, men ran for office because of 
their deep dissatisfaction with the Political Council's candidate rec-
ommendation system. On a more visceral level, Akao Bin said that 
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the election campaign provided him with a public forum that facili-
tated his criticism of the Tojo government.62 
Traditional Japanese election practices, still in evidence today, also 
increased candidate totals. Perhaps as many as ten percent of all 
candidates realized that they had no chance whatsoever of being 
elected, but ran anyway just to gain the public exposure the election 
campaign provided. By making themselves known to the voters, they 
had a headstart in the upcoming municipal elections, their real elec-
toral goal.63 The so-called "single flag groups" (jchi hata gum'i) candi-
dates also had very restricted interests and planned to devote their 
campaigns to limited, pragmatic, future goals. More of such types 
than usual appeared in 1942 because the wartime inflation made the 
2,000 yen election bond a less prohibitive financial barrier than it had 
been in past elections. It was for such candidates, who might cor-
rectly be described as "power aspirants," cheap advertising.64 
Finally, the government's attitude toward the record candidate 
numbers was ambiguous since so many candidates might be liable to 
provoke disorder, proving difficult to control. If, however, candidates 
did not disrupt the election or incite public disorder, the Tojo cabinet 
probably welcomed the additional candidacies. More candidates meant 
more opportunities to disseminate official policy and more chances to 
involve all segments of society in a didactic election campaign to pro-
mote homefront unity for the war effort. 
The record candidate turnover indicates, in a quantitative manner, 
that the Diet was still regarded as an effective political institution and 
that a Diet seat was a significant position. If potential candidates 
believed otherwise, they would, it seems, shun the burden of time, 
energy, and money that was necessary to compete successfully for a 
Diet seat. A blend of idealism, that they could do better than their 
predecessors, and realism, that only within the existing political struc-
ture could they implement their ideas, permeated newcomers' ranks. 
Professional politicians may have been held in low esteem, but the 
institution of the Diet was not. 
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Chapter V 
The 1 9 4 2 Election Campaign: An Overview 
Election Promotion 
Total warfare failed to disrupt traditional Japanese election cam-
paigning techniques. Campaign rally, supply, and topic restrictions 
however did seem to dampen public enthusiasm for the candidates. 
Voters found it difficult to identify with an election campaign that 
lacked the free swinging competition characteristic of political party 
elections. They missed the campaign's accustomed holiday atmosphere.1 
Superficially, one could notice election preparations as streetcars 
and city buses dashed about Tokyo decorated with reminders to vote. 
When taking tickets, bus girls politely told passengers to be sure to 
vote.2 Enlightenment campaign rallies dotted the city and, despite 
a restricted male suffrage, women's groups occupied streetcorners urg-
ing passers-by to vote. School children were even mobilized to bring 
home classroom explanations about the campaign. Huge election 
message streamers bedecked IRAA Headquarters and even the Metro-
politan Police Board's forboding red turret. The staid Home Minis-
try building itself unfurled a massive banner reading "Your Vote 
Builds Greater East Asia." That unimaginative slogan symbolized the 
election campaign's problem. 
The Tojo cabinet and the Home Ministry apparently believed that 
quantity could compensate for quality and consequently deluged voters 
with a flood of campaign lectures, pamphlets, radio broadcasts, ban-
ners, posters, and newspaper stories. The enlightenment campaign 
itself seemed like a brilliant innovation for it legally mobilized public 
associations like the IRAA and the Adults Association for essentially 
political ends. However, although the enlightenment campaign by 
starting in early March extended didactic campaigning, it pre-empted 
the election campaign that opened on April 4. This early start probably 
overtaxed popular interest in the campaign because it proved impos-
sible to sustain such high pitched enthusiasm for two months. Like a 
slowly developing \abufy drama, stretching out the election campaign 
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perhaps appealed to election connoisseurs but left the layman a bit 
bored. 
Too many other distractions tempted the public for election rhetoric 
to monopolize its attention. War news filled several newspaper col-
umns every day. The day lacking some spectacular military feat 
offered the Information Bureau its chance to stir up chauvinism by 
releasing individual heroic exploits. For instance, in early April a 
well coordinated propaganda campaign capitalized on the exploits of 
the midget submarine crews, the so-called Pearl Harbor war gods, 
conveniently omitting that a United States prisoner of war camp at 
present rudely enshrined one "god." Furthermore, in the spring of 
1942, it was business as usual on the homefront as movies, \abu\i 
theater, concert recitals, and operas drew packed houses. More im-
mediate concerns also consumed public time and patience exemplified 
by more people willing to line up to buy wafer-thin rice crackers from 
a streetcorner vendor than to hear an election speech.3 Then, of course, 
the annual outings to view the springtime cherry blossoms drew vast 
crowds to public parks and away from election and enlightenment 
campaigns. Life was maddeningly normal. 
IRAA and Adults Association efforts to make voters aware of the 
election had mixed results. Both organizations headquarters' staff 
members originally tried to combine their forces for the enlightenment 
campaign. A Committee to Accomplish a Yo\usan Election (Yo\usan 
sen\yo \antetsu undo iin\ai) did sponsor a mass meeting at Tokyo's 
Hibiya Park in mid-March, although light drizzle held down at-
tendance.4 Regionally, a lack of cooperation characterized the two 
associations as each implemented its local level campaign as it saw 
fit, forming joint committees in only 16 of 47 prefectures.5 
The IRAA's election platform conformed identically with the 
previously announced cabinet election plans. Organizationally, the 
IRAA established eight regional campaign districts where throughout 
March IRAA national representatives provided campaign direction 
for regional branches.6 Its campaign tried to mobilize voters by ap-
pealing to their sense of duty to vote and emphasizing that the voters 
could help to eradicate "foreign ideas" like individualism, liberalism, 
and democracy. "Those we want to run" not "Those who want to 
run" became the IRAA's slogan and that probably represented its 
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most lasting contribution to the 1942 campaign. The former candidates 
were those of national outlook as opposed to the latter self-seeking 
opportunists. Identifiable characteristics of such "unsuitable candi-
dates" were a lack of commitment to Japan's immutable national pol-
icy, cynicism about national renovation, and possession of jiban built 
on favoritism, money, or abuses of public office.7 
Plays, movies, lectures, pamphlets, and neighborhood association 
billboard posters spread the IRAA's enlightenment campaign and it 
sponsored over 300 meetings nationally.8 In late February, the IRAA 
had requested the public to submit election slogans and by March 3 
claimed to have received about 100,000 entries. Additionally, in late 
March, it called on all reservists and local town and village organiza-
tions to promote the "general election's ethical elevation," but response 
lagged as only 10 prefectures did so.9 
Press reports described the "enlightenment campaign" as inactive 
in Aomori, weak in Hiroshima, and, more ominously, poor attendance 
marked Miyagi's campaign as did friction causing "rumors" between 
its IRAA and Adults Association branches.10 Throughout March, an 
enlightenment campaign featuring movies and political drama toured 
Fukuoka Prefecture, but, in mid-April, reporters noticed that no co-
ordinated campaign had developed there.11 In Hokkaido, Chiba, and 
Tochigi, the public "was not dancing to the enlightenment campaign 
piper's tune."12 
The major cities were, at best, lukewarm about "enlightenment." 
In Kobe the lack of campaign atmosphere mystified reporters. Osaka 
observed little enlightenment activity which was better than the "non-
existent enlightenment campaign" in Nagoya and Yokohama. Despite 
IRAA lectures, dramas, and movies to promote the didactic campaign, 
Kyoto's political consciousness was "abominable." Similar events in 
Tokyo Prefecture also failed to generate much enthusiasm for the 
election.13 
There were some successes. Aiichi Prefecture, outside Nagoya City, 
reported an active IRAA effort, and, in neighboring Gifu public lec-
tures drummed home the election's importance. Gunma's IRAA 
branch staged plays, movies, and traditional Japanese music concerts 
to attract audiences for enlightenment lectures. It also combined busi-
ness with politics by conducting war bond sales at enlightenment 
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rallies with excellent results, especially in the remoter districts.14 Like-
wise, in Iwate Prefecture, the ever popular "picture story shows" 
(/{ami shibai) were mobilized for the election effort.15 
Like its parent body, the IRAA's enlightenment campaign was 
mediocre, and ultimately unable to accomplish its goals. The enlight-
enment and subsequent election campaigns highlighted the IRAA's 
decline compared to the Adults Association ascent. 
The war encouraged the Adults Association to launch its boisterous 
campaign. Its local chapter leaders perceived the wartime election as 
their chance to smash the regional political status quo exemplified by 
the incumbent politician's jiban. In those rural areas where it enjoyed 
traditional backing, the Adults Association exhibited the ability to 
promote an animated campaign, but it also revealed a tendency to 
bully opponents into silence. 
In Nagano and Gunma Prefectures, the Adults Association con-
ducted a lively enlightenment campaign and in Nara and Kanagawa 
Prefectures openly campaigned against incumbents. It probably was 
strongest and most active in Kagoshima where the worst campaign 
interference excesses occurred. The association dominated local en-
lightenment campaigns and ran roughshod over its IRAA counter-
parts.16 
As self-styled vanguards of reform, Adults Association members 
inevitably clashed openly with the Political Council over the latter's 
candidate recommendations. Prefectural units ignored or flaunted the 
Council's selections for recommended candidates. In Shimane Pre-
fecture, for instance, the Adults Association vice-director refused to 
support the Council's recommended candidates. Instead he ran him-
self as an independent backed by the association, thus splitting the 
association and the Political Council during the election campaign. 
The Political Council recommended too many incumbents for the 
Aomori Adults Association so they refused to support recommended 
candidates. Likewise, in Fukushima Prefecture, the Adults Associa-
tion quarreled with the Council because it failed to recommend "new 
men" as candidates and association members even asserted that they 
had the right to support their own candidates.17 While such cases of 
outright defiance were probably exceptional, the Adults Association 
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plainly used its regional advantages as much to advance its own cause 
as it used them to promote the yo\usan election. 
Adults Association election related activity was much more dynamic 
in the countryside than in the large cities. Even in the hinterlands 
though, it failed to produce a uniform "enlightenment" movement, 
notable failures occurring in Saitama and Chiba Prefectures.18 During 
the actual election campaign, Adults Association members disrupted 
independent and even certain recommended candidates' campaign 
rallies, resulting in numerous allegations of illegal campaign interfer-
ence being lodged against it. 
The Political Council's Campaign 
The Political Council devoted its main efforts to helping its 213 
recommended political newcomers' election campaigns. The fact that 
these new men were unfamiliar with national level campaigning 
prompted the Council to explain its well organized and disciplined 
campaign overview in a primer distributed to all candidates. Starting 
with the very basics, the primer instructed candidates on how to file 
their \oho, a critical matter for the candidate had to file one with the 
election authorities in his district and it constituted his platform as 
well as introducing the newcomer to the voting public. General Abe 
and prefectural Council branch leaders endorsed all testimonials. Ad-
ditionally, both prefectural and the national Council branches mailed 
3,220,000 postcards to voters encouraging them to choose recommended 
candidates on election day. Each branch sent at least 5,000 cards per 
candidate and in the 90 districts where recommended candidates 
seemed on the borderline of defeat or victory, 10,000 additional cards 
were mailed to voters. This latter mailing occurred in the final, 
crucial election stage and the Council specifically designed it to impress 
the electorate with the Council's organization and national coordina-
tion. On the negative side, it buried prospective voters in a blizzard of 
junk mail and election prose. It was again quantity replacing quality, 
political overkill. Even as avid a student of political affairs as Meiji 
University professor Yabe Teiji (1902-1967) balked at reading the 
campaign literature for all 23 candidates in Tokyo's fifth ward.19 
As for the actual electioneering, Council members, including Abe, 
Goto Fumio, Suetsugu Nobumasa, and Nagai Ryutaro made phono-
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graph recordings that recommended candidates in turn could use at 
their campaign rallies. The records' themes ranged from the necessity 
of Diet renovation to Nagai's polemic calling on all Asians to unite 
to smash Britain and America. Every recommended candidate also 
received a political handbook that covered election campaigning tech-
niques with homey advice on topics like how to organize election 
committees, to select campaign rally locations, or to endorse candi-
dates. 
The Council planned the election campaign in three phases. Phase 
one would fix the candidate in the voters' minds through a series of 
district wide campaign rallies and endorsements. Next the candidate 
would promote his election by campaigning district wide for ten days. 
Phase three, coinciding with the campaign's final days was considered 
the most important so the candidate had to concentrate his campaign 
rallies in the district's key precincts. Recommended candidates antici-
pating close races with independent rivals in severely contested elec-
tions had to avoid mutual destruction by uniting with other recom-
mended candidates against the independents, a proviso strikingly 
similar to the former parties' jiban deals. Council branch units also 
assessed independent candidates' campaigns and reported their findings 
to recommended candidates' campaign directors. They in turn adapted 
their candidates' campaign to exploit opponents' weaknesses. If con-
fronted by a superior independent candidate, recommended ones 
should "invade" the independent's jiban by using local community 
leaders as speakers at their campaign rallies.20 It may have been an 
election for new men, but the electioneering techniques were as old as 
Japan's first general election. 
Each recommended candidate allegedly received at least 5,000 and 
perhaps more than 10,000 yen for their campaign expenses from a 
special secret army fund. Details of this secret fund (\imitsu\in) 
remainded clouded. Hashimoto Seinosuke claimed that Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Hoshino Naoki disbursed the funds while another account 
credits the prefectural Home Ministry general affairs director with dis-
tributing the money. The alleged "slush fund" may have totaled 10 
million yen, coincidentally the amount of a similar election slush fund 
that the Seiyukai Party leaders used to bankroll their 1928 candidates 
to the tune of 30,000 to 50,000 yen each.21 
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Recommended candidates, probably because of their advantages, 
began their campaigns tardily and from April 4 to 10 left the field to 
their independent opponents. Weather turned against the Council as 
wind and rain held down attendance at an April 10 mass rally at 
Tokyo's Hibiya Park. After such a lackadaisical start, the recom-
mended candidates spent the next two weeks making up lost ground. 
On April 12 polls showed about 60% of recommended candidates 
(mainly incumbents) would be elected but a week later that figure 
reached 75%, or about 350 candidates. General Abe managed to avoid 
any political miscues by contenting himself to remark on the decided 
turn for the better that the campaign had taken.22 Polls confirmed the 
strength of recommended incumbents and former Diet members with 
182 winning and 35 of the other 59 still having good prospects for 
election. Among new men, however, only 40 clearly led their inde-
pendent rivals with 130 contested races too close to call.23 
The campaign rally constituted the Political Council's main means 
of assisting recommended newcomers' campaigns. During 19 days, 
in April, the Council sponsored approximately 460 major rallies and 
11,000 rallies of all kinds throughout Japan. The majority of rallies 
occurred during the campaign's final ten days when the Council 
staged a political blitz\reig against independent opponents in a na-
tionally coordinated finale. General Abe did his part by sending tele-
grams to all branch chiefs and recommended candidates praising their 
efforts and assuring them of his conviction of inevitable victory.24 
Benefiting from central guidance and lavish campaign funds, rec-
ommended candidates' greatest advantage was the coordination func-
tion provided by the national Council. All other political organizations 
lacked that capacity and, indeed, parties like the Do\6\ai or public 
associations like the Ri\\en yosei\ai did not enter a national candidate 
slate. Locally, the Council still had to cooperate with regional influ-
ences like accommodating incumbents who became recommended 
candidates, prefectural governors' desires, and local Adults Association 
and IRAA ambitions. 
Regional influences bent, but did not break, under national pressure 
from the Political Council and the Tojo government. The Council 
itself never penetrated the local political arena, rather wisely leaving 
that complex and sensitive operation to its prefectural branches staffed 
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by local community leaders. Despite rhetoric about "new men" with 
national, not sectional, outlooks, even recommended candidates with-
out significant local support and cooperation, the traditional election 
criteria, could not expect easy victories. Against an entrenched political 
jiban, a recommendation and Council backing did not guarantee 
success as testified to by the defeat of 44 recommended newcomers. 
Neither did an incumbent's recommendation insure re-election as 
demonstrated by the defeat of 35 recommended incumbents (33 
Yo\udo). Council opponents seriously contested the election, some-
thing unheard of in a show election. 
Non-Recommended Candidates 
The earliest election planning committees considered the Do\o\ai 
the potential anti-government party.25 Its February stand against the 
recommendation system and Ando Masazumi's March Diet interpella-
tion confirmed the previous police estimates that the Do\o\ai was 
intrinsically anti-government. Identified in the public mind as "lib-
eral," the Do\6\ai endorsed no "new men" as candidates, making it 
easy to stigmatize it as a prop for the old order. Internal factionalism 
added to the party's handicaps. Nevertheless, the 28 Do\o\ai incum-
bents standing for re-election refused to acquiesce meekly to official 
pressure and to become shills for national unity in a didactic election 
campaign. Criticism of domestic policy, especially the recommenda-
tion system, characterized the party's campaign oratory. The Do\o\ai 
unreservedly supported the war effort, but it disagreed with the Tojo 
cabinet's homefront policies.26 
Ozaki Yukio, unquestionably the most unabashed government 
critic, personified this Dokpkai position. His open letter to Tojo was 
one example. In campaign speeches, Ozaki's forte, he attacked the 
recommendation system as being the equivalent of a government 
appointment to the Diet and, consequently, a denial of the Lower 
House's representative function.27 His \dho, reduced to an incompre-
hensible jumble as the police censored it in 27 places, was yet another 
example of his stubborn determination to resist vigorously government 
attempts to manipulate the election. Ozaki brazenly denounced any 
government interference in independent candidates' election cam-
paigns and wrote that liberalism's detractors in fact criticized the 
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Meiji Emperor's greatest work, the constitution. After all, he argued, 
no matter how long the war lasted, the nation and the constitution 
would exist in perpetuity and they had to be safeguarded. 
Ozaki could appeal to the constitution's authority for that sacro-
sanct document still commanded the respect of all segments of Japa-
nese society as a gift publicly bestowed on loyal subjects by the revered 
Emperor Meiji. War had not altered that fact. Instead, through-
out the election and throughout the war, institutionalized law, ulti-
mately embodied in the constitution, remained intact. Both the 
Tojo government and its opponents like Ozaki recognized constitu-
tional provisions, although applying different interpretations to them.28 
Government condoned election excesses in previous elections and in 
1942 no more nullified the Meiji Constitution than similar excesses 
in the United States might void that constitution. 
Generally, the Dd\d\ai suffered from a lack of publicity in news-
papers and popular magazines. These treated Do\6\ai candidates, 
with a few notable exceptions, as an indistinct part of the independent 
candidates' generic whole. The attention the party did receive was 
usually negative as the press criticized its failure to coordinate a cam-
paign. D6\6\ai standard bearers really ran as individuals and perhaps 
16 or 17 candidates could expect to be elected by virtue of their strong, 
personal jiban connections.29 Otherwise political observers scorned 
the party's inability to arouse any feeling among the electorate.30 
This latter defect, in part, was due to official interference directed 
against Do\6\ai candidates. 
Interference was a recurrent phenomenon in prewar Japanese elec-
toral politics. It might be either "negative" or "positive" in applica-
tion. The former meant that the police strictly enforced the minutest 
regulations against one faction or party, but were lax to the point of 
condoning election violations by their opponents. The latter type in-
volved the direct intervention of police or local government authorities 
in a campaign for the advantage of specific candidates. Examples of 
such activity to affect decisively the election were campaign rally 
suspension or obstruction, voter intimidation, vote solicitation, cam-
paign disruption, or arresting candidates. 
Do\6\ai candidates had to campaign under the close scrutiny of 
the police who allegedly ignored election infringements committed 
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by Dokpkai opponents; in Kagoshima, Nagasaki, Kyoto, and Niigata, 
police reportedly ignored recommended candidates' violations at cam-
paign rallies and those same candidates' campaign workers' viola-
tions.31 In Toyama, police took no action against a recommended 
candidate who gave away free sake at his campaign office throughout 
the electioneering period.32 The candidate had enough sense to stop 
temporarily this spirit flow so that grateful, if hungover, voters might 
repay him at the polls. Voters, in fact, did elect him, perhaps antici-
pating his victory party. 
As for "positive interference," prefectural governors in Gunma and 
Kagoshima allegedly instructed community leaders and public em-
ployees for whom to vote; the Wakayama governor ordered Civilian 
Guard (Keibodan) units to obstruct independents' campaigns and to 
solicit votes for recommended candidates; in Nagano, Gunma, To-
yama, Yamagata, Kumamoto, and Nagasaki the police canvassed for 
votes for recommended candidates. The latter incensed one voter so 
much that he nullified his ballot by hurriedly scrawling, "The Police 
are recommended candidates' campaigners!"33 
The most sensational 1942 example of "positive interference," how-
ever, was Ozaki Yukio's arrest for alleged lese majeste. Secure in his 
Mie jiban, Ozaki came to Tokyo to stump for Third District Doko\ai 
candidate Tagawa Daikichiro's campaign. On April 12 and 13, speak-
ing before crowds of around 400 persons, Ozaki denounced the recom-
mendation system, exhorted his audience to preserve the constitution, 
and, using the Chinese proverb that the third generation squanders 
the inheritance, recalled that the present Showa Emperor was the third 
generation since the Meiji Restoration and thus it required extra vigi-
lance to defend constitutional government. Police attending the rally 
made stenographic copies of his speeches, and, after two unheeded 
"Cautions" during the April 13 rally, ordered the meeting suspended. 
Afterwards, Ozaki returned to Mie but the Thought Police subse-
quently ordered him to appear in Tokyo to answer lese majeste 
charges.34 Released while the prosecutors prepared their case, Ozaki 
returned to Mie to campaign successfully for re-election despite police 
attempts to disrupt his campaign by arresting him. 
Against such interference that was a continuing fact of Japanese 
political life, the Do\6\ai countered with joint assistance tactics. A 
93 
candidate with a strong jiban like Hatoyama or Ozaki would cam-
paign in a weaker candidate's district to try to stimulate voter support 
for that candidate. Indeed, Ozaki was doing just that when the 
alleged lese majeste incident occurred. With only 28 candidates, how-
ever, the party could not mount a national campaign because its 
scattered constituencies even made it difficult for the Do\6\ai to assist 
its candidates in relatively remote areas like Toyama or Kochi Pre-
fectures. Eleven of the 28 Do\o\ai candidates stood in three large 
cities (Tokyo-Osaka-Kyoto) and in Ozaki's Mie stronghold. Transpor-
tation and geographic proximity in these areas made joint assistance 
feasible. 
Despite police, IRAA, and Adults Association interference, the 
Do\o\ai never abandoned its campaign of criticizing the Tojo cabinet. 
After the election, Do\6\ai candidates who believed that their cam-
paigns had been victimized by interference used the law courts for 
recourse. No physical abuses of any candidate or his supporters, to my 
knowledge, occurred. Verbal threats, intimidation, and arrests did 
occur, but, if evidence was lacking, the police had no choice but to 
release those arrested. Such actions did, as intended, seriously disrupt 
candidates' campaigns, but legal appeals existed for plaintiffs. While 
interference was severe, it was not unprecedented. Elections being 
imperfect phenomena, candidates' and government authorities' abuses 
traditionally recurred. In that context, the 1942 general election was 
a typical prewar Japanese style election in which the government 
employed its police and administrative powers, as it had done on simi-
lar occasions in the past, to try to affect decisively the election results. 
As the Dokpkai challenged Tojo from a "liberal" position, Japa-
nese rightists challenged him from a nationalist platform. The reform 
right probably was the single most disruptive element during the 1942 
election. Far from cooperating in a national unity show election, 
internecine warfare even characterized the internal relations of reform 
rightists with their parent organizations. 
The Right Wing Campaigns 
Simmering with righteous indignation over the Political Council's 
recommended candidates, these self-proclaimed advocates of "national 
unity in wartime," faced a fundamental dilemma. If they remained 
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silent, their actions might be interpreted as support for all government 
policies; but, if they openly criticized the election, they might disrupt 
national unity and thereby provide ammunition for anti-Japanese 
propaganda. When reform rightist leaders vehemently censured the 
government, their rank and file became uneasy and often sided with 
the government against their own party's official platform. Conversely, 
passive acceptance of government policies might result in a particular 
organization's atrophy. 
Tohd\ai members, for example, split over Director Nakano's anti-
government election line. The Yamaguchi incumbent left the party's 
ranks because he feared that Nakano's tactics would divide the elec-
torate. Divisions over election policy also occurred in the Tohofafs 
Hiroshima branch, and, in Gunma, popular reaction against the local 
party's organization caused ten branch directorate members to quit. 
Party members openly denounced Nakano for using the party to 
advance his own selfish interests and for his uncompromising hard 
line, anti-government campaign.35 
Hashimoto Kingoro faced a similar rebellion from below. His 
Sefyseikai, already bitterly divided over the candidates chosen from 
among the membership, splintered further because of the "rampant 
dissatisfaction" over Hashimoto's consuming interest in getting elected. 
The police wrote off the party in June for it had "lapsed into political 
and ideological morbidity."36 Similar charges of using members to 
advance personal ambitions were leveled at Dai Nipponto Director 
Sasaki Itsucho (1909- ) and against the Kokusuitos Director Sasa-
gawa who, members felt, cooperated too intimately with former party 
men in order to get elected.37 Dissatisfaction characterized the Toa 
renmei doshi\ai membership because Director Ishiwara Kanji refused 
to play an active role in the election campaign.38 
The entire right wing's disruptive role concerned the government. 
Traditional rightists generally were extremely negative towards the 
election. The Dai Nippon Seisanto (Great Japan Production Party) 
opted "to kill the election by silence {mo\usatsii)" while the ]i\ishin 
do jo (Sincerity School) asserted that elections in wartime should best 
be avoided. The Mizuho \urabu was schizophrenic, simultaneously 
supporting its members who were recommended, but otherwise criti-
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cizing the election as meaningless and denouncing former party mem-
bers running for re-election.39 
Radical rightists participated in the election for they believed that 
the public's anti-government, anti-election attitude would cause elec-
tion defeat for the Tojo cabinet. They assumed that the cabinet would 
have to take responsibility for such a defeat and, in early May, the ensu-
ing political disorder would catapult rightists into a national reform 
cabinet to conduct national renovation.40 Based on political preconcep-
tions grounded in wishful thinking, reform rightists ultimately decided 
to oppose the government so that they might capitalize on the antici-
pated post-election confusion. 
The Tohd\ai, led by Nakano's leapfrogging national campaign in 
support of Tohokai endorsed candidates, concentrated on a speaking 
campaign that denounced a government controlled economy, attacked 
bureaucratic politics, and rebuked the Political Council.41 The l\\en 
\inno undo (One Prefecture Loyalist Movement) switched horses in 
midstream by leaving its inactive posture in favor of making scurrilous 
attacks on incumbents, the Tojo government, and the Political Coun-
cil. Though barred legally from participating in the election as an 
association, the RikJ?en yoseikai entered 37 candidates as individuals, 
all of whom "coincidentally" endorsed Director Tanaka's castigation 
of the "government plot" to prohibit the organization from campaign-
ing as a political association. The Kodo renmei continued its hysterical 
verbal barrage against the zaibatsu, the former party leaders, and 
former party members. Akao Bin drew surprising middle class sup-
port in Tokyo for his anti-Tojo election campaign. A Kyushu-based 
reform rightist group even threatened to carry out a Showa Restoration 
by illegal means.42 
The Japanese right wing did not cooperate with the Tojo cabinet's 
didactic election plans. There is no evidence of sympathy between 
"rightists" and "militarists," let alone rightist assistance in building 
a military dictatorship.48 Even outwardly rightists scorned Tojo. The 
police continued their close surveillance of rightist groups whose ac-
tivities during the election campaign only reinforced Tojo's percep-
tions of the right's dangerous and irresponsible nature.44 
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The Dullest Campaign 
Tsukui Tatsuo (1901- ), the right-wing publicist, summarized 
the contemporary political consensus when he wrote that the election 
campaign rallies were so dull, there were many rallies where a candi-
date's campaign workers and speakers actually outnumbered his 
audience.45 There were four reasons for this most uncharacteristic 
Japanese election campaign sluggishness. First, according to the gov-
ernment, the public confidence in recommended candidates made it 
unnecessary for them to attend campaign rallies. Second, election 
speeches became hackneyed and stereotyped, lacking any special flare 
or voter appeal. Third, the electorate was too preoccupied with its 
war-related work to spend its rare free time attending campaign 
rallies. Fourth, the electorate missed the competition representative 
of the political party election and accompanying festival atmosphere 
that had in the past stimulated interest.46 
In large Japanese cities, the campaign keynote was apathy. Com-
mentators attributed Tokyo's dull campaign and lukewarm voter 
response to the failure of "new men" to materialize to meet voter 
expectations.47 Referring to the "surprising emptiness of the campaign 
rallies," a reporter noted that a Kobe candidate's turnout of 300 was 
"completely extraordinary." He ascribed the indifference to a surplus 
of rallies, 60 to 70 opening daily in Kobe, Kyoto, and Osaka, that 
spread the available audience too thin. Dull campaign rally speeches 
contributed to the passivity and few volunteered as campaign work-
ers for candidates as neighborhood associations remained inactive.48 
These conditions were more perplexing for Kansai residents reported 
dissatisfaction prior to the election but, instead of stimulating election 
interest, the campaign rallies' "failure to deal with fundamental 
problems" channeled the discontent into boredom.49 
In rural Japan the situation was, if possible, even worse. Reports 
from the northernmost island of Hokkaido admitted the failure to 
develop an election awareness in the hinterlands. Concurrently, north-
eastern Japan's voters took little interest in the election or enthusiasm 
about the campaign.50 Aomori candidates counted themselves fortu-
nate to attract a crowd of 50 persons since many rallies there opened 
without any audience at all!51 The story repeated itself in central 
Japan where officials blamed the election's stagnation on "old order 
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candidates" running in the campaign. Apparently, such types were still 
good to kick around. A Yomiuri correspondent got some revenge on 
the police censor when he censured campaign rally speeches for ignoring 
such immediate problems as Japanese-Soviet relations, government 
assistance to small scale industries, and the food shortage.52 Instruction 
14, of course, forbid discussion of such topics. Dull campaigns typified 
Mie, Shiga and Wakayama Prefectures and the press blamed a "hang-
over" from the party polities' era for Iwate's apathy.58 
The only two genuine election hotbeds were Nagano, where the 
local Adults Association worked feverishly in the campaign, and 
southernmost Kyushu's Kagoshima Prefecture. One reporter praised 
the latter as "so passionate about the election that it shamed its neigh-
boring prefectures," but a less impassioned, and less charitable one, 
traced this zeal to Kagoshima's abysmal level of political underdevelop-
ment that precluded any deviation from the official government line.54 
Even the April 18 American air raid conducted by 16 B-25 bombers 
at roof top level over Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Kobe 
did not interject any animation into the lackluster campaign. Air 
defense authorities considered an air attack against the home islands 
inevitable, but the surprise attack came as a shock. It was the first 
taste of war for the homefront and, indeed, until then little had 
changed dramatically in Japan since the opening of the Pacific War.55 
In the raiders' wake, Tokyo police reported a run on food stocks, 
particularly non-staple items and some hoarding. Business at tea shops 
and meeting places dropped by 70% the day of the raid.56 Perhaps 
the only patrons were undercover police observing each other. The 
raid similarly restricted election campaigning. 
The Home Ministry, in accordance with its previously announced 
instructions about air attacks during the election, suspended campaign 
rallies. The ban lasted four days, punctuated in Tokyo by false air 
raid alerts sounded by nervous air defense officers. Nationally the 
ministry imposed similar restrictions. Ozaki Yukio, for example, in 
a letter from Mie confided that there was great confusion there as a 
result of rally cancellations; Nakano Seigo's Kochi City appearance 
was cancelled; and Noyori Hideuchi (1885-1968), standing in Kyu-
shu's Oita Prefecture, also reported that campaign rallies there had 
been suspended.57 The Political Council instructed its candidates to 
98 
substitute a pamphlet campaign when air raid alerts suspended their 
campaign rallies.58 
A foreign journalist in Tokyo believed that the Tojo government 
used the raid as a pretext to reinforce discipline, an interpretation 
supported by newspaper editorials that stressed the edifying effects of 
being bombed.59 Strict censorship accounted for some self-fulfilling 
analysis but not all Japanese shared the notion that bombing was good 
for you. Reform rightists furiously lambasted the government and the 
military for their failure to live up to previous "boasting" about the 
air defense system's invincibility. They also accused the government 
of negligence because its "total absorption" in the election campaign 
had given enemy bombers the chance to strike Japan.60 As an accurate 
political barometer, the Political Council took away any silver lining 
when it warned its candidates against taking advantage of blackout 
regulations to conceal illegal house to house campaign visits, vote buy-
ing, or bribery.01 The new politics seemed remarkably like the old. 
The Doolittle Raid temporarily interrupted electioneering, but 
despite some sentiment to the contrary, the Home Ministry never 
wavered in its determination to see the election through to its conclu-
sion.62 As a campaign rally topic, denouncing the airmen's barbarism 
for bombing a primary school was sure to draw applause. Beyond 
that, it had no great affect on the election. 
Unable to conceal such widespread apathy, the government en-
couraged explanations that blamed everything and everyone but itself. 
The candidates' lack of style, an increased workload for farmers during 
their planting season, and a lingering turn off effect from political 
party campaigns became culprits.63 Others excused the election cam-
paign's dullness because it was unfair to compare the 1942 election to 
the "mob psychology" that dominated political party campaigns.64 
Apparently wartime elections should be dull. No one questioned why 
candidates suddenly lacked style either. 
Attendance at Tokyo election campaign rallies provides a quanti-
tative comparison to the two previous general elections. It is true that 
in 1942 the Metropolitan Police Board requested candidates in Tokyo's 
seven constituencies to limit themselves to three campaign rallies per 
day, not exceeding 100 per candidate for the entire campaign; to sus-
pend nighttime rallies in case of air raid alerts; to suspend rallies if 
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an air raid warning occurred; and to limit automobile use to one per 
day per candidate.65 Such restrictions were not covert police attempts 
to stifle campaigning. A scarcity of resources plus a record number 
of candidates in Tokyo necessitated them. Gasoline and paper ration-
ing, for instance, restricted candidates' mobility and publicity. Even 
three rallies per candidate per day meant potentially 300 daily, taxing 
the voter, already election weary from the prolonged enlightenment 
campaign, to the limit. 
In the 1936 general election, Tokyo's seven districts yielded 87 
candidates who held 5,304 campaign rallies, approximately 61 rallies 
per candidate averaging about 128 listeners per rally.66 Incomplete 
police data for the 1937 general election reveals even higher attend-
ance, averaging about 130-140 persons per rally although few candi-
dates (68) held less rallies (3,200 plus).67 In 1942 more candidates 
(97) held more rallies (4,358), but attendance dropped quantitatively 
to around 322,000 total, an average of 74 per rally.68 Accompanying 
this sharp decrease in campaign rally crowds was a sharp increase in 
the number of cautions and of suspensions the police ordered at the 
rallies. This strict police enforcement of Instruction 14 undoubtedly 
was conducive to stereotyped candidate speeches that bored voters be-
cause of the speeches' vagueness and lack of relevance to contemporary 
problems and issues. It is tempting to equate police restrictions as the 
cause of poor rally attendance, but the examination of a specific 
candidate's campaign quickly shows the pitfalls of such an approach. 
Recommended incumbent Pak Ch'un-kum (1891-1973), in 1932 
the first Korean ever elected to the Imperial Diet, based his jiban in 
Tokyo's Fourth District. Having about 1200 Korean voters, it was the 
largest single Korean voting bloc in Japan. In his 1937 campaign, Pak 
enjoyed the largest average rally audiences, over 780 per speech, but 
in 1942 this figure dipped to around 170 per speech. Police reported 
that an unrecommended Korean candidate split Pak's jiban and drew 
away Pak's potential supporters. This formidable opponent, capitaliz-
ing on his own previous election experience as a municipal office candi-
date and on the assistance of community leaders, boldly invaded Pak's 
jiban and ran an active speech campaign opposing Pak's election plat-
form. The candidate allegedly supplemented his campaign through 
vote buying and police had his campaign workers under investigation 
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for such offenses. Pressed by a determined opponent in a tough race, 
Pak seemed unable to generate his previous voter appeal and police 
judged his re-election chances as slim.69 Traditional election practices, 
trying to capture an opponents' jiban, utilizing community leaders, 
and even buying votes, seemed to play as important a role in the 
decrease of Pak's campaign audiences as did police restrictions on his 
campaign rhetoric. 
The Tojo cabinet and the Home Ministry did endeavor to spark 
voter interest in the campaign. Tojo dispatched his cabinet ministers 
nationwide between April 18 and 29 to speak in support of recom-
mended candidates and the yo\usan election as part of the Political 
Council's overall coordinated campaign finale against their opponents. 
The government also employed radio broadcasts more extensively than 
in previous election campaigns to try to reach voters via the neighbor-
hood association meetings. General Abe's own neighborhood associa-
tion meeting appeared in the Asahi newspaper but perhaps the photo 
of a cherubic Abe flanked by three thoroughly uncomfortable looking 
neighbors who seem anxious for their cue to leave lacked the desired 
effect. 
On April 4, Vice Home Minister Yamazaki Iwao (1894-1968) used 
a 15-minute radio address to explain election goals and the proper way 
to evaluate rival candidates.70 Home Ministry officials also contributed 
to Shuho with articles like that appearing in the March 25 issue ex-
plaining that the election campaign was the domestic counterpart of 
the overseas military campaign.71 
On April 27, the Tojo government sponsored its largest campaign 
rally at Hibiya Park. Prime Minister Tojo's speech, broadcast nationally, 
reviewed the military triumphs to date. He then exhorted the electorate 
to go to the polls for their single vote was the equivalent of one 
building block in the construction of Greater East Asia. General Abe 
followed and told his audience that, although easier said than done, 
they must work together to eliminate the electoral abuses that exempli-
fied past election campaigns.72 Tojo attached utmost importance to 
the widest possible dissemination of these speeches and the Metro-
politan Police Board ordered its police to collect written reactions to 
the Hibiya radio broadcast from neighborhood association leaders, 
school principals, factory managers, and small merchants, in short, the 
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Kanagawa 4-22-42 6 P.M. 
Sendai 4-23-42 7 P.M. 
Matsuyama 4-26-42 7 P.M. 
Yokohama 4-29-42 2 P.M. 
Fukuoka 4-29-42 9 A.M. 
Sapporo 4-29-42 1 P.M. 
* Source: YS, March 14, 1942, 2. 
Justice Minister Iwamura, Election Puri-
fication Central League Director Tazawa, 
IRAA Central Cooperative Committee Di-
rector Goto Fumio 
Home Minister Yuzawa, Cabinet Informa-
tion Bureau Director Tani Masayuki (1889-
1962), Ando Kisaburo 
Yuzawa, Tani 
Nakai Yotaro (1887-1953) Retired Lieuten-
ant General, Tazawa, Finance Minister 
KayaOkonori (1889- ) 
Assistant Information Bureau Director 
Okumura Kiwao (1900-1969), Yamazaki 
Iwao, Maruyama Tsurukichi (1883-1956) 
Education Minister Hashida Kunihiko 
(1882-1945), Tazawa, Ando 
Vice Justice Minister Omori Kota (1887-
•?) 
Yuzawa, Kaya 
Omori, Goto Fumio 
Iwamura, Maruyama 
middle class. They received generally laudatory replies, but several 
respondents simply wrote that they had not listened to the broadcast 
or that they had no opinion about it.73 
It seemed as though the Tojo government was trying to convince 
itself that the election campaign was a success. In fact, despite the 
considerable time, effort, and resources that the government devoted 
to the campaign, the public did not participate properly in the en-
lightenment or in the election campaigns. Both campaigns failed to 
attain their anticipated goals of demonstrating homefront unity. 
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Chapter VI 
Candidates and Campaigning 
The 1942 election was the hinge on which Japanese political leader-
ship for the next decade turned, but the stigma attached to election 
campaigning in 1942 continues to make that campaign a sensitive 
political topic in Japan. The Occupation authorities' subsequent 
"purge" of all recommended candidates is generally regarded by those 
Japanese historians who prefer to dismiss conveniently the 1940's as 
"fascist" or as "militarist" as "proof" of the validity of their labels. 
Politicians who re-entered political life after the Occupation ended 
in 1952 naturally remain reticent about describing their 1942 cam-
paigns. A visceral feeling persists that anyone, even independent candi-
dates, who won election must somehow have supported the so-called 
"Tojo dictatorship."1 
I selected ten candidates whose campaigns illustrate electioneering 
techniques and interference problems in the 1942 general election. The 
availability and the reliability of source materials plus the require-
ment that the candidate's campaign exemplify his party, faction, or 
peer group's experience determined selection. Royama Masamichi 
(1895- ), Shioden Nobutaka, and Tsukui Tatsuo represent recom-
mended "new men," Ozaki Yukio the Do\o\ai, and Nakano Seigo 
the Tdho\ai. Miki Takeo (1907- ), who in 1975 became Prime Min-
ister of Japan, typifies independent incumbents and Nishioka Take-
jiro's (1890-1958) extreme case shows government interference against 
Diet splinter group members' campaigns. Noyori Hideuchi's cam-
paign points out the pitfalls an independent, former parliamentarian 
might encounter while attempting a political comeback. Miyake 
Shoichi (1900- ) exemplifies former Socialist Masses Party members' 
campaigns. Finally, Shimomura Jiro's (1890-?) situation vividly 
demonstrates naked interference completely disrupting a campaign. 
Theory to Practice 
Professor Royama Masamichi was one of pre-war Japan's preemi-
nent political scientists. In 1939, he resigned his Tokyo Imperial 
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University professorship to express his dissatisfaction with the univer-
sity president's handling of the so-called Kawai Eijiro Affair.2 A 
former member of the defunct Showa \en\yu\ai, Royama's trenchant 
political commentaries appeared regularly in the leading Japanese 
opinion journals. 
In any Japanese election, the so-called "cultured man" {bun\a)iri) 
commands respect, and the 1942 election "especially prized" such per-
sons as "new men."3 Friends had already sounded out the former profes-
sor about running for office and then Gunma Prefecture Governor Mu-
rata Goro asked Royama to stand for election in that prefecture. 
Although unenthusiastic about becoming a Political Council recom-
mended candidate (Royama thought his personal connections in 
Gunma would suffice to elect him even lacking a recommendation), he 
could not politely refuse Murata's request. He still believes that 
Murata personally, and not the local Political Council branch, selected 
him because the governor wanted to capitalize on Royama's well 
known name.4 For his part, an election campaign offered Royama the 
unique opportunity as a candidate to apply the political science theories 
that he had been studying and writing about for the past two decades.5 
Although Royama resided in Tokyo, no restrictions existed to pre-
vent his standing for election in his native Gunma Prefecture. Actually, 
this practice of returning to one's home or a different prefecture to 
stand for election was widespread in the Japanese electoral world. 
Finance Minister Kishi ran in his native Yamaguchi Prefecture and 
the Tojo cabinet's Agriculture and Forestry Minister Ino Hiroya, 
though a Tokyo native, stood in Mie Prefecture. Gunma's Second 
District, where Royama campaigned, was a defunct political party 
stronghold so political analysts expected "new men" to encounter 
great difficulties being elected.6 Three of the district's four recom-
mended candidates were incumbents, leaving Royama the sole political 
newcomer. Kogure Sanjiro (1868-1959), a seven term Do\6\ai mem-
ber, was the only independent incumbent but four other candidates 
made a total of nine contestants for the four allotted Diet seats. 
Press reports from the Gunma campaign generally lauded Royama. 
The Ko\umin, for example, singled him out as the sole exception to 
an otherwise dull campaign. Conversely, the Nichi Nichi reported all 
recommended candidates enjoying favorable popular response and 
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Royama particularly possessing both "new man" appeal and local 
Adults Association support. The Miya\o's correspondent, however, 
thought that the Gunma situation represented the triumph of what 
he termed the "old faces" and not the patriotic spirit that supposedly 
would characterize the election. Nevertheless, political analysts pre-
dicted that Royama faced a stiff battle because Kogure held a strong 
jiban, and, as late as April 26, the Hdchi believed Royama's election 
in doubt.7 
In fact, Royama finished an unexpectedly high second in the 
voting. He attributed his success to hard work, personal enthusiasm, 
and campaign funding from friends as well as from his own pocket.8 
By prior agreement, each candidate limited himself to 100 campaign 
rallies so Royama began his rallies at 10 a.m. every morning and con-
tinued until five each afternoon. No matter how small the audience, 
he spoke impassionately about the election's importance, the recom-
mendation system, the postwar future of Japan, the farming villages' 
problems, and continental, i.e., Sino-Japanese affairs.9 Despite his 
recommendation, he campaigned vigorously as one of the few recom-, 
mended candidates who displayed more zeal than his independent 
rivals. 
Such tactics originated in Royama's previous theories that successful 
campaigning depended on making an impression and on stirring the 
electorate's emotions. Word of his infectious mood and zealousness 
spread and more and more listeners began to attend his rallies. As-
sistant speakers from Tokyo also aided his campaign, as did his many 
friends and relatives in Gunma. 
Royama also benefited, albeit without his knowledge or solicitation 
on his part, from pressure that Governor Murata exerted on Gunma's 
community leaders to elect only recommended candidates. Murata 
interfered on his own initiative, without specific Home Ministry in-
structions. He tried to avoid interfering too openly because early 
detection of his meddling would have created problems for the election 
campaign.10 Indeed, after the election, defeated incumbent Kogure 
did allege that Murata had directed community leaders to vote for 
specific candidates and to assist in their elections. Police reportedly 
canvassed among the district's important families for votes for rec-
ommended candidates.11 Murata had such confidence in his tactics 
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that he permitted campaign rallies to progress unhindered by the 
police since the recommended candidates, with his help, would win 
anyway. 
Gunma's Second District provides a classic illustration of the man-
ner in which a prefectural governor could use his influence to favor 
candidates identified as pro-government. It is true that Royama never 
requested such "assistance," but Murata, to insure that only recom-
mended candidates won, saw it as almost a personal obligation to have 
the man he asked to become a candidate elected. Royama, however, 
outpolled three strong incumbents. His vigorous campaign certainly 
must be given credit for his election. Whether his dynamic campaign 
or official prefectural interference was more "responsible" for his 
election is a moot point, but, on the basis of his second place finish, 
perhaps interference was more instrumental in the third and fourth 
place finishers' election. 
The Anti-Semitic Drawing Card 
The fiercest campaign, in terms of candidate numbers relative to 
available seat numbers, occurred in Tokyo's sprawling Fifth District 
where 23 candidates (five recommended) vied for five seats. Covering 
10 of Tokyo's 35 wards, the Fifth Constituency encompassed the 
western and the southern city areas and contained over 452,000 voters. 
A high percentage of intellectuals residing there and a large "floating 
vote" (uncommitted to a particular candidate) characterized the dis-
trict's political complexion. The latter encouraged new candidacies 
as did the lack of strong incumbent opposition for only one incumbent, 
Makino Ryozo (1885-1961), stood for re-election.12 The district became 
a magnet attracting "new men," 17 of the 23 candidates being political 
newcomers. 
The excessive candidate numbers caused "complete disorder" in 
the district's election campaigns because the candidates lacked easily 
identifiable "distinctive traits."13 Retired Lieutenant General Shioden 
Nobutaka was the most conspicuous candidate, a distinction attributed 
to his anti-Semitism.14 Such a unique and incongruous topic gave 
Shioden an immediate attention getter in a lackluster campaign. It 
provided him with the chance to make a name for himself among 
106 
voters despite the strict regulations governing campaign rally topics 
that restrained other candidates. 
By way of illustration, on April 17, 203 rallies opened in Tokyo 
drawing about 15,000 listeners, about 70 each. That day police issued 
50 cautions and suspended six campaign rallies when campaign orators 
touched topics that the police believed might lower economic produc-
tion, be critical of a controlled economy, or create doubts among the 
public.15 A topical breakdown of such incidents for the entire cam-
paign also reveals that police supervising campaign rallies adhered 
strictly to Instruction 14's directives governing the control and the 
guidance of campaign rallies.16 
Cautions/Suspensions 
Speeches abusing the IRAA or Political Council .... 172 26 
Speeches slandering a controlled economy 163 18 
Speeches attacking government policies, bureaucrats, 
and dividing the public & military 120 25 
Speeches "radically disrespectful and dangerous" . . 7 4 15 (1 arrest) 
Speeches abusing the recommendation system 
or recommended candidates 73 6 
Speeches attacking the nation's upper classes 55 7 
Speeches creating public disunity or discord 45 6 
Speeches using "improper language" & causing 
anxiety or confusion 33 (1 arrest) 
Other (1 arrest) 
819 128(3) 
Such strict interpretation of Instruction 14's provisions could tend 
to make campaign rhetoric rather uniform and could reduce popular 
interest in Tokyo's election campaign. In such circumstances, a candi-
date possessing a unique platform and, as in Shioden's case, one that 
was not too sensitive as a campaign rally topic, had a very valuable 
asset. As Shioden himself crudely put it, "Differing from the other 
candidates, I talked about the annihilation of the Jewish influence 
lurking behind the war."17 
Initially reluctant to enter the election race, Shioden decided to 
run after supporters assured him that money was no problem and that 
he could freely state his own opinions. He received 20,000 yen ($10,000) 
from "Abe's Political Council" and insisted this donation came from 
zaibatsu funds, not from any secret army war chest.18 Funded and 
recommended, Shioden set out on the Tokyo streets to deliver the 
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catechism of hate that he had discovered in Russia during service in 
the Siberian Expedition (1918-1922) and that he had nurtured ever 
since as an anti-Semitic agitator and hack pamphleteer.19 
If Shioden only managed to be elected, his campaign might be 
dismissed as an example of bigotry playing on wartime phobias to 
amass votes, but Shioden received a totally unexpected, record shat-
tering 76,250 votes, the most of any candidate in any Japanese election! 
Likening his election campaign to a parachutist dropped in the midst 
of enemy pillboxes, Shioden attributed his astounding triumph to his 
loyally serving the emperor, holding more than 80 campaign rallies, 
being recommended, and having a military background that, he felt, 
united the public and military sectors within his campaign.20 
Post election analysis accounted for his success not in terms of his 
campaign rallies where turnout was not huge nor to his mediocre 
campaign literature, but rather to three factors: his military back-
ground, his status as an aviation pioneer, and his anti-Semitism that 
"was becoming the trend of the times."21 More prosaically, Tokyo 
police contended that Shioden enjoyed the support of local Reservist 
Association chapters, the Mizuho \urabu, traditional rightists bell-
wethers like Baron Hiranuma and Toyama Mitsuru (1855-1944), as 
well as the "intellectual class" and that his "fierce campaign" had 
aroused the public making Shioden a household name.22 
Anti-Semitism probably was the key factor in Shioden's record 
breaking accumulation of votes. He premised his campaign on viru-
lent anti-Semitism that tapped the Japanese public's racism and xeno-
phobia. His theme of an "international secret organization" led by a 
"Jewish Directorate" (yudaya \anbu) that was responsible for World 
War One and the Russian, German, and Austrian Revolutions which, 
in turn gave Jews power in the so-called "anarchist camp" could ap-
peal to anti-communists as well as middle class bourgeois "intellec-
tuals." Simultaneously, his assertion that Jews "maintained interests 
in the American and British capitalist system and thus encircled Ja-
pan" struck responsive cords among the general public who could 
identify his rantings with enemy nations.23 Shioden's "ideal" candi-
date was one who would "smash the Jewish financial power manipu-
lating America and England," and fertile ground existed in wartime 
Japan for the cultivation of anti-Semitism.24 
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The popular monthly Bungei shunju characterized the Diet as 
"splattered with international Jewry's evil influence," and proposed 
that the standards of the notorious French anti-Semite Charles Maur-
ras (1868-1952) be a litmus test for all candidates.25 As a Tokyo 
Imperial University student, the historian Irokawa Daikichi (1925- ) 
had to study the "Jewish Problem" and students as well as faculty 
seriously advanced anti-Semitism as a solution for the secret, Jewish, 
"Freemasonry" that threatened Japan and Japanese \o\utai.2Q In such 
a receptive atmosphere, ambient bigotry thrived, and, combined with 
the wartime xenophobia, released Japanese racist impulses. The appeal 
was, at root, anti-foreign, symbolized by a sinister "Jewish directorate," 
and continual emphasis on Japanese uniqueness and national character 
easily led to such xenophobic racism. The topic was permissible for 
campaign rallies for it avoided Instruction 14's prohibition against 
employing racial war themes in campaigning. Shioden however man-
aged to present the electorate with a non-Japanese, ostensibly easily 
identifiable "nationality" to hate during wartime. It was secret, inter-
national, and threatening enough to titillate voters without disrupting 
national unity. Anti-Semitism was the "ideal" campaign topic be-
cause it simply had no connection with wartime Japanese reality. 
Recommended Defeat 
The reform rightist political commentator and journalist Tsukui 
Tatsuo also campaigned in Tokyo's vast Fifth District. Perhaps due 
to his literary talents, Tsukui preferred the pen to the sword, and, 
eschewing the violence usually associated with reform rightists, had 
twice, unsuccessfully, stood for the Imperial Diet from his "jiban" 
in Kanagawa's First Constituency, Yokohama City.27 In 1942, Tsukui 
was the chairman of the Daitoa doshi\ai (Greater East Asia Comrades 
Society) which he and Fuke Toshiichi (1912- ) organized in 1942 
to promote the candidacies of lesser known reform rightists in the 
general election.28 
Tsukui himself had worked in conjunction with government plan-
ners to advance Comrades Society members' chances as possible candi-
dates. However, typical of national reform rightist experience, the 
Political Council ultimately rejected all of his 30 suggested candidates. 
The Tokyo Political Council Branch, nevertheless, did recommend 
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Tsukui and Fuke and the national headquarters in turn approved their 
selections. Tsukui claims that he was a disinterested party in this 
selection process and, to his knowledge, the police did not investigate 
him as a "suitable candidate" prior to his recommendation. Although 
recommended, Tsukui's campaign demonstrates the problems a rec-
ommended candidate might encounter. 
A Political Council grant of 5,000 yen ($2,500) covered his elec-
tion campaign expenses.29 Armed with a recommendation, campaign 
funds (\aban), and a small but active reform rightist organization 
supporting him, Tsukui's election chances seemed good. In retro-
spect, he believed that the recommendation hurt him more than it 
helped him for his campaign "lacked appeal and determination." A 
recommendation bred overconfidence.80 The recommendation also 
hurt him, Tsukui felt, among the local intellectuals who could exhibit 
an anti-government posture by voting for independents. Yet, as a 
man of letters, Tsukui had expected to make a successful appeal to this 
significant voting bloc.31 
Tsukui concentrated his efforts on the campaign rally, opening 
three or four daily and focusing on two themes. First, he contended 
that the China War showed the need to reorganize the political world 
and that Diet reform would accomplish such renovation. Second, 
Tsukui stressed the need to develop a sound public opinion as the 
ideological and cultural basis for politics. He attracted respectable 
audiences, ranging from 20 to 150 persons. The local Adults Associa-
tion chapter and a prominent prefectural assemblyman also lent their 
assistance. Despite such local help, Tsukui had several difficulties. 
His election campaign bogged down. Neighborhood police de-
scribed Tsukui's speech and pamphlet campaigns as praiseworthy, but 
lacking impact because voters could not identify him as a reform-
conscious candidate.32 Another difficulty was police activity. Local 
police maintained an around-the-clock surveillance on his campaign 
headquarters and stopped and searched his supporters, despite his 
recommended candidate status. Police also summoned visitors to 
Tsukui's home to the local police box for interrogation. The severe 
attitude, Tsukui maintains, resulted from the local police chief's long-
standing ties with former political party politicians and, consequently, 
as an "outsider," Tsukui received harsh treatment from the police. 
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Following orders to prevent election violations, local police were also 
after a notorious district "election broker" and closely checked all 
candidates' activities in hopes of catching the culprit bartering votes.33 
Indeed, as the following chart shows, Tokyo police seem to have 
enforced election regulations impartially against recommended and 
non-recommended candidates alike. 
ELECTION LAW VIOLATIONS (TOKYO PREFECTURE) 
Type Recommended Toho\ai Other Independent 
Vote Buying 52 .... 21 303 
Door-to-Door Solicitations .... 35 9 5 116 
Illegal Campaign 34 9 12 120 
Obstruction 1 .... 1 2 
Unsuitable Vote .... 1 
Worker Violation 2 .... .... 4 
Other 6 4 5 21 
130 22 44 578 
Source: Keishicho, "Shugiin senkyo hanzai shirabe," May 30, 1942 in Archive 
Title 1464 Reel 212, Frame 80455. 
Whether or not the disruption of Tsukui's campaign was intentional 
or incidental to strict election enforcement cannot accurately be de-
termined. It does highlight the tenuous line between legal police 
activity and election interference. 
A greater obstacle than the police was Tsukui's lack of a \anban 
(reputation as an influential politician or political appeal). Tsukui 
"shared" his political ideology with three other reform rightists who, 
by appealing to the same voting bloc, effectively split the reform 
rightist vote among four competitors. Tsukui finished a lowly ninth 
with 18,000 votes. Advertising himself as Japan's human bullet, 
another reform rightist Kodama Yoshio (1911- ), whose later "Lock-
heed Connection" would help to topple a government, attracted a 
similar voter type and finished eighth with 19,000 votes. If combined, 
the 37,000 votes represented a third place finish and election.34 More-
over, a traditional rightist, Shioden, with a "unique" \anban attracted 
votes in record numbers that might otherwise have gone to Tsukui. 
The lack of the Japanese electoral world's traditional "three ban' 
(jiban, \aban, \anbari) spelled Tsukui's defeat. Yokohama was his 
jiban; the Political Council supplied his \aban, but it also had to 
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support its other recommended candidates; other candidates shared 
his \anban. Recommendation alone did not guarantee victory. Tra-
ditional election criteria remained necessary. 
The Legend as Campaigner 
Aspects of Ozaki Yukio's anti-government, anti-Tojo, and anti-
Political Council campaign have already been mentioned. The Meiji 
Constitution by providing a legal framework adhered to by the Tojo 
government and Ozaki's unique stature in the political world made 
possible his stinging rebukes to "national unity" in terms unknown in 
"totalitarian" or "militarist" regimes. Ozaki was the only representa-
tive who had been elected in every election in Japanese constitutional 
history from 1890 to 1942, and, with good reason, was the so-called 
"god of constitutional politics." He was also a shrewd campaigner 
who drew on years of campaign experience to capture campaign audi-
ences. At 84, Ozaki even turned his deafness to advantage by forcing 
the police supervising his rallies to hold up signs with "Caution" or 
"Suspension" written in large characters should the occasion arise.35 
His appeals to liberalism made the occasion frequent. 
An Ozaki election rally always promised to be a memorable event. 
Absolutely secure in his Mie Third Electoral District jiban, Ozaki 
placed his talents and appeal into service for his beleaguered Do\6\ai 
colleagues. Stumping for Tagawa Daikichiro's campaign, Ozaki 
helped to develop a "rousing campaign" through ringing oratory 
praising liberalism and touching sympathetic chords among listeners. 
Even as the police escorted Ozaki from the rostrum after the so-called 
"Third Generation" speech, the crowd shouted "Police suppression" 
and cheered the charismatic old politician.86 
Following the alleged lese majeste incident, prosecutors questioned 
Ozaki on April 23 and confined him overnight at Sugamo Detention 
Center where guards gave the old man extra blankets to ward of? the 
night chill. Freed the following morning, the police later that day 
re-arrested Ozaki and charged him formally with lese majeste?1 
Released prior to his court appearance, Ozaki returned to Mie and 
campaigned successfully for re-election. 
Newspapers buried Ozaki's arrest and his indictment in their back 
pages identifying him cryptically as "One Mie Candidate" arrested 
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by the police. Finally, on April 25, the Asahi acknowledged that 
indeed Ozaki had been arrested but, because of his distinguished past 
service, he would be released after the official indictment.38 The arrest 
did make news at the court where the emperor advised Justice Minister 
Iwamura to keep him informed of all developments in the Ozaki 
case.39 Political opponents hurled the lese majeste canard at Ozaki 
during his Mie campaign in a desperate effort to unseat the old warrior. 
As a contemporary observed, however, while Ozaki's remarks were 
imprudent, there could be no doubt about his loyalty.40 
On July 4, the prosecution decided to try Ozaki and, on December 
21, 1942, he was found guilty of lese majeste and sentenced to eight 
months confinement; a verdict commuted to two years probation be-
cause of his advanced age. That did not end the affair. Ozaki appealed 
the verdict and, on June 27, 1944, the Appeals Court overturned the 
lower court ruling by declaring Ozaki innocent of all charges.41 
Ozaki's ultimate vindication overshadowed his Do\o\ai colleague Ta-
gawa's election defeat which, one of Tagawa's opponents maintains, 
directly resulted from the adverse popular reaction to Ozaki's re-
marks.42 
The One Man Campaign 
Nakano Seigo possessed advantages similar to Ozaki's, an invincible 
jiban in Fukuoka's First District, oratorical gifts, and the additional 
benefit of a large, national organization behind him. Since the Politi-
cal Council would recommend no Tohokjzi candidates, the Tdhd\ai 
directorate instructed its 300 nationwide branches to prepare for the 
election campaign being careful not to create suspicions of election 
impropriety in their planning. Since the party was organizing an 
"active campaign" to gain political power, "idle or inactive" branch 
directors would be replaced.43 
Nakano himself was the center of a whirlwind national speaking 
tour that carried him from the northeastern provinces on April 6 
through southern Kyushu by April 22. He spent only two days cam-
paigning in his own district, depending instead on his jiban organiza-
tion for his election.44 His ardor, characterized by an unyielding anti-
government stand, made Tdhokai members uneasy. After all, it was 
wartime and the rank and file did perceive homefront unity as a 
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desirable goal. Thus, Honryo Shinjiro (1903-1971) repeatedly advised 
Nakano to soften his hard line; Yamaguchi branch members openly 
questioned Nakano's attitude; and Toho\ai General Affairs Director 
and Diet incumbent Oishi Dai (1903- ), running for re-election in 
Kochi Prefecture, counseled Nakano against such anti-government 
campaign tactics. 
During his national campaign tour, Nakano struck at the Political 
Council, at the economic system (less "Jewish-like liberal capitalism") 
and at the incompetent bureaucracy. He regularly questioned govern-
ment policies and specifically demanded that the government exclude 
zaibatsu influence from the so-called Southern Regions.46 With a 
certain dry wit, the Police Bureau observed that Tohokai rallies tended 
to require police cautions and that in Tokyo the party ranked first 
in what police jargon termed "deviation" from Instruction 14's official 
control and guidance standards.47 
Internal bickering and overambitious planning stretched Toho\ai 
resources too thin and only seven of its 47 candidates, Nakano in-
cluded, won election. Nakano personally blamed the humiliating 
defeat on illegal government interference and intimated that prefec-
tural governors and regimental area commanders conspired to rig the 
election.48 Individual Tohokai candidates' experiences testified to the 
close attention that the police gave to their campaigns. 
In Kagoshima's First District, Oda Shigeru (1892-?) claimed that 
the local governor instructed public employees, police chiefs, school 
principals, Keibodan and Adults Association members to cooperate 
to elect recommended candidates while simultaneously, he equated 
independents with traitors. The Adults Association, as an organiza-
tion, endorsed specific recommended candidates and neighborhood 
council meetings turned into political election discussions. Marked 
ballots designated recommended candidates for voters. In Oita Pre-
fecture, the Tohokai candidate alleged that the police director solicited 
support for recommended candidates from among the community 
leaders and advised them not to help independents' campaigns. There 
was also alleged campaign worker intimidation. In Niigata, Tohokai 
candidates encountered strict police supervision that may account for 
the defeated Tohokai candidate's decision to quit politics, a move that 
left a serious gap in the party's regional organization.49 Tohokai 
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backed candidates alleged similar instances of prefectural government 
interference in their campaigns in Kochi, in Gunma, and in Nagano 
Prefectures.50 Additionally, police censors at least twice deleted arti-
cles in the party's official journal, Todairiku (Eastern Continent), for 
suggesting that the Political Council was plotting to revive a uba\ufu" 
order and for spreading Nakano's anti-government philosophy. Also 
censored were two Tohokai auxiliary periodicals for carrying Nakano's 
opinions and for the disrespect and possible lese majeste that the 
government discovered in the party's plan for post-election Japan.51 
In dealing with other reform rightists, the Tojo government and 
the police were impartially severe. Akao Bin's Ken\o\u\ai ranked 
second to the Tohokai in "deviation" from official government stand-
ards. Authorities regarded the Kodo renmei as "clearly anti-Political 
Council," and police scrutinized the lkA€n fynn° unc^o for its slander-
ous campaign against the Political Council, the zaibatsu, and former 
political party members. Luckily, the Ri\\en yoseikai did receive 
close attention leading police to arrest three of its members for plot-
ting to murder victorious candidates should Director Tanaka lose, 
as he did, his election bid.52 
The Tohokafs election experience typified that of reform right 
organizations and candidates. Their anti-government, anti-Political 
Council platforms led to open disagreement with and criticism of 
the Tojo government. Regarding this attitude as dangerous, the 
police moved to silence these vociferous critics by intimidation, arrest, 
harassment, and strict control of their campaign rallies. Also revealed 
was the reform rightist followers' ambivalence expressed as splits be-
tween the membership and the leadership. These cleavages stemmed 
from the contradiction between the Tojo cabinet's requirements for 
homefront wartime unity and the reform rightist leaders' require-
ments for their respective organizational programs. This equivocal 
sentiment represented the reform right's traditionally unclear attitude 
toward parliamentary politics, while their past tendency to use 
violence to achieve their ends still frightened away potential supporters. 
Unable to live down their violent heritage and without jiban unable 
to cope with prefectural level police suppression, the reform rightists 
fared very poorly in the 1942 election. Not only did they fail to win 
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in great numbers as they had expected, but also the "old" political 
leadership maintained its hold on the Diet. 
Unrecommended in the Countryside 
The 1942 election campaign in Tokushima's Second District was 
Miki Takeo's second national campaign. In 1937, he became the 
youngest man ever elected to the Lower House. Previously an inde-
pendent, in 1941 Miki joined the Yo\udo and his 1942 situation char-
acterized that of first and second term Yo\udo members. The 
Tokushima Political Council Branch bypassed him for recommenda-
tion in favor of Akita Kiyoshi and two "new men," both ironically 
older than Miki and both with the same surname, Miki Yokichiro 
(1901- ), a successful local businessman and Miki Kumaji (1880-?), 
a prefectural assemblyman. The national headquarters in turn ap-
proved these branch choices. 
Miki Takeo believes that his extended study abroad at the Univer-
sity of Southern California made him unacceptable to the Tojo govern-
ment, and thus to the Political Council.53 Since Tokushima was a 
rural area and a political backwater, Miki's American sojourn also 
hindered his election campaign. From the very outset, Miki, as an 
independent, had to deal with the accusation that he was pro-American 
and was conspiring to spread enemy propaganda. It "followed" that 
voting for him was treasonous because he would serve as an enemy 
spy within the Diet.54 
Miki's campaign rallies naturally attracted the usual police sur-
veillance but, since the police judged Miki as having a good chance 
of being re-elected, they concentrated their efforts to obstruct his 
campaign. One tactic that the police used against Miki paradoxically 
created the impression of a thriving campaign. Plain clothes officers 
who attended Miki's rallies in hopes of uncovering election violations 
inadvertently, by their very presence, swelled attendance at those rallies. 
Such deceptive crowd size in turn prompted the press to describe 
Miki as typical of the growing popularity of independents who were 
pressing recommended candidates.50 
To try to minimize any voter popularity in Miki's case, following 
his rallies the police questioned individual listeners either trying to 
entrap them or to intimidate them. Police also solicited votes for rec-
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ommended candidates and told voters that Miki was indeed a traitor. 
The local Adults and Reservist Associations "combed the countryside" 
campaigning against him, and local support dried up because of police 
intimidation. For example, the local police chief advised a local con-
tractor, who had assisted Miki financially in 1937, that all his munici-
pal contracts would be withdrawn if he unwisely insisted on again 
backing Miki. When prefectural outsiders like Miki's former Waseda 
University professors journeyed to Tokushima to speak on his behalf, 
their support was more than counter-balanced by vigorous Adults 
Association opposition to him. 
Although these obstacles convinced Miki that he would not be 
re-elected, he did win easily, finishing as he had in 1937 in third place 
and gaining an additional 800 votes in the process. The more shocking 
defeat in Tokushima was that of the unrecommended fourth termer, 
former Minseito member Manabe Katsu (1881-1963), the 1937 front-
runner. Voters apparently rejected 62 year old Miki Kumaji as too old 
in a "new man" election. Miki Takeo's victory, despite police and 
public association interference, may be traced to his youth, his determi-
nation, but, more plausibly, to his opponents' caliber and to his jiban. 
Although Miki's account provides scant information about that jiban, 
it must have been instrumental in his re-election. He surely cultivated 
local ties during his five year Diet term and built himself a solid 
jiban that was resilient enough to withstand prefectural interference 
and still bring him enough votes for victory. A strong jiban could be 
decisive. In Tokyo, for instance, police analysts quickly conceded 
Do\6\ai members Hatoyama Ichiro and Ando Masazumi's re-election 
for both their jiban remained virtually unchanged since 1937.56 
Miki Takeo's experience shows that a strong jiban could offset the 
lack of a recommendation and localized interference. Prefectural 
authorities interference certainly hindered potential campaign workers' 
willingness to participate in the campaign, but it was not necessarily 
a decisive factor in the campaign. The traitor slur, interesting because 
pro-government candidates employed the exact same smear rhetoric 
in 1890, 1915, and 1928 elections, also failed, as it failed against Saito 
Takao (1870-1949), Ozaki Yukio, and Hatoyama Ichiro, when the 
electorate returned all those men to the Diet. Independent, incumbent 
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politicians remained difficult to unseat as 47 of 133 such candidates 
won re-election. 
Supervising Candidates 
The campaign of Nishioka Takejiro (1890-1957) exemplified pre-
fectural government interference at its extreme. Representing Naga-
saki's First District, the former Seiyu\ai member was in his sixth term 
and, in 1942, affiliated himself with the Koa giin \ai. His constit-
uency included Nagasaki City where, in August 1941, a municipal 
"recommended election" married by charges of prefectural and city 
government interference against independent candidates occurred.57 
Police constantly harassed Nishioka's campaign as officers searched 
his campaign offices and confiscated his campaign materials; main-
tained continual surveillance on his campaign headquarters; tapped 
his telephone calls; followed visitors leaving his home; and intimi-
dated voters by insinuating that they should only elect recommended 
candidates.58 They coupled this "negative" interference with "posi-
tive" measures as the police openly canvassed for votes for recom-
mended candidates and the Nagasaki governor used his own relatives 
and prefectural teachers to spread support for recommended candi-
dates. In his capacity as IRAA prefectural branch director, the gov-
ernor instructed community leaders that: 
The existing, so-called independent candidate system of elections is 
unsuitable for today's requirements. The general public must be made 
to realize that fact fully.59 
Furthermore, local ward office officials told neighborhood associa-
tion members that if independents won election, the governor and 
the police director would be dismissed. On an even more personal 
level, a village police inspector appealed to community leaders not to 
support Nishioka or else he, the inspector, would be transferred. It 
was a powerful appeal, if the official in question were a popular one. 
Other independents like former Seiyukai member Honda Eisaku 
(1886-1948) felt the wrath of official prefectural displeasure. An en-
thusiastic supporter who applauded a bit too loudly and too long for 
one of Honda's speeches, promptly found himself detained and inter-
rogated by the police. At polling stations on election day, the police 
told voters for whom to vote and, to make sure voters followed such 
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heavyhanded suggestions, one detective rigged a mirror that enabled 
him to watch voters marking their ballots. Not unexpectedly, no 
independent candidate won in Nagasaki's districts. 
The IRAA and Adults Association also worked against independ-
ents. On April 1, for instance, both associations issued "candidate 
qualifications" that included promoting patriotic and sincere men for 
office and disparaging those who ignored the national good for their 
own interests, namely independent candidates.60 It was no April Fool 
when the governor announced on election eve: 
We will appreciate your gracious cooperation. Tomorrow all of us 
together will go to vote properly. To be sure, no one will watch you at 
the polling station, but "Heaven knows and earth knows." With a true 
feeling vote for a true person. Those who damage national polity are 
our enemies. With our one, mighty vote this kind of person will be 
punished.61 
Nishioka received his punishment even before election day. Police 
totally disrupted his re-election campaign because of a technical elec-
tion law violation resulting from his campaign manager's oversight. 
Using the pretext that Nishioka's supporters began campaigning prior 
to the official election period, police officers arrested his campaign 
manager, his campaign workers, and ultimately, Nishioka himself 
when he stepped off the Tokyo train at Nagasaki Station.62 Although 
prosecutors released Nishioka after several days' detention, campaign-
ing was impossible and he never recaptured lost ground. After his 
defeat, he filed indictments against the Nagasaki governor, the Naga-
saki City mayor, and the local police director. Police investigators 
placidly claimed no basis for Nishioka's allegations existed. 
The case shows how zealous police election law enforcement could 
totally disrupt any campaign and it also shows the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing between legal and illegal police election activities. As 
seen on the following chart, in 1942 both the number of alleged 
election law violations and the number of persons involved in such 
incidents decreased in all but one category (Other) when compared 
to the previous 1937 general election. The prefectural authorities, 
especially the governor, did create an anti-independent candidate at-
mosphere, but Nishioka's overzealous supporters did technically vio-
late election laws, meaning grounds for arrest did exist. A similar 
case occurred in Chiba Prefecture where an independent alleged that 
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the police disrupted his rally and detained him for questioning: the 
police claimed that they suspended the rally only after the candidate 
refused to heed two previously issued cautions.63 There were cases 
where both regulators and regulated seemed to have grounds for 
complaint, further blurring the line dividing legal police work and 
police interference. 
Misplaced Faith 
Journalist, polemicist, militant right wing anti-communist, and in 
1932 the founder of the pro-emperor newspaper Teito Nichi Nichi 
shimbun (Capital Daily News), Noyori Hideuchi attempted a politi-
cal comeback in 1942. Noyori stood for the Diet in 1924, in 1928, and 
finally in 1932 won election as a Seiyukai representative from Oita 
Prefecture's First District. After a single term (1932-1936), Noyori 
returned to his newspaper enterprise. He had practical campaign and 
legislative experience, and presumably still retained a skeleton Oita 
jiban plus a newspaper to promote his cause. Additionally, as a promi-
nent supporter of the Axis Alliance, Noyori thought that his politics 
reflected the spirit of the times and that his time had also come. 
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Noyori had several reasons for standing as an independent candi-
date. Tojo's February 18 speech calling for new men to create a fresh, 
powerful Diet encouraged Noyori for he believed that the government 
would not interfere in the election. The public would realize that he 
was not using the election as a stepping stone for personal advance-
ment so that even as an independent he might win election. Finally, 
he felt an obligation to those who endorsed him.64 Influential and 
powerful men like traditional rightist Genyosha kingpin Toyama 
Mitsuru, the managing editor of the Japanism advocate Nihon oyobi 
Nihonjin (Japan and the Japanese), Miyake Yujiro (18604945), Shira-
tori Toshio and Nakajima Chikuhei, both recommended candidates, 
all endorsed Noyori. One campaign poster included testimonials by 
no less than five retired generals and admirals who billed Noyori as 
the champion "to annihilate Britain and America." Exactly how 
Noyori would do this was left to the voter's imagination. 
During his election campaign, Noyori relied on letters of endorse-
ment from the above backers as well as from Oita Prefecture com-
munity leaders. He put his main effort into campaign rallies, holding 
perhaps 70 or 80 altogether, where he attracted crowds averaging 
between 70 and 150 listeners throughout his campaign. This turnout 
convinced Noyori that he was far ahead of all rival candidates in 
Oita's First District. Local newspapers shared his optimistic assess-
ment.65 
As the campaign progressed, Noyori's tone became progressively 
more critical. In March he had bemoaned that candidate standards 
were too abstract, and by April he complained about the dull and 
dispirited election.66 Although describing himself as a "wholehearted 
supporter" of Tojo's cabinet, as the election campaign wore on, so did 
Noyori's temper. Police censored his newspaper four times when he 
tried to publish articles implying government interference occurred 
or intimated that collusion between the Military Affairs Bureau and 
the Tojo government would result in only the election of recom-
mended candidates.67 
Noyori's optimistic appraisal of himself as the first or second place 
contender seemed realistic for the press considered the two recom-
mended new men's elections doubtful. Then, coincidentally concur-
rent with the Political Council's final, coordinated campaign blitzlyeig, 
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the local police chief intervened and requested community leaders to 
refrain from any endorsement of Noyori that might damage new, 
recommended candidates' election chances. If they did make such 
endorsements, the police chief threatened "to expose" Noyori's faction. 
Furthermore, police disregarded Keibodan members' campaigning on 
recommended candidates' behalf and, on election day, these latter day 
soshi (political bullies) shouted from the village office's second and 
third story windows to voter queues below to "Vote for recommended 
candidate ,"68 
Dirty tricks also hampered Noyori's comeback bid. At an April 23 
evening rally, a false air raid report forced a temporary blackout of 
Noyori's rally. When the lights went back on and the rally resumed, 
only 12 or 13 of the original 50 listeners returned. He blamed "politi-
cal opponents" for this unscheduled interruption. 
As fifth place runnerup, Noyori personally attributed his defeat to 
the popular misconception that the Political Council and the IRAA 
were related associations. This led voters to regard independents like 
himself as IRAA and government opponents.69 His articles also con-
tinually alluded to his naive confidence in Tojo's word that the election 
would be impartial. Noyori misplaced his faith. Indeed, after his 
defeat he complained that the Tojo government should have acted 
morally when supervising the election and because of his increasingly 
bitter anti-Tojo polemics, the following year the Home Ministry 
ordered his Teito newspaper to cease publication.70 
A combination of police and local association interference plus a 
coordinated Political Council campaign defeated Noyori. Police inter-
ference alone did not throw the balance against him. The Political 
Council's campaign strategy, specifically designed in its last stage to 
help recommended candidates who seemed in danger of defeat, mo-
bilized powerful local support against Noyori just when coincidentally 
the police began to intimidate community leaders. Their common 
ends using unrelated means hurt Noyori at the campaign's critical 
period. His campaign does illustrate the obstacles that independent 
former parliamentarians had to overcome in 1942 to be elected. Only 
eight of 49 such candidates could do so. 
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Campaigning as Usual 
Miyake Shoichi himself described his 1942 Niigata Third District 
campaign as not much different than his previous three election cam-
paigns, the latter two of which he won. As a candidate of non-
mainstream political parties, the Zen\o\u rono taishuto (National 
Workers and Farmers Masses Party) in 1932 and the Sha\ai taishuto 
thereafter, Miyake was a seasoned campaigner whose left wing politics 
conditioned him to expect official harassment as a political fact of life. 
Niigata exemplified the swelled candidacy numbers as 35 men 
contested 15 Diet seats compared to only 23 candidates in the 1937 
election. So-called "new men's" absence among the district's recom-
mended candidates caused a lack of voter support for the election 
campaign and for the Political Council. Niigata's jiban were also 
famous as was its tradition of re-electing incumbents, so even inde-
pendent incumbents like Miyake were formidable opponents for 
political newcomers.71 
Entering his seventh year in the Diet, Miyake had constructed a 
durable jiban by providing for his constituents' needs, especially by 
bringing additional health care, a hospital, and improved school facili-
ties to his district. Consequently, he enjoyed the support of friends, 
relatives, and political backers in the region. He relied on the cam-
paign rally and tailored his campaign speeches to meet his audiences' 
needs. That mainly meant concentrating on the farming villages' 
problems because these places provided him with his strongest sup-
port.72 
His election campaign was free from any open prefectural inter-
ference, although local police disrupted his campaign speeches and 
harassed his election committee members. Based on his past experi-
ences, however, Miyake did not consider such events unusual or 
indeed any more severe than in his previous election campaigns.73 
Count Arima Yoriyasu, the former IRAA director accused of harbor-
ing leftist ideas, was Miyake's most prominent supporter and journeyed 
from Tokyo to lend his talents to Miyake's campaign. Police did not 
order cautions or suspensions in great number, but did caution one 
speaker for offering personal inducements for votes when he reminded 
an audience that Miyake had been instrumental in bringing a hospital 
to the area.74 Generally, the police were impartial toward both rec-
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ommended and independent candidates alike, a condition that Miyake 
attributes to the prefectural governor's attitude.75 He also believes 
that the prefectural authorities thought that he would be defeated 
anyway, so they redoubled their efforts against more promising candi-
dates and ignored him. 
Local Tdhd\ai candidates, in contrast, did meet strict police super-
vision. The IRAA and the Adults Association actively campaigned 
for recommended candidates while obstructing independent ones. In 
the neighboring Second District, both organizations meddled in for-
mer Socialist Masses Party member Ii Seiichi's (1892- ) first national 
campaign. In more northern Akita Prefecture, former Sha\ai tai-
shuto central executive committee member Kawamata Seion (1899-
1972) found himself the object of thought police investigation and 
a special report to Home Minister Yuzawa for having the termerity 
to tell campaign crowds to take care of their own interests before 
worrying about national policies.76 
Miyake though worked unceasingly throughout what he termed 
a "hot-blooded" (chinoke-ga-oi) campaign while his recommended 
opponents, somewhat like Tsukui Tatsuo, became overconfident and 
waged uninspired insipid contests. Miyake finished first in his con-
stituency and owed his success to being a well-known incumbent (he 
had a jiban) whose active campaign capitalized on recommended 
candidates' underestimating his jiban resources. A lack of interference 
also permitted him to develop a winning campaign. The February 
police investigation rated Miyake "undesirable" as a Diet member, 
yet he not only easily won another term but also got the most votes 
in his constituency. 
This suggests that election interference depended on prefectural 
officials' initiative. It also shows that campaign conditions varied 
widely, from the overt interference in Nagasaki, to the more subtle 
manipulation in Gunma, to the lack of interference directed against 
Miyake in Niigata. For Miyake, the 1942 election was an impartial 
election in which voters selected candidates of their choice rather than 
any handpicked Military Affairs Bureau or Tojo-approved flunky. 
The Impossible Campaign 
A record number of candidates, chiefly due to the presence of 432 
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new, independent office seekers, characterized the 1942 election. The 
dismal showing of these new men, of whom only 30 won elections, 
resulted from political inexperience, public indifference to their cam-
paigns, or interference. Perhaps the most important factor in their 
defeats was the extreme difficulty of getting elected to anything in 
Japan without organized backing in the form of a political party or 
Political Council, or in 1942, from a jiban developed during the prior 
party polities' era. Shimomura Eiji's campaign in Kagoshima's Second 
District points out all these obstacles. 
Even under ideal conditions, Shimomura faced a herculean task. 
Nine opponents vied for the district's four seats, including three in-
cumbents (two recommended, one independent) and four others 
who had previous affiliations with the defunct political parties. Un-
fortunately for Shimomura, instead of ideal conditions in Kagoshima 
Prefecture, it was the place where election interference was at its very 
worst during the 1942 election. 
Kagoshima was a predominantly rural prefecture, condescendingly 
described as the most politically backward area in all Japan. Its gov-
ernor took the government line literally and exerted pressure on com-
munity leaders to support only recommended candidates. A strong 
Adults Association chapter added its weight to the recommended 
candidates' campaigns. Community leaders in turn mobilized the 
electorate who would perform as their local chiefs directed. Kago-
shima might qualify as the prototype for proper voter participation in 
a show election. 
Allegations against the prefectural Kagoshima authorities read like 
an election interference primer. Local school principals used public 
associations like neighborhood association meetings to denounce in-
dependent candidates as traitors who opposed the imperial will be-
cause, in circular logic, a recommendation was in accordance with the 
imperial will. As traitors, independent candidates' children and even 
grandchildren should, arguments ran, be excluded from public em-
ployment! Adults Association village level organizational directors 
conspired to convoke special meetings and projects to coincide with 
independent candidates' rallies, and thus prevent voters from attending. 
A police officer told a local farmers' meeting that independent candi-
dates had "red ideas," so everyone had to support recommended 
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candidates. One enterprising police chief told neighborhood associa-
tion members in his district that, if even a single independent candi-
date were elected, their headman would have to kill himself in 
atonement. Luckily, the headman was not put to the test, but one 
wonders if it was his idea or the police chiefs in the first place. Addi-
tionally, neighborhood association members who failed to attend 
recommended candidates' campaign rallies would be reported to the 
police. The prefectural governor endorsed recommended candidates 
in a letter that he sent to all prefectural community leaders while the 
Adults Association, the Reservist Association, and the police all cam-
paigned openly for recommended candidates. On election day, the 
police tried to intimidate voters by blocking the entrance to polling 
stations, by interrogating potential voters, and by instructing voters 
to select recommended candidates. Adults Association members also 
joined in this voter harassment.77 
Shimomura felt that he was not recommended because he had no 
personal acquaintances or ties with either the national government or 
the prefectural authorities.78 His troubles began early and continued 
throughout the entire campaign. Officials scheduled special neighbor-
hood association meetings that, by prearrangement, coincided with his 
campaign rallies or potential voters might be mobilized for road repair 
and forest clearing, usual tasks, but set to overlap the times of Shimo-
mura's rallies. Even if he did manage to collect an audience, his 
evening rallies proved tumultuous because Adults Association toughs 
on motorbikes surrounded the rally grounds and tried to intimidate 
persons going to the meeting. 
Added to this the fact that Shimomura was a political neophyte 
lacking a jiban and organized backing made his chances of election 
nil. His own inadequate resources combined with the open interfer-
ence directed against independent candidates throughout Kagoshima 
Prefecture overwhelmed him as well as the other independent candi-
dates there. Shimomura's disastrous showing (he tallied a mere 264 
votes out of over 100,000) clearly indicates that his election would 
have been extremely doubtful even in the most scrupulously impartial 
election. In that sense, he was typical of the approximately 25% of 
"new men" who failed to attract sufficient votes and consequently had 
their election bond confiscated. His campaign is interesting in itself 
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as an example of naked government interference directed against an 
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independent candidate but it becomes more meaningful by reason 
of his post election activities. After the election of only recommended 
candidates in Kagoshima Prefecture, the defeated independents took 
their case to court. 
Four Kagoshima Second District defeated candidates, Shimomura 
included, brought indictments that the election should be declared 
void because of the massive interference. A Civil Affairs Bench in-
vestigation into the conduct of the election was figuratively under fire 
due to the Kagoshima prefectural police and authorities' uncooperative 
attitude, and, as the inquiry neared completion, literally under fire by 
hedge-hopping American fighter aircraft operating over southern 
Kyushu.79 As a result of these investigations, conducted at risk of 
life, limb, and reputation, on March 1, 1945 the Civil Affairs Bench's 
Third Session declared Kagoshima's Second District election null and 
void and ordered a rerun.80 
All concerned parties accepted this judicial decision and held a 
rerun election on April 20, 1945. It is true that the rerun did not 
change the initial results. The significant point, however, remains 
that a court issued an essentially anti-government order and the gov-
ernment implemented it. As in the Ozaki case, governmental authori-
ties abided by the court decision, unpalatable as it must have been, 
which reinforces the interpretation that the rule of law still operated 
in wartime Japan even as military defeat loomed everywhere. 
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Interference in Perspective 
The preceding examples of electioneering are useful in analyzing 
the problem of interference in the 1942 general election. The salient 
feature of electoral interference in 1942 was the widespread disparity 
in its application. Election interference appears to have been mainly 
conditional on the particular prefectural officials', especially the gov-
ernors', attitude. When governors actively conspired against inde-
pendent candidates as in Kagoshima, Nagasaki, and Gunma, prefec-
tural interference was pronounced and decisive as only recommended 
candidates won election. However, in areas like Tokyo and Niigata, 
where the prefectural authorities acted more impartially, the election 
results reflected a mixture of both recommended and independent 
candidates winning election. Any direct equation of recommended 
candidates' election with illegal interference cannot be made due to 
the presence of an incumbent majority among recommended candi-
dates who may simply have been re-elected on the basis of their incum-
bency and previously constructed jiban. 
The contradiction between constitutionalism and illegal election 
interference appears to substantiate the "failure" thesis of pre-war 
Japanese parliamentary politics. If political modernity may be gauged 
only in terms of whether or not an alteration of power took place 
via elections, then Japan, of course, never modernized politically 
because Japanese elections were meant to confirm, not to transfer, 
power. In its historical context, election interference in 1942 was 
not innovative; instead, it adhered to traditional forms of election 
obstruction. 
Prior to 1942, there were three great examples of election interfer-
ence, the 1892, the 1915, and the 1928 general elections. Interference 
motivations differed in all three, but interference forms were strik-
ingly similar. The 1892 election was the most notorious in Jap-
anese constitutional history. Home Minister Shinagawa Yajiro or-
dered prefectural governors to insure the defeat of political party 
candidates and the election of government party men. Armed with 
this carte blanche, police canvassed for votes, intimidated voters, con-
doned vote buying by pro-government candidates, and even presided 
over a small war in Kochi Prefecture between rival political factions. 
The human toll nationwide was 25 dead and 388 injured, although 
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unofficial estimates were much higher. The object of such interference 
was to crush the nascent political party, the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) 
and to promote the Child \urabu (Central Club), a pro-government 
party. The result, despite the interference, was that 163 Jiyutd versus 
137 Child \urabu were elected and Shinagawa had to resign under 
pressure. Moreover, all governors did not obey the Home Minister's 
injunction. The Akita governor, for example, believed that interfer-
ence detracted from the public ability to select "true representatives" 
and, consequently, ignored Shinagawa's orders.81 Interference then 
failed. 
The second instance of large scale electoral interference occurred 
in the 1915 general election when Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu 
(1838-1922) employed massive police interference to try to create a 
second major political party to oppose the Seiyukai. Wholesale shifts 
involving 16 retirements and 35 transfers of governors preceded the 
election, and during the election the police restricted Seiyukai candi-
dates while ignoring violations by the pro-government Ri\\en doshi-
\ai (Constitutional Comrades Society). Accused of election law vio-
lations, Home Minister Oura Kanetake (1850-1918) resigned a week 
after the election. Ten Diet members were indicted on bribery charges, 
and Okuma's government, despite electing 153 Doshikai candidates 
and reducing Seiyukai deputies from 188 to 108, faced a severe public 
reaction to its overt interference that ultimately forced Okuma's resig-
nation. Another election followed just two years later and that elec-
tion, not incidentally, was a resounding Seiyukai triumph.82 
The third major incidence of election obstruction happened in 
1928, the 16th General Election and Japan's first universal male suf-
frage election. Once again, shifts of prefectural officials preceded the 
campaign. The difference this time was that a political party Home 
Minister, the Seiyukai s Suzuki Kisaburo (1867-1940), led the inter-
ference. The Police Bureau, also controlled by the Seiyukai, ordered 
its officers to suspend campaign rallies "when speakers slander the 
election by suggesting election interference by the government."83 
Suzuki also ordered strictest supervision of Minseito candidates and 
used police election intelligence to help lagging Seiyukai members' 
campaigns. Seiyukai candidates also received a classified Police Bureau 
document that explained methods of evading the election laws.84 
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However, as in the past, the results were not one-sided. The Seiyu\ai 
elected 217 candidates, but the Minseito elected 216. Moreover, Suzuki, 
the Police Bureau Director, and 10 governors were accused of election 
interference. Suzuki had to resign and, profiting from a popular 
backlash, the Minseito won an overwhelming victory at the polls two 
years later. 
In 1942, 381 recommended and 85 independent candidates were 
elected. Government interference at the prefectural level was in cer-
tain instances, but not all, decisive in the election of candidates. Do\o-
kai leader Hatoyama Ichiro, for example, found himself temporarily 
detained by the police following the suspension of one of his rallies. 
Police also arrested Hatoyama's supporters after suspending another 
of his rallies.85 Likewise, "almost all" of Do\o\ai candidate Ando 
Masazumi's 30 rallies were ordered dissolved, it being rare if one 
ended without incident.86 Do\o\ai candidates alleged more blatant 
interference in Gunma, Wakayama, Toyama, Hiroshima, and Naga-
saki. 
Nationally, Adults Association, Reservist Association, and Keibddan 
members canvassed for votes for recommended candidates. These 
groups in Kobe assailed Saito Takao as a traitor and pacifist and other-
wise tried to disrupt his rallies. Police confiscated Saito's campaign 
literature.87 In Kyoto, Ashida Hitoshi contended that police also 
confiscated his campaign literature, harassed his supporters, and 
that Adults Association bullies disrupted his campaign rallies. Ad-
ditionally, the Kyoto area regimental commander denounced his 
candidacy as treasonous. In Niigata, police arrested Do\o\ai candidate 
Kita Reikichi (1885-1961) and prosecutors indicted him for allegedly 
spreading rumors during his campaign. Independent Kawamata 
Seion, the object of thought police attention, campaigned under close 
police supervision. Nevertheless, despite these clearly illegal obstruc-
tions, all of the above named candidates won re-election.88 
Prefectural authorities, especially the governors, led the local police 
and government interference against independent candidates. They 
used the police power as it had been used in the past, to try to affect 
decisively the election's outcome. Legal recourse for victims, however, 
did exist. The election was neither free nor completely controlled. 
Instead it followed a previously established pattern of Japanese gen-
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eral elections in which government interference influenced some, but 
not all, election contests. 
As a generalization, the Tojo government either led or condoned 
election interference mainly against Do\d\ai, Tdho\ai, and former 
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Socialist Masses Party candidates because they had the best chances for 
election among independent candidates. Interference forms were con-
sistent with past precedents indicating that the prefectural governor 
was the key to the degree of interference in each candidate's case. 
As the authority on the spot, the governor's influence could be the 
decisive ingredient in an election. If, however, the governor went too 
far, he risked a political backlash and legal action such as occurred 
in 1892, in 1915, in 1928, and again in 1942. 
In that context, the prefectural authorities' interference was a part 
of the electoral process' demimonde as were vote-buying, election 
brokers, and election obstruction. Interference was cyclical in nature, 
but always simmered just below the thin crust of legality provided by 
the constitution. The shadowy world of election fixers and manipula-
tors also, unfortunately, seems generally to be a permanent feature of 
the democratic electoral process. From the rotten borough of parlia-
mentary Great Britain to Watergate, there have always been those who 
have attempted to use elections for personal gain instead of an ex-
pression of the popular will. Perhaps a comparative study of this 
aspect of popular elections might provide a more accurate measure of 
"political modernity" or of the validity of the so-called "failure of 
parliamentary politics in Japan." 
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Chapter VII 
The Hollow Victory 
Election Results 
The 1942 general election was a superficial government success. 
Over 12 million of the nearly 14.6 million eligible Japanese voters 
trooped to the polls and cast almost eight million votes or 66.3% of the 
total for recommended candidates, while just over four million voted 
for independents.1 Prefecturally, voting percentages for recommended 
candidates ranged from highs of over 84% in the politically conserva-
tive backwaters of Iwate and Kagoshima to a low of 44.6% in Aomori 
where the public had been particularly apathetic about the campaign, 
possibly because the incumbents were the majority of recommended 
candidates.2 There were very few invalidated ballots, only 2,597 in 
all. Among these, some 20% complained about food shortages, 15% 
assailed the election with graffiti like, "A sponsored election makes 
fools of the people," " J a P a n s fifst trick election," and "The police are 
the recommended candidates' campaigners." Another two percent 
complained about the Doolittle Raid by criticizing Tojo for compaign-
ing during wartime or reproving the military who "contemplate while 
enemy planes attack!" One anonymous voter even preferred Doolittle 
to Tojo as he scrawled on his ballot, "North American Aircraft, Ban-
zai!"3 In universal suffrage elections since 1928, the voter absentee 
rate of 16.8% in 1942 was lower than any except the 16.7% in the 1930 
VOTER ABSENTEE PERCENTAGES FOR 
UNIVERSAL MALE SUFFRAGE ELECTIONS 
1928 19.7% 1936 21.3% 
1930 16.7% 1937 26.7% 
1932 18.3% 1942 16.8% 
ABSENTEE RATE IN MAJOR CITIES IN 1937 AND IN 1942 
1937 1942 
Tokyo 37.8% 14.0% 
Kyoto 36.1% 18.9% 
Osaka 46.3% 24.9% 
Yokohama 30.8% 21.0% 
Kobe 28.7% 17.5% 
Nagoya 24.2% 15.2% 
Source: Naimusho keihokyoku, "Shugiin giin sdsenkyo no gaikyo" (Aspects of 
the General Election for the Lower House), Naimu \osei jiho (July 1942), 4-5. 
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general election.4 A genuine surprise was the near record turnout 
because, based on the low campaign rally attendance, political analysts 
had expected a much higher absentee rate. 
Contemporary journalists explained the vast voter turnout, as op-
posed to the poor crowds at rallies, as a function of the labor shortage. 
While hard work and long hours, especially in rural areas, had pre-
cluded people attending campaign rallies, voting required less time 
and consequently did not interfere with other work. Secondly, the 
record number of candidates had apparently diminished the available 
audience since it was physically impossible to attend every campaign 
rally or, in the case of Tokyo's Fifth District, to attend more than a 
handful of rallies conducted by the 25 candidates.5 Thirdly, there was 
ideal weather nationwide on election day. Fourthly, in retrospect, 
observers pronounced the enlightenment campaign a success.6 Other 
reasons suggested for the overwhelming turnout were candidate bal-
ance, "impartial" election regulation, and the IRAA, Adults, Reservist, 
and Greater Japan Women's Associations' as well as neighborhood 
associations' role in getting out the vote. Several Japanese historians 
maintain that these latter activities amounted to forcing voters to cast 
ballots or to face recriminations.7 
These historians point out that non-voters had to provide their 
reasons, in writing, to their respective neighborhood association leaders. 
A special form devised for this purpose required the abstaining voter 
to record personal information (age, address) and his reason for not 
voting, categorized as due to travel, illness, or other.8 According to 
Home Ministry statistics, however, neighborhood associations employed 
this format in only five prefectures besides Tokyo,9 meaning that in 
41 prefectures voters did not have to explain in writing their failure 
to vote. Neighborhood associations did exert peer group pressure on 
their members to vote and neighborhood billboards urged voters to go 
to the polls in 13 prefectures while members in 10 others vowed to vote 
or issued identification slips to indicate those who had voted in 21 
prefectures. Characteristic of the entire campaign, standardization was 
lacking. Peer group pressure and certainly some coercion existed, but 
it seems likely that most voters cast their ballots because they wished 
to demonstrate their political choice via the ballot box. No one tam-
pered with ballots and, based on election interference indictments, 
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only in rare instances did the police or political toughs try to coerce 
or to intimidate voters at the polling stations. 
The Japanese press was effusive in its praise. The Nichi Nichi 
termed the election a "considerable success" that, by striking a blow 
at the former party jiban, allowed men of national outlook to be 
elected. An Asahi editorial also believed that the old political jiban 
was dead and that the election showed beyond any doubt the Tojo 
government's firm base of support. With the election as the first stage, 
a yokusan Diet for national renovation would presently be established. 
The Yomiuri, elated by so many political newcomers' success, also saw 
the death of jiban. It was true that "not a few" old style politicians 
remained, but Diet renovation, the election's fundamental premise, 
had been accomplished. The elected "new men" would form the nu-
leus of the Diet's "new order" and, working with re-elected incum-
bents, who would, of course, have a yo\u$an consciousness, would 
reform the Diet.10 
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Source: Inoue, "Yokusan senkyo o tsuku, 2 ," 36-38. 
Political Council members also crowed about the election results 
because they raised morale, united homefront opinion behind the war 
effort, and placed almost 200 "new men" in the Diet as successful 
recommended candidates. General Abe, avoiding any further blunders, 
expressed his thanks and appreciation to the Second National Branch 
Chiefs Convention that opened in Tokyo on May 4 and that officially 
dissolved the Council on May 6.11 Having served its purpose, the 
Political Council could be disbanded. This meant, however, that there 
was no longer any national political association in Japan. 
An elated Prime Minister Tojo informed a May 2 national radio 
audience how pleased the government was that the election had been 
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conducted fairly and had further strengthened homefront unity. Elec-
tion results, according to Tojo, proved to Japan's allies the Japanese 
people's "unflinching determination" to fight the war to a successful 
conclusion. Now, he continued, the election was over, but he would 
still serve the emperor by prosecuting the war effort backed by the 
entire nation.12 
Winners and Losers 
Election results seemed to justify such optimism. Among recom-
mended candidates 381 (169 new, 200 incumbents, and 12 former 
parliamentarians) won election from the 466 entries (213 new, 235 
incumbents, and 18 former) or 81%. Recommended incumbents 
showed the best election ratio, 85% (200 of 235), while recommended 
newcomers trailed only slightly at 79% (169 of 213), and 67% of 
former members (12 of 18) were also elected. Among unrecom-
mended candidates, 35% of incumbents (47 of 132) won re-election, 
but unrecommended newcomers, lacking Political Council support or 
jiban, managed a paltry seven percent, electing just 30 of 432 candi-
dates. Former members who were not recommended fared slightly 
better at 16% (eight of 49). 






































This infusion of political newcomers had its corollary in which 
incumbents they replaced. Before the election there were 38 Lower 
House vacancies and 45 Yo\udo, two Giin \urabu, eight independents, 
and six Do\6\ai members either retired from politics or opted not to 
run in the 1942 election thus creating 61 additional open seats, or 99 
total. Of the 308 Yo\udo members, 263 ran and 196 were elected 
(204/175 recommended, 59/21 independent), a net loss of 112 seats. 
The Giin \urabu lost six seats, the Kda domei 16, and the Do\6\ai 19. 
Altogether 105 incumbents lost their re-election bids. The 199 new men 
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in turn may be seen as replacing these 204 (99 open, 105 defeated) 
parliamentarians. About half these losses were Yo\udo freshman and 
sophomore members whom the Yo\udo leadership sacrificed during 
the recommendation process. The remainder were Yo\udo opponents 
from the Do\6\ai or Koa giin \ai. "New men" replaced about 100 
defeated incumbents, but not the former political party leaders. In 
fact, the average age of representatives, in an election ballyhooed as 
one to infuse "fresh, new talent" into the Diet, actually increased from 
53 years seven months to 54 years two months.13 













































Average 54 yrs. 2 mo. 53-7 54-3 52-6 52-7 51-9 
Source: Sen\yo no jise\i, 165-169. 
Among former party leaders and their lieutenants, Nakajima, 
Machida, Maeda, Nagai, Shimada, Kiyose, Yamazaki, and even Hato-
yama and Ozaki as independents won re-election with comparative 
ease. The most conspicuous losers among so-called "established parlia-
mentarians" were Tawara Magoichi (1869-1944), a former Commu-
nications and Industry Minister in the Hamaguchi Cabinet; Do\6\ai 
members Tagawa Daikichiro and Hyogo Fifth District sixth termer 
Wakamiya Sado (1875-1946); and Haraguchi Hatsutaro (1876-1949), 
a retired lieutenant general and formerly on the Seiyu\ai Directorate, 
a third termer in Fukuoka's First District. Only two prominent 
Yo\udo figures, recommended Tawara and independent Nomura 
Karoku (1893-1952), a tenth termer formerly on the Minseito direc-
torate, lost. Other significant losers included the former Socialist 
Masses Party members who elected only 13 of 40 candidates, including 
five recommended ones, and who polled about 460,000 votes as com-
pared to over 920,000 in the 1937 general election.14 
The right wing's myriad forces, although electing more representa-
tives than ever before, had to assess the 1942 election as a bitter failure. 
Among reform and traditional rightists, 28 recommended and 21 inde-
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pendent candidates were elected.15 These 49 seats, although they 
should not be thought of as a single, unified voting bloc, represented 
a tripling of seats the right held compared to the 1937 results. How-
ever, over five times the number of reform rightists (196) ran for 
election as in 1937. The Tohokai ran 47 candidates yet elected but 
seven and all 37 Ri\\en yoseikai candidates lost. Those 49 elected 
"orthodox" reform rightists (21 independent) received slightly more 
than one million votes and another 34 candidates (five independent) 
whom the police described as merely "nominal" (non-activist) reform 
rightists also won, securing a little over 575,000 votes. Most "nominal 
rightists," 23 in all, had affiliations with Ishiwara Kanji's Toa renmei 
doshi\ai and they amassed nearly 450,000 votes or 79% of all "nominal 
rightists'" totals. Rightists, according to police tabulations, added 34 
seats to their Diet total, but ran 245 candidates among whom 196 were 
from the reform right camp. In the previous general election, only 
38 reform rightists had entered, but their numbers increased fivefold 
in 1942. Moreover, police reported reform rightists' unrest for contrary 
to their expectations the election did not throw the government and 
the domestic political scene into turmoil thus creating the chance 
for them to seize power. Despite recommended candidates' crushing, 
landslide victory, all was not peaceful in the Japanese political world. 
By May other sources of election criticism began to appear. One 
political authority sarcastically observed that while the election's goal 
was to elect new Diet men, the Political Council had merely perpetu-
ated Yo\udo rule. The presence of so many re-elected Yo\udo incum-
bents in the Diet accordingly reduced the possibility of renovating that 
institution.16 Moreover, critics singled out Adults Association election 
activity for censure on the grounds that the association had used the 
campaign to advance its own, not national, interests.17 There were 
open charges that the Adults Association, dissatisfied with a limited 
enlightenment campaign role, unilaterally criticized "old style candi-
dates" and even, in some instances, denounced recommended candi-
dates whom its leaders identified as "old style" mainstream Diet poli-
ticians. Such activity reinforced the image that association members 
had "run wild" during the election campaign.18 The election's bitter 
residue of resentment against the government and the Political Council 
appeared clearly in the reform rightists' camp. Dd\okai members, 
138 
however, were also busy filing indictments alleging government spon-
sored election interference and other defeated candidates like Noyori 
Hideuchi were in no mood for further sugar-coated homefront unity 
rhetoric. Despite such widespread discontent, however, the paradox 
remains that all political associations in Japan did dissolve and almost 
all Lower House members did join the Yokusan Political Society 
(Yokusan seijikai), the new political association that the Tojo govern-
ment created on May 20,1942. 
The Imperial Rule Political Society 
Like much in Japan, form belies substance. The IRAA appeared 
to be a monolithic political party but, in fact, was a multifarious public 
association forbidden by law to participate in political activity. The 
so-called Yokusan Diet of 1940-1941 (76th Session), instead of provid-
ing homefront unity according to form, produced widespread domestic 
discord over the IRAA's status. So too with the Political Society. As 
the sole political association in Japan after May 1942, it appeared to be 
the culmination of "one-nation one-party" theorists' goals. A closer 
inspection of the association's goals and later tribulations dispels the 
notion that the Political Society functioned as a monolithic political 
body, particularly in the Diet's Lower House. 
Tojo hoped to capitalize on the election results and accordingly 
prepared post-election plans for "concentrating" political power in a 
new political organization to be headed by General Abe Nobuyuki.19 
In order to achieve this objective, on May 7 Tojo invited 70 men repre-
senting the political, financial, and opinion communities to his official 
residence and requested their assistance in consolidating domestic 
political power to realize homefront unity. Among these 70 representa-
tives, 32 of the 33 former Political Council headquarters personnel 
and 29 business and opinion sector delegates were present.20 The dele-
gates agreed among themselves to form the inevitable Preliminary 
Committee for the Concentration of Yokusan Politics (Yokusan seiji 
\esshu junbikai) whose deliberations resulted in the Yokusan Political 
Society's inauguration.21 
Over 950 sponsors endorsed the Political Society, including 338 
Peers, 425 Lower House representatives, 53 IRAA officials, 45 former 
Political Council branch chiefs, and 43 Reservist, IRAA, or former 
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Political Council members. In accordance with the Police Public 
Safety Law, imperial family members, active duty military men, and 
others forbidden to join political organizations as well as eight Lower 
House members then under indictment for alleged election violations, 
were excluded from the new association. Tojo appointed General Abe 
the director and, in his inaugural address, Abe told the assembled 
delegates that the Political Society was neither a political party rooted 
in conflict like American or European models nor was it a "one-nation 
one-party" dictatorship's tool. Abe, who had a knack for ambiguity, 
instead characterized the Society as Japan's own unique political 
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creation. 
The new society's charter did not clarify his nebulous remarks. Its 
aims were: 
Based on \ofyitai principles, to concentrate political power for the 
Greater East Asia War's prosecution. 
Based on loyalty to the Constitution, to anticipate a Yo\usan Diet's 
establishment. 
Based on close liaison with the IRAA, to anticipate a thorough yo\usan 
movement through mutual cooperation. 
Based on the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere's establishment, 
to anticipate a new world order's construction.23 
During the preparatory meetings leading to the Society's creation, 
Japanese political associations and parties began to dissolve themselves 
in a manner reminiscent of the 1940 pre-IRAA stampede to disband 
the existing political parties. The Dokp1{ai, for example, dissolved on 
May 14, closely followed by the Yo\udo five days later. The Tdho\ai, 
still seething with recriminations over its disastrous election cam-
paign, bowed to the inevitable and disbanded itself on May 23 while 
Akao Bin's Ken\o\u\ai and Hashimoto Kingoro's Se\isei\ai also 
broke up as political associations. Furthermore, 456 of the 466 Lower 
House representatives and members of the aforementioned disbanded 
associations joined the Political Society.24 Among Peers, all but 18 
entered the Society, although the existing Peers' clubs, which per-
formed that chamber's management function, as fraternal in nature, 
were not required to disband. Instead, each club dispatched a repre-
sentative to the Society. Overall, the Society seemed to enjoy bicameral 
Diet support. 
A General Affairs Committee composed of 29 members (14 perma-
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nent), including Katsu Masanori, Ota Masataka, Oasa Tadao, Nagai 
Ryu tar 6, Maeda Yonezo, and Yamazaki Tatsunosuke ran the Political 
Society. The same pre-election Diet leaders who had dominated the 
Political Council staffed the Society's highest decision making organ. 
They also established a bureaucratic nightmare known as the Political 
Affairs Investigatory Committee. It had 15 committees (one for each 
ministry), 31 directors, and two vice-chairmen. Its chairman, Yama-
zaki Tatsunosuke, supposedly maintained close liaison with the cabi-
net, the ministries, and IRAA-related associations to prepare pre-
session Diet plans. He also worked with various ministry personnel 
to investigate and to revise planning drafts that would be submitted 
to the General Affairs Bureau as definitive proposals.25 The IRAA, as 
a public association, found itself relegated to menial nonpolitical work 
like bond rallies, promotion of national fitness, and increased produc-
tion. Both the IRAA and the Political Society were supposed to co-
operate with the government to achieve homefront unity. In reality, 
the Political Society followed almost exactly along the guidelines that 
the Yo\udos February general meeting had proposed* In short, the 
Political Society was expected to monopolize political power in Japan.26 
Since the IRAA was to lead the public side of this equation, the 
Tojo cabinet decided to consolidate within it other public associations 
like the patriotic unions, the Greater Japan Women's Association, and 
the Japan Boy Scouts. It swiftly accomplished this after meeting with 
those associations' representatives in early June and, following an un-
derstanding reached at that conference, on June 25, those groups 
disbanded themselves in order to enter the IRAA. Similarly, in mid-
July, the IRAA absorbed the Election Purification League and on 
July 17 the IRAA's Central Cooperative Committee extended its scope 
to encompass the community councils and neighborhood associations 
network. Prefectural governors, however, still remained as the IRAA 
prefectural branch directors. Additionally, Tojo again reorganized 
the IRAA as five Bureaus (General Affairs, Practical Action, Revive 
Asia, Training, Investigatory) replaced the existing three (General 
Affairs, Organization, East Asia). The newly created Investigatory 
Bureau's primary task was liaison with its Political Society counterpart 
and with government ministry committees in order to provide these 
committees with inputs concerning national livelihood conditions. 
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It had 10 subcommittees with approximately 200 members examining 
matters ranging from pure science to elevating national spirit.27 
An uneventful two day session of the Extraordinary 80th Imperial 
Diet (May 27-28, 1942) passed only four bills, none of crucial impor-
tance, and unanimously approved a vote of appreciation for the armed 
forces.28 The Tojo cabinet regarded this session as a success because 
it contributed to homefront unity by demonstrating to foreign powers 
the Japanese government's and people's "iron determination" to prose-
cute the war effort.29 Indeed, according to a secret cabinet document 
circulated prior to the 80th Session, the exhibition of such Diet soli-
darity was the government's precise goal.30 Homefront unity had 
seemingly been attained. 
Crac\s in National Unity 
From the Political Society's very inception, the police cautioned 
government leaders not to overestimate the "external effects" of the 
Political Society and thereby fall victim to domestic disunity because 
of factional disputes among the Society's members.31 Thought police 
analysts expressed their anxiety about Lower House members who, 
while concealing their great dissatisfaction with the government's 
election policy, still joined the Political Society. Former 1930's party 
leaders like Machida Chuji, Nakajima Chikuhei, Akita Kiyoshi, and 
Uchida Nobuya (1880-1971), a former Seiyu\ai directorate member, 
disapproved of the Political Society's mainstream leaders who had been 
these old party chieftains' political lieutenants.32 Now these one-time 
subordinates controlled Society affairs, leaving the old leadership with 
titular advisory positions (Nakajima and Machida) while consigning 
Akita and Uchida to serve on the Society's obscure Accounting Over-
seers Deliberative Council. In this sense, the 1942 election dethroned 
the 1930's leadership and replaced them with their former political 
lieutenants as Maeda, Nagai, Oasa, Ota Masataka, Katsu, and 
Yamazaki became the new Diet Lower House and Political Society 
power brokers. 
The gravest source of police concern, however, was the reform 
rightists' attitude. Representatives of this persuasion claimed that the 
Political Society was an establishment plot to perpetuate the status quo. 
Police analysts warned that government overconfidence might inad-
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vertently engender the chaotic political situation that reform rightists 
had forecast after the election. Such conditions in turn could provide 
these extremists with the chance to seize power.33 Newly elected 
reform rightists like Akao Bin, Sasagawa Ryoichi, and Hashimoto 
Kingoro continued to scorn so-called "liberal Diet elements" whose 
presence in the Diet, they felt, precluded a truly fresh, powerful Diet's 
creation. Pessimistically, thought police observed that, although all 
reform rightist Diet men had joined the Political Society, this amor-
phous group required strictest vigilance because its entire political 
camp was "wrapped in tendencies critical of and estranged from the 
Political Society."34 
Even though ultimately all but eight Lower House members en-
tered the Political Society, this offered no cause for rejoicing to the 
hardheaded police realists. Quite candidly, police analysts suggested 
that former Do\o\ai members joined the Society because they realized 
that they could not openly oppose it. Among elected unrecommended 
candidates who joined, there was an air of resigned dissatisfaction. 
Rising conflict between the so-called new men, the Diet freshmen 
eager to change everything and their legislative seniors anxious to 
preserve their own prerogatives added another problem. In the Upper 
House, 18 Peers refused to enter the Society because, they believed, its 
existence violated the constitutionally established bicameral legislature; 
because it was unsuitable for Peers, the supposed "overseers of govern-
ment institutions," to join a political association; and because those 
Peers who did join a political association were merely doing so for 
personal advancement's sake and thus foresaked their perogatives as 
Peers.35 Finally, police thought that reform rightist associations like 
the Tohd\ai, the Kenkpkukai, and the Sekjseikai had dissolved and 
their Diet members joined the Society because "they clearly had the 
idea that the government would not recognize any political association 
outside the Political Society."36 Those who proclaimed that a new, 
monolithic political party now existed to promote homefront unity 
for the war effort interpreted form as substance. The mundane truth, 
glaringly apparent to dispassionate police realists, was that such home-
front unity had not been achieved. 
Neither did the Political Society's new subcommittee liaison system 
with government ministries prove conducive to homefront solidarity. 
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It faced three problems. First, deliberative sessions, theoretically the 
new tripod government-IRAA-Political Society-system's backbone, de-
generated into elaborate affairs where members accorded overly re-
spectful treatment to important government figures but failed to 
produce politically significant results.87 Second, the cabinet and the 
ministries subcommittee system only functioned during those few 
months each year when the Diet met in session and therefore found its 
activities accordingly reduced. Third, the committee system's func-
tional overlap inherently contained potential conflict of interests in 
dealing with inter-committee affairs. Yamazaki Tatsunosuke, for 
instance, chaired the Society's Political Affairs Investigatory Commit-
tee and simultaneously the IRAA's Investigatory Committee plus di-
rected (with Maeda, Oasa, and Nagai) both the Society and the IRAA. 
Nagai, for his part, also remained as Revive Asia Bureau director 
(formerly East Asia Bureau). Disputes among subordinates on differ-
ent committees chaired by the same man inevitably led to charges of 
favoritism. The subcommittee system was too complex to coordinate 
cabinet, IRAA, and Society affairs. 
The Tojo cabinet, in effect, superimposed the Political Society 
over the Diet, the IRAA, and even the government. Ostensibly the 
sole political association in Japan, it failed to provide national home-
front unity because a reaction among IRAA staffers and their Society 
counterparts occurred as both tried to protect or to expand their 
bureaucratic empires at the other's expense. The overlap of functions, 
that was supposed to allay such inter-association rivalry, really exacer-
bated it as chairmen like Nagai or Yamazaki became caught in the 
middle of squabbles between members of agencies they controlled. It 
also proved impossible to balance successfully the myriad associations 
that had just dissolved themselves to enter the IRAA. The Adults 
Association status within the IRAA remained unclear, and other 
organizations such as the Greater Japan Woman's Association and the 
patriotic unions also tried to retain their separate identities within 
the IRAA structure. Perhaps the key dispute between the Political 
Society and the IRAA involved the creation of regional branches for 
the Society. 
The Political Society equivocated about expanding its influence 
beyond the Diet. Rank and file Diet men especially wanted to develop 
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regional branches in order to maintain contact with their constituents 
and to construct their jiban for the next general election. The Society's 
directorate, however, adopted the position, as expressed by Maeda 
Yonezo in response to those Diet members who favored local branches, 
that the establishment of local branches monopolizing political power 
would smack of the former political parties. Instead, Maeda proposed 
that the Political Society and the IRAA cooperate regionally and he 
reaffirmed that the IRAA would direct the public while the Society 
guided the homefront yo\usan movement's political aspect. His an-
nouncement only stimulated increased controversy within Diet ranks 
because it left the Political Society as a disembodied entity that divorced 
the elected membership from their constituents and from their jiban. 
To further complicate matters, the Adults Association had just 
completed a powerful, if not nationally coordinated, anti-jiban cam-
paign and Political Society leaders expected their future, vigorous 
resistance to the creation of local Political Society branches.38 The 
Adults Association, although a public association, used its role in the 
1942 general election to create its own political foundation. It ex-
panded that base considerably by its involvement in the May 1942 
municipal, town, and village assembly elections when over 30,000 
association members were elected to these local assemblies.39 These 
successes only whetted the Adults Association's political palate and 
did not dilute in the slightest its fundamental anti-former political 
party or anti-bureaucratic characteristics. In part, this accounts for the 
Adults Association's continued resistance to the Political Society's 
acquisition of a regional organization network. By spring 1943, the 
Adults Association boasted 47 working prefectural branches, 820 county 
or city ones, and 10,594 at the town and village level with 1,300,000 
members.40 
Political reporters wrote of the Adults Association's regional politi-
cization and openly criticized this tendency.41 The Adults Association 
should end its political maneuverings, they felt, and cease encroach-
ing on regional political affairs as well as superseding the local 
IRAA.42 General recognition existed that the regional IRAA no longer 
amounted to much more than its local business office while the emerg-
ing Adults Association was the political force in the hinterlands.43 
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Evidently the estrangement between the Adults Association and the 
IRAA was irreconcilable. 
The IRAA's Third Cooperative Council (September 26-29, 1942) 
exhibited confusion over its future role when delegates articulated what 
was better left unsaid. If the IRAA lost all its political character, it 
would be mortally weakened, but, if the Political Society did not pos-
sess a regional organization, then its purpose would be negated locally 
and, consequently, the IRAA would be unable to assist the Society in 
consolidating homefront power for the war effort.44 
Breakdown of Political Society Control 
In the face of the Allied counter-offensive in the South Pacific, the 
perceived requirement for greater homefront unity magnified this 
problem within Political Society ranks. Some 290 Lower House So-
ciety members organized the Senryo\u zo\yo rinji \yogi\ai (Extraor-
dinary Committee to Reinforce War Potential) and demanded the 
IRAA and Political Society's unification. The Tojo government, how-
ever, wanted the IRAA retained in its role as an auxiliary administra-
tive organ to implement government sponsored public campaigns.45 
As the government committed itself to the existing dual IRAA-
Political Society structure, the cabinet naturally opposed any funda-
mental reform and refused to consider the extraordinary committee's 
proposal. A private instruction of November 20, 1942 made the cabinet 
position clear to the Political Society leaders. 
Cumulatively, the proliferation of bureaucratic agencies that aug-
mented rather than replaced existing entities increased political tensions 
because, as in the 1940-1941 IRAA situation, it simply papered over 
deep divisions with a homefront unity facade, this time in Political 
Society form. The Society also exacerbated regional antagonisms be-
tween itself and the local IRAA and its related associations. The 
government, whom police kept well informed of this unpleasant fact, 
faced the 81st Regular Imperial Diet Session's opening in December 
1942 with an apprehension that the session proved justifiable.46 
According to the Tojo cabinet, the 81st Diet's mission was to 
manifest one hundred million peoples' determination to prosecute the 
war effort.47 This required the Diet's unquestioning approval of all 
government introduced legislation, but the government expected diffi-
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culties to arise in the Diet over its controversial regional reorganization 
plan, over its intention to utilize the candidate recommendation sys-
tem in the upcoming prefectural elections, and over the Tokyo City 
reorganization bill. In order to forestall any possible embarrassment 
on the Diet floor, ministerial subcommittees worked with the Political 
Society to deliberate in advance on the session's legal and budgetary 
legislation prior to its actual introduction into the Lower House. But, 
in order not to create the impression that the Diet had abandoned its 
legislative perogatives, these subcommittees decided that prefunctory 
public debate on the government sponsored legislation should occur 
in the Diet, after which the original drafts would be approved and 
unanimously passed unamended.48 The re-emergence of Lower House 
factionalism fractured these expectations. 
Factions, reminiscent of pre-election days in-house negotiating 
groups, quickly reestablished themselves in the post-election Diet. On 
July 20, 1942, 199 newly elected both recommended and independent 
candidates formed a negotiating group, the Seishin \urabu (New 
Members Club) to promote their Diet interests. Dominated by right-
ists like Akao, Sasagawa, Sasaki, and Shioden, the club attacked liberal 
parliamentarians like Ozaki Yukio and pressed for Political Society 
local branch formation. Similarly, other "research clubs," as the police 
labeled them, coalesced. Seventy-five second and third termers organ-
ized the Sanjunichi\ai (Thirtieth Club) that, like the Seishin \urabu 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Political Society's existing arrange-
ment and wished to reform it by the formation of local branches. 
The approximately 40 Adults Association affiliated Diet members 
established the Juichi nichi\ai (Eleventh Day Society) expecting to use 
it to promote Adults Association branches as the new political base for 
the Political Society. The remaining eight former Do\6\ai members 
joined with Ashida Hitoshi and Saito Takao in the Shisaikai (Like 
Thinkers Society) and 15 former Giin \urabu members founded the 
Sansui sa\ura gumi (Cherry Landscape Society). Largest among these 
sometimes overlapping "research groups" with some 258 members 
was the Ko\umin \yoi\u shin\6 giin renmei (Dietman's League to 
Promote Public Instruction), a pro-government Diet club dedicated 
to cooperation with government policies and dominated by the Politi-
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cal Society leaders like Maeda, Nagai, Kiyose, and Yamazaki who 
were League members.49 
Ten days before the 81st Session opened, on December 14, 1942, 
Seishin \urabu and Sanjunichi \urabu members joined forces with the 
newly established (October 1942) Keizai giin renmet (Diet Members 
Economic League) composed of 261 members, mainly middle level 
parliamentarians, to sponsor the Yushi daigishi\ai (Volunteer Repre-
sentatives Association). With 106 members, the Association's goal 
was Political Society renovation through the establishment of a single, 
national, political association. Moreover, as part of this renovation, 
Association members demanded that the Diet General Affairs and 
Directorate personnel be selected on the basis of Diet management 
and not, as was the practice, on condition of being a Political Society 
General Affairs Directorate permanent member; that the Political 
Society's headquarters system be realigned and that its General Affairs 
and Directorate staffs be reduced; and that a lower level, regional 
Political Society organization be created. Director Maeda, on Decem-
ber 24, replied that the headquarters agreed with the basic positions 
advocated. However, he believed that the necessity of the unification 
of the IRAA and Political Society being unclear and because it would 
interfere with the upcoming Diet business, any actual reform would 
have to be delayed.50 Meanwhile, these "research groups' " maturation 
led editorialists to comment on the reappearance of both old and new 
factions in both Houses.51 
The 81st Diet Session became a nightmare for the To jo government 
and for the Political Society directors because disgruntled Diet mem-
bers refused to be manipulated like Bunra\u puppets. In the Upper 
Chamber, Count Okochi once again questioned Tojo about allega-
tions of widespread government interference during the 1942 general 
election campaign.52 Two days later, on February 6, 1943, during 
the Lower House Budget Committee Hearings, Satsuma Yuji (1897-
1966), elected as a Tdho\ai candidate from Fukui Prefecture, inter-
pellated Tojo and Yuzawa concerning the propriety of a candidate 
recommendation system. Sasagawa Ryoichi also heaped scorn on the 
candidate recommendation system. When Tojo and Yuzawa tried to 
dismiss the issue, their evasions met catcalls, laughter, and shouts of 
"Be serious!" Satsuma, his own election campaign victimized first by 
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police harassment when he spoke out in favor of a redistribution of 
Southern Front resources and later arrested for alleged vote buying, 
heckled the prime minister as he told him that a popular joke in 
Kagoshima during the 1942 election was that even Tojo probably 
could not get elected running as an independent candidate.53 During 
the debate on city reorganization, supposedly a pro forma matter, 
Dietmen again attacked the candidate recommendation system and 
forced Tojo to admit under tough, relentless questioning that the 
government would not employ such a system in the upcoming prefec-
tural elections.54 The following day, February 19, Yuzawa reaffirmed 
the premier's decision.55 
This campaign to prevent a candidate recommendation system's 
use in the approaching prefectural elections predictably had developed 
among elected independent candidates, mainly from the reform right. 
On January 27, 1943, 20 such members including Satsuma, Nakano 
Seigo, Mitamura Takeo (1899-1964), and Akao Bin, organized the 
Hisuisen yushi daigishikai (Unrecommended Candidates Volunteer 
Diet Man's Association) in order to block a recommendation system's 
future use.56 Parliamentary opposition proved instrumental then in 
causing the government to abandon the candidate recommendation 
system. This decision came as a great shock to the Adults Association, 
particularly at the local level, for Adults Association prefectural 
leaders believed that the recommendation system, despite certain 
flaws, was the most powerful weapon in their arsenals to destroy still 
existing jiban?1 
The 81st Session's major crisis erupted over the Tojo cabinet's at-
tempt to revise the Wartime Penal Regulations Code. The crux of 
the bill was that those who "opposed" the national government in 
wartime or otherwise disturbed public tranquility might be punished 
by up to seven years penal servitude or imprisonment.58 Maintaining 
that the Penal Regulations reform provisions were unclear and that 
its passage into law might result in the emergence of a police state 
(an\o\u seiji), an odd alliance ranging from reform rightists to liberal 
former Do\6\ai and former Socialist Masses Party members banded 
together to try to prevent passage. 
On March 6, the Political Society's Investigatory Committee ap-
proved the government's draft proposal. That same afternoon, Tsu-
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gumo Kunitoshi led a parliamentary group whose members, aware 
of the growing resistance to the bill, tried to ramrod the unamended 
legislation through the in-house Diet committee. A brawl between 
the bill's supporters and its detractors erupted. Amidst overturned 
desks and flying inkstands, opponents literally fought with Tsugumo's 
flying wedge to prevent the bill from reaching the Diet floor. An 
emergency cabinet meeting as well as an emergency Political Society 
Directorate meeting convened in an attempt to pressure recalcitrant 
members into passing the legislation. Late night phone calls and 
veiled threats did not dissuade opponents, and, on the Diet floor, 
former Do\o\ai leader Hatoyama joined with Tdhddoshi\ai (the 
public association successor to the defunct, political Toho\ai) director 
Nakano to denounce the pending legislation.59 Despite their efforts, 
the Penal Regulations revision passed unamended, but not, as the 
Tojo cabinet had hoped for the sake of homefront unity, unanimously. 
Contrary to the government's expectations and desires then, a com-
placent Diet did not perfunctorily rubber stamp legislative bills. 
During the following 82nd Extraordinary Diet Session (June 16-18, 
1943), Akao Bin, in the middle of Prime Minister Tojo's address to 
Lower House members, suddenly leaped to his feet and shouted out 
that Tojo act, not just talk, about contemporary problems. Compound-
ing Akao's rudeness was the presence of foreign observers from various 
so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere nations who received 
an unexpected look at Japanese parliamentary politics in action. The 
Lower House leadership censured Akao for his unruly conduct, but, 
in his support, Nakano, Hatoyama, Eto Genkuro (1879-1957), a retired 
major general re-elected as an independent, and Shiratori Toshio 
walked out of the Political Society.60 
The Disintegration of Homefront Unity 
These domestic political disruptions added to the military woes 
besetting Japan's far-flung armies and navies and the besieged Tojo 
government became increasingly repressive. It is possible to date this 
phenomenon from August 1942 when Tojo elevated Colonel Shikata 
Ryoji (1896- ) to Tokyo Military Police Commander. Following the 
Midway (June 1942) and Guadalcanal (August 1942-January 1943) 
military debacles and the increased political dissent exemplified by 
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Diet events, Tojo lashed out at political opponents and attempted to 
coerce them into supporting homefront unity. As the former Military 
Police commander put it, in the Pacific War's early stages Tojo used 
the military police sparingly but, as his policies came under fire and 
as his popularity began to fade, he employed the military police to 
try to suppress any opposition.61 One such abuse of power Tojo 
directed against the reform right. On October 18, 1943, thought police 
arrested Nakano Seigo as part of a nationwide roundup of T6hod6-
shi\at and reform rightist Kinno ma\oto musubisha members. 
Thought police alleged that these groups conspired to overthrow the 
Tojo cabinet and to assassinate its leaders. 
The previous April, Tojo had pushed through a cabinet reorganiza-
tion in hopes of solidifying contacts among the government, the IRAA, 
and the Political Society. He appointed Yamazaki Tatsunosuke Agri-
culture and Forestry Minister and Oasa Tadao Minister of State; the 
IRAA's vice director and Adults Association director Ando Kisaburo 
became Home Minister, and Viscount Okabe Nagakage (1884-1970), 
an IRAA and Political Society Directorate member, assumed the Edu-
cation Ministry portfolio. In spite of the obvious political intent of 
these appointments, when Tojo asked Oasa to secure the Diet's coop-
eration in preventing the incarcerated Nakano from taking his seat 
in the 83rd Extraordinary Diet Session scheduled for October 26-28, 
1943, Oasa refused. To make matters worse, Oasa informed a cha-
grined Tojo that Nakano, as a Diet member, could not be prevented 
from taking his seat. Moreover, if Nakano were not allowed to 
assume his Diet seat, all independence under law would vanish in 
Japan.62 The newly appointed Metropolitan Police Board director 
Susugida Yoshitomo (1897-1963), who as Kagoshima governor during 
the 1942 election exhibited few qualms about election interference, told 
Tojo that there was insufficient evidence to hold Nakano past October 
25. Chief Prosecutor Matsuzaka doubted that enough evidence existed 
for an indictment and ultimately, even though Colonel Shikata took 
personal charge of Nakano's interrogation, the police freed Nakano on 
October 25. During the early morning hours of the next day, Nakano 
committed suicide. The episode again illustrates that the Diet was 
not a rubber stamp but a still respected institution and that the 
rule of law still was to a marked extent respected in wartime Japan. 
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The preceding examples of Diet dissent and of Diet defiance of 
the Tojo cabinet's wishes clearly make it impossible to support the 
assertion that the 1942 General Election served to provide a "dicta-
torial political base" for Tojo's government or that the Diet found 
itself completely unified under the Political Society. It is true that the 
existing 1942 political parties did dissolve in order for their members 
to enter the Political Society, but a one-nation one-party system did 
not result.63 Neither did the civilian right restrict its criticism of 
Tojo's regime to the final stages of the war because the reform right 
continually criticized the Tojo cabinet from the opening days of the 
Pacific War.64 Even anti-Diet contemporaries recognized the lack of 
national unity and Diet solidarity. Military Aflfairs Bureau chieftain 
Sato Kenryo, for instance, commented that while outwardly the Diet 
appeared united and strong, internally the factionalism characteristic 
of the former political party era still was rampant.65 Finally, the 
Political Society, in spite of its obstensible monopoly on political power 
in Japan, never became the mass mobilization political party that its 
progenitors envisaged. In that sense, it cannot be equated with proto-
typical totalitarian style parties that "exist to organize a monopoly 
of political power" and "are permanent ruling parties."66 Instead, the 
Political Society, paradoxically in a manner more representative of 
democratic parties, competed with the Adults Association, with the 
IRAA, and with the cabinet for its share of political power. Its failure 
to establish viable local branches, however, precluded the Political 
Society from activating popular support for anything. The Adults 
Association superseded the IRAA in assuming that role at the local 
level. Friction and competition, not harmony and cooperation, be-
came the hallmarks of relations between the Society and the Adults 
Association. 
This all suggests that wartime Japan was a pluralistic political 
system.67 Restrictions obviously existed on individual and on political 
liberties. Simultaneously, though, competition for political power 
shares continued and the former party politicians enjoyed a resurgence 
to national prominence as cabinet ministers. The resilience and te-
nacity of the "defunct" political parties' leading personalities, who, 
after all, dominated the 1942 General Election and subsequently 
recovered gradually their positions of prestige and authority within 
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the wartime cabinets, indicates that although the political parties were 
institutionally weak, the party politicians and their associated local 
power bases were individually strong. If, as suggested, the party lead-
ership dissolved their parties to advance their own interests, their 
decision appears sound in the light of their return to political power 
in 1942 and in 1943. The former party men took care of their own 
interests. That may seem like a callous disregard of constituents' 
interests, but the prewar Japanese politician never considered himself 
to be the representative of a mass constituency. Rather he represented 
special, local interests, personified by the community leaders. The 
politician was as much a creature of his jiban as his jiban was the 
creation of his labors. 
Indeed the former party politicians outlasted Tojo's government, 
the Political Society, the IRAA, and even their archenemy the Adults 
Association. After Tojo's resignation as prime minister on July 18, 
1944, Shimada Toshio, Maeda Yonezo, and Machida Chuji appeared 
as cabinet ministers in Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki's new govern-
ment. The government dissolved the Political Society itself on March 
30, 1945 to be replaced by yet another vain attempt at creating a 
monolithic political party, the Dai Nippon sei]i\ai (Greater Japan 
Political Association). A May 8, 1945 cabinet decision disbanded the 
IRAA and the Adults Association so that their respective members 
might enter still another newly created homefront unity vehicle, the 
Kokumin giyutai (People's Heroic Fighting Corps).68 
Throughout the Pacific War, the former party leaders and their 
top lieutenants continued to vie successfully for a share of political 
power as illustrated by their again attaining cabinet level rank. This 
was possible because even in a conservative but pluralistic society the 
government needed the politicians' expertise and specialized knowledge 
to conduct state affairs. The Meiji Constitution, even with the con-
servative interpretation then attached to that document, made it im-
possible for any government to ignore the Diet.69 Cabinets, then, had 
to cooperate with the former party leaders to have their legislation 
approved in the Diet. This arrangement was not as onesided as it 
might appear since it provided the former party leaders sufficient 
leverage to dominate the 1942 General Election's candidate recom-
mendation system, the Political Society, and despite friction among 
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membership, to be able to steer government introduced legislation 
through the Lower House passage. In exchange for the political conti-
nuity that they provided in the Diet and in the Political Society, whose 
structure ultimately followed the basic Yokudo formulation, former 
party leaders were rewarded with cabinet level rank. The give and 
take of the parliamentary system, including the electoral process, 
functioned in Japan throughout the Pacific War.70 
These developments, in turn, highlight the Japanese political ex-
perience since the 1868 Meiji Restoration characterized by a continual 
dualism between reform and conservative thought, or succinctly, the 
struggle of change versus tradition. In value laden terms, the process 
has been described as the conflict between absolutism and liberalism. 
The patterns of the general elections of 1892, 1915, 1928, and 1942 serve 
as excellent examples of this clash between traditional and reform 
currents. It is not surprising then that there are marked similarities 
among all four elections, even to the point of similar rhetoric to ra-
tionalize illegal interference. 
In such a political atmosphere, the 1942 General Election was not 
a Hobson's choice. Viable independent candidates contested, in many 
cases successfully, the election with their recommended counterparts. 
Moreover, the pageantry associated with "totalitarian style" elections 
was conspicuously lacking. The chief reason for the 1942 election 
campaign's dullness perhaps was the lack of lower level political 
mobilization units, similar to the Nazi block leader or the Soviet 
agitator, to activate the population to participate "properly" in the 
campaign.71 It is true that the Home Ministry and the cabinet mo-
bilized the neighborhood association network for the election, but the 
Police Security Law of 1900 by strictly defining the separation of public 
and political associations restricted neighborhood association functions 
during the campaign. It remained a semi-free institution reflecting the 
wartime society. 
Despite the preponderant military influence, the army was not a para-
mount influence in the campaign. The Military Affairs Bureau failed 
in all its one-nation one-party schemes for the IRAA; its leaders Muto 
and Sato discovered themselves outclassed by Home Ministry bureau-
crats during the pre-election campaign planning, and Military Affairs 
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Bureau designs for the Adults Association also ended in disillusion-
ment.72 During the candidate selection process, regimental area com-
manders did not have the final voice in picking recommended candi-
dates, and the military police did not interfere in the election cam-
paign itself.73 All documentary evidence indicates that election 
supervision and election regulation remained where it traditionally 
had been, within the Home Ministry. 
Home Ministry police did attempt to regulate strictly the election 
campaign. Part of this rigid enforcement may be attributed to the 
wartime conditions that added further to the already existing restric-
tions on individual liberties that, the other part of the equation, an 
increasingly conservative government had erected to protect itself 
from the perceived menace of social change. When police took the 
lead in directing election interference, they did so in traditional forms. 
While it cannot be denied that the police did obstruct some candidates' 
campaigns, their interference was irregular in application and de-
pended on the prefectural governor's predilections. While the wartime 
Japanese political milieu may not have been the most appealing, it 
simply contained too many "peculiarities," an effective, functioning 
constitution, a working legislature, free elections, a functioning judi-
ciary that insured an appeal to law as ultimately embodied in the 
constitution, to be labeled as "fascist."74 
The pluralistic pre-war Japanese society did not coalesce into a 
"monolithic state" nor was it a "totally integrated" one during the 
Pacific War. Sectional, political, ideological, and economic interests 
continued to exist, never in complete harmony with an idealized 
"homefront unity," but rather as they had developed since the Meiji 
Restoration, co-existing, each supreme in its own sphere and each 
jealously guarding its own perogatives. Even the optimum conditions 
produced by a spectacular series of battlefield victories, capped by the 
capture of Singapore, could not fully reconcile these pre-war Japanese 
society trademarks. Neither "absolutism" nor "liberalism" ever com-
pletely eclipsed the other. A mixture of these two strains of thought 
emerged in the conservative, pluralistic, pre-war Japanese society and 
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The Outline of the Basic Campaign for the 
Accomplishment of the Yo\usan Election 
Cabinet Resolution February 18, 1942 
1) The Title of the Campaign: It will be called The Campaign for the 
Accomplishment of the Election for the Successful Prosecution of the Greater 
East Asia War. 
2) The Campaign's Objectives: At the time the general election is executed, 
a mass, national, people's movement will be developed in order to anticipate 
the establishment of a fresh, powerful Diet which has the aim of successful 
prosecution of the Greater East Asia War. We anticipate that the realization of 
a yo\usan election will cope with the serious situation. 
3) Basic Campaign Policy: The election serves as an opportunity to raise 
national morale for inevitable victory and to harden the firm national con-
sciousness for the prosecution of the Greater East Asia War. The establishment 
of a fresh, powerful Diet can positively evoke a heightened national, earnest, 
pure, political will. 
The prosecution of the Greater East Asia War is the major objective, and 
we can foment universally the opportunity to mobilize for the Diet suitable, 
qualified men who should be entrusted with the serious responsibility of true 
imperial rule assistance. 
Faced with the serious circumstances under which the election takes place, 
the election will be completely ethical and will decisively sweep away existing 
evil practices so that a just, clean election can appear. 
4) Methods for Executing the Election: It will be thoroughly inculcated by 
an enlightenment campaign. 
Based on the above fundamental principles, this campaign, as a great en-
lightenment movement having the aims of successful prosecution of the Greater 
East Asia War, establishment of a yo\usan Diet, and the realization of a 
yo\usan election, will mobilize the bura\u, chonai-\ai, and tonarigumi in cities, 
towns, and villages, local organizations, and, of course, all other possible organi-
zations. We anticipate active development. 
Fomenting the tendency to recommend candidates: It can positively foment 
the tendency to recommend the most suitable candidates for the realization of 
the yo\usan election's enlightenment campaign. 
Election Ethics and Wartime Arrangements: During a time of grave crisis, 
in order to have a true and sincere yo\usan election, we expect the following 
arrangements will anticipate election ethics and wartime arrangements: 
We expect a just election to sweep away existing private considerations and 
connections related to elections. 
We will endeavor to arouse the mass electorate's self-consciousness, work for 
the eradication of election crimes, and prevent voter absenteeism. As for election 
campaigners, through their self-discipline and self-regulation, we expect that 
election violations will cease. 
In compliance with wartime requirements, we will work rationally to provide 
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materials and labor. Economy and improved campaign methods are necessary 
for the election campaign. 
Organs for the implementation of the campaign: This campaign, as a cam-
paign to unite government and people in national solidarity, will be implemented 
by the principal organs indicated below. 
The government will determine basic campaign policy and will lead the 
entire campaign under close contact with related organs. 
Local governments, complying with the national government's basic policy, 
will determine campaign implementation policy and lead the entire campaign 
locally. 
The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (including the Imperial Rule 
Assistance Young Adults Association) and the Central Election Purification 
League will develop a popular movement in cooperation with the national and 
local governments. 
Source: Naikaku kanbo shuji, ed. (Chief Cabinet Secretariat), Nai\a\u 
seido 70-nen shi (A Seventy Year History of the Cabinet System) (Tokyo: 
Okurasho insatsu kyoku, 1955), pp. 490-491. I am grateful to Mr. Suekuni 
Masao of the Boeicho senshi shitsu for providing me with a copy of this docu-
ment. 
Appendix B 
Articles to be Especially Alert for at This Time 
Cabinet Information Bureau Second Section December 9, 1941 
1) Explanations distorting the war's true motives or slandering the Empire's 
just position. 
2) Explanations distorting the particulars of the opening of hostilities or slan-
dering measures of the government or high command. 
3) Arguments whose tenor suggests that we expected German and Italian 
assistance at the time of opening the war. 
4) Arguments whose tenor suggests that a conflict of opinions between the 
government and the military exists. 
5) Explanations that the public should not obey government directions or that 
might cause a lack of harmony in public opinion. 
6) Arguments whose tenor would likely bring about unrest and agitation in 
relations with China, Manchukuo, and in other foreign relations. 
7) Arguments whose tone could foster anti-war or war-weariness tendencies 
among the public. 
8) Arguments tending to foster anti-military ideas. 
9) Arguments tending to foster pacifist tendencies which could cause a dejec-
tion of national morale. 
10) All arguments whose tone might cause a disturbance of home front law 
and order. 
Source: "Kiji sashi-tomeru jiko," cited in Hatanaka Shigeo, Showa shuppan 
danatsu shoshi (Tokyo: Tosho shimbun, 1977), 67-70. 
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Appendix C 
Matters Related to the Control of Articles about the General Election to the 
House of Representatives Secret February 28, 1942. 
Matters such as the following which oppose this general election or inten-
tionally try to diminish national zeal toward the general election: 
A) 1. Describing the election as originating in democratic ideas that are con-
trary to our national polity or trying to destroy national polity will not be 
approved. 
2. As for the execution of a general election in wartime, matters likely to 
divide public opinion, divulge our deficiencies to the enemy, actions that 
waste wartime materials, hinder expansion of production, emphasize an 
adverse influence on the prosecution of the Holy War, or points about 
bossism will not be allowed. 
3. Persons claiming that without electoral reform old-order politicians in-
evitably will use the election to regain their former high positions, and, 
consequently, the election is meaningless. 
B) Matters that might give birth to ideas critical of the Political Council, in-
tentionally distort the government's purposes, create distrust of the govern-
ment, or suspicion about the election's fairness. Examples: 
1. Independent candidates have been pressured as part of a plan to elect 
specific individuals, and, thus, it is a denial of the spirit of the constitution. 
2. The Political Council, government, military, or government officials, in 
order to accomplish their own political ambitions, have created a plan for 
a government manufactured election, and the candidate recommendation 
system is an obstruction to a fair election. 
3. Extensive slander of the men the government summoned at the time of 
establishing the Political Council or suggesting, as a method, the estab-
lishment of the Political Council was a backward step. 
C) Matters such as agitating to show disapproval (in the election) by not voting 
or voiding one's ballot. 
D) Matters such as agitating that, because this election will establish a yo\usan 
political order, one should absolutely prevent the return to high positions 
of old-order politicians either by illegal means or direct action. 
E) Matters such as taking advantage of the election to agitate the public with 
enemy or communist propaganda. 
F) Other matters likely to obstruct public order will not be allowed. 
Source: Naimusho keihokyokucho, "Shugiin giin sosenkyo ni kansuru kiji 
torishimari ni kansuru ken," Secret February 28, 1942 in Archive Title 1470 
Reel 214, Frame 83420-83421. 
Appendix D 
Police Bureau Instruction Number 14 Top Secret March 26, 1942 
FROM: Home Ministry Police Bureau Director 
TO: Each Prefectural Governor 
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Board 
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As for election campaign speech rallies in this election for the Lower House 
held under Greater East Asia Wartime conditions, facing the necessity of unify-
ing still more public opinion and demonstrating the true value of one hundred 
million people's total order, together with anticipating especially appropriate 
guidance and management, on the one hand these campaign rallies, as a part 
of the imperial rule assistance movement, will positively elevate national morale. 
In general, the following directions are expected to be used to control campaign 
rallies. 
1) These standards of control and guidance should be pointed out to candi-
dates or election campaign directors. It is desired that you adopt methods to 
deliver adequately these objectives. 
2) It is desired that you thoroughly anticipate and correct by guidance 
before the fact serious points concerning matters which could result in cautions 
or suspensions. 
3) As for matters in election rallies which are recognizable as requiring 
special attention, whenever such arguments occur they are to be reported simul-
taneously to the Justice Ministry's Chief of Criminal Affairs and the Chief 
Justice of the Court, both of whom should be properly notified. 
Part I Standards Subject to Control at Speech Rally Arguments 
A) Related to the Greater East Asia War 
1) Fomenting a peace movement or optimistic attitude or doing such 
things which might give rise to fears having an adverse influence on national 
determination to prosecute a long war. 
2) Arbitrarily calling for the restoration of various Southern Front terri-
tories, spreading one's own personal view about the Southern Areas adminis-
trative methods and economic policies, of such matters likely to create fears 
and confusion about the government's Greater East Asia statesmanship. 
3) Matters such as calling the Greater East Asia War a racial war between 
the colored and whites. 
4) Creating doubts in public confidence in the national government or its 
ability, or maintaining that there should be direct negotiations with Chiang's 
(kai-shek) political clique. 
B) Related to Foreign Affairs 
1) Anything that might hinder the friendly relations with Germany, Italy, 
or other Axis powers. 
2) Maintaining that hostilities should be opened against the Soviet Union, 
emphasizing the opinion about the danger on the Northern Front, or other-
wise giving the impression that our nation will attack the Soviet Union, or 
needlessly irritating the Soviet Union. 
C) Domestic Problems 
1) Intentionally abusively criticizing the government or its policies giving 
rise to fears of government insincerity. 
2) Arbitrarily denouncing or abusing the nation's upper classes and such 
things as encouraging domestic rivalry. 
3) Of course, matters that might range into anti-war or anti-military state-
ments; intentionally attacking government officials or such things that might 
give rise to a split between the government and the public or cause an anti-
government atmosphere are forbidden. 
4) Discussing material shortages, stimulating disagreement over material 
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supply and demand, irritating by exaggeration about the handling of public 
discontent and dissatisfaction, or matters related to insinuating the existence 
of scandalous incidents which might foment societal unrest. 
5) Opposition to economic controls, falsifying those controls' true motives, 
or matters which might give rise to adverse ideas about economic controls. 
6) Suggesting inflation's inevitability or matters that might provoke con-
cern about financial monetary policy. 
7) Speculating about how quickly surplus Southern Front resources will 
flow into (Japan), predicting relief from economic controls, the change or 
closing of medium and small industries, and other matters, like the adverse 
influence exerted by reorganization. 
D) Election Related 
1) Opposing this general election or causing a lessening of national zeal 
toward the general election. 
2) Intentionally distorting the government's true motives concerning the 
recommendation body, the Political Council, causing a lack of confidence in 
the government, or giving birth to suspicions about the election's fairness. 
E) Matters such as being the source of false, wild rumors about the present 
situation. 
F) Matters such as ranging into military, diplomatic, or economic state secrets. 
Part II Outline for Positive Guidance of Speeches 
Per the instructions for positive guidance which were previously indicated, 
according to the government's methods of leading public opinion, thoroughly 
plan special guidance which emphasizes above all else the following points: 
1) Based on the Imperial Rescript of the Declaration of War, endeavor to 
clarify the justice (of our position) and righteousness of opening hostilities. 
2) Emphasize that after we patiently had endeavored for peace over a long 
period, finally, for the sake of the Empire's prestige and the defense of our 
national existence in Greater East Asia, when it was unavoidable, we went to 
war to destroy wickedness and establish righteousness. If we are unable to win 
this war, the Empire's survival and lasting independence as well as the equi-
librium of East Asia cannot be expected. 
3 ) No matter how long this war lasts, we will eradicate the evil roots of 
American and British military and economic pressure. You should emphasize 
the determination inevitably to realize the great ideal of the Land of the Gods. 
4) As for the issue of total war, stimulate the determination to apply oneself 
with untiring perseverance to practice patriotic public service at one's occu-
pation with the awareness of total war. 
5) This war will certainly be protracted. Together with hardening all the 
more national resolution and the belief in inevitable victory, you should plan to 
elevate national morale. 
6) The enemy's will to fight will not necessarily collapse. It is necessary, 
once again, to prepare thoroughly for the expansion of enemy military prepara-
tions and their plans for another attempt at a decisive battle. Emphasize that 
the people should exert themselves for a vast increase in national production to 
demonstrate all the more national power. 
7) Telling (your audiences) of our officers and men overseas bravely dying 
for their country, emphasize that we should do our duty in plans for increased 
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agricultural production in wartime, reorganization of industry, national bond 
drives, and, towards important points of national policy, all the more sincerely 
perform our homefront public service. 
Source: Naimusho keihokyokucho, "Keihokyoku hakko dai 14 go," Top 
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\o\utai (national essence), 8-9, 23, 48, 
70, 109 
Konoe Fumimaro, 5-6, 9, 11, 12-16, 23, 
81, 159 n. 25 
Korean suffrage, 176 n. 69 
Koron (magazine), 55 
Kuhara Fusanosuke, 4 
Kumagai Ken'ichi, 10 
Kumagai Naota, 74 
League for the Construction of a Co-
operative Order in the Farming Vil-
lages (Noson \yodotai \ensetsu 
domei), 39-40 
Machida Chuji, 4, 75, 137, 142, 153 
Maeda Yonezo, 4, 7, 14-15, 16, 22, 28, 
30, 33, 71, 137, 141-2, 144-5, 148, 
153 
Maki Tatsuo, 7 
Makino Ryozo, 11, 106 
Manabe Katsu, 117 
Maruyama Tsurukichi, 102 
Matsuzaka Hiromasa, 52, 151 
Maurras, Charles, 109 
Metropolitan Police Board, 53, 55, 99, 
101-02, 151; evaluation of Diet in-
cumbents, 21-2; instruction on can-
didate investigations, 47-8; super-
vision of rightist rallies, 42 
Mikami Takashi, 41, 42 
Miki Kumaji, 116-7 
Miki Takeo, 103; campaign, 116-8; po-
lice interference against, 116-7; tac-
tics, 116-7 
Miki Yokochiro, 116 
Military Affairs Bureau, 7, 8, 24, 38, 
41, 51, 72, 121, 124, 152, 154; and 
Adults Association, 38, 41 
military police (\empeitai), 45, 46, 58, 
59, 150, 151 
Minseito, 4, 11, 28, 41, 74, 117, 129-31 
Mitamura Takeo, 149, 180 n. 57 
Miwa Jyuso, 48, 79, 177 n. 12 
Miyake Shoichi, 99, 103; campaign, 
122-4; jiban, 123; tactics, 123-4 
Miyake Yujiro, 121 
Miyazawa Taneo, 11; and 77th Diet 
controversy, 18 
Miyoshi Shigeo, 7 
Mizuho \urabu (Japan Club), 79, 
95-6, 108 
Murata Goro, 72, 104, 105, 106 
Muto Akira, 7, 24-5, 154, 162 n. 16; 
total war ideas, 7 
Nagai Kafu, 19 
Nagai Ryutaro, 4, 22, 25, 28, 30, 33, 
71, 87-8, 90, 137, 141-2, 144, 148 
Nakai Yotar5, 102 
Nakano Seigo, 5, 9, 29, 33-4, 73, 95-6, 
98, 103, 149-51; campaign, 113-6; 
tactics, 113-6 
Nakajima Chikuhei, 4, 16, 22, 61, 121, 
137, 142 
Narita Ichiro, 23, 24, 26, 34, 51 
National Governors' Conference, 51-2 
National Police Chiefs' Conference, 52 
neighborhood associations, 3, 8, 27, 
35-6, 125-6, 134, 154 
"new men," 27, 37, 48, 77-8, 91, 103-06, 
117, 123-7, 137, 143; composite, 
76-7; definition, 23; elected, table, 
135; motivations, 81-2; numbers of, 
80; recommended, 73-4. See also 
independent candidates & recom-
mended candidates 
New Party Movement: 1940, 3-5, 7, 
10; 1941, 16-7, 23; 1942, 25 
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Nihon musanto (Japan Proletariat 
Party), 4, 5, 59 
Nippon hyoron, 54 
Nishioka Takejiro, 103; campaign, 
118-20; legal appeals, 119 
Nomura Karoku, 137 
Noyori Hideuchi, 103; campaign, 
120-2; criticism of election, 121-2, 
139; interference problems, 122; 
tactics, 121 
Oasa Tadao, 22, 28, 32-3, 71, 73-4, 
141-2, 144, 151 
OdaShigeru, 114 
Ogura Masatsune, 28, 30 
Oikawa Koshiro, 15 
OishiDai, 114 
Okabe Nagakage, 151 
Okada Tadahiko, 22, 28, 30, 33, 71 
Okochi Kiko, 65, 67-8, 148 
Okochi Masatoshi, 28, 29, 30 
Okumura Kiwao, 102 
Okuma Shigenobu, 129 
Omori Kota, 102 
Ota Kozo, 28, 30, 41, 79, 90, 170 n. 18 
Ota Masataka, 28, 30, 34, 71, 74, 90, 
141-2 
Oura Kanetake, 129 
Outline for Guiding Public Opinion 
(Genron shido yoryo), 60-61 
Outline of the Basic Campaign for the 
Accomplishment of the Yokusan 
Election (Yokusan sen\yo \antetsu 
\ihon yo\o), 26; translation Appen-
dix A, 187-8 
Ozaki Yukio, iv, 10-11, 17, 22, 91-2, 
94, 98, 103, 117, 127, 137, 147, 180 
n. 54, 182 n. 24; arrest of, 112; cam-
paign, 112-3; legal appeal, 113; lese 
majeste affair, 93; open letter to 
Tojo, 69 
Pak Ch'un-Kum, 100-01 
Patriotic Associations Council for Gen-
eral Election Measures (Sosen\yo 
taisa\u ai\o\u dantai \yo~gi\ai)y 41 
Pearl Harbor; effect on censorship pol-
icy, 55; effect on homefront Japan, 
19-21. See also World War II Japan 
Homefront 
Police, 34-6, 47-50, 52, 55-6, 120; Adults 
Association, 39-40; alleged election 
interference, 92-4, 105-6, 114-7, 
125-6, 128-32; cautions & suspen-
sions issued, 100, 107; censorship, 
55; Instruction, 14, 57 ff; investiga-
tions of candidates, 49-50; post elec-
tion political assessment, 142-3; su-
pervision of campaign speeches, 
52-3, 110, 115; supervision of right-
ists, 42. Also see Home Ministry, 
Metropolitan Police Board 
Police Bureau (keihokyoku), 45, 48-50, 
52, 55; Adults Association, 39; Con-
trol of campaign rallies, 57-8; In-
struction, 14, 57 
Political Affairs Investigatory Commit-
tee, 141 
Political Council, see Yokusan Political 
Structure Cooperative Council 
Political Parties, 2, 4, 13, 14; decline 
of, 2-3; dissolution of, 5, 18. See 
also Do\6l{ai, Ko\umin domei, 
Minesito, Nihon musanto, Ri\\en 
doshi\ai, Seiyul^ai, Sha\ai taishuto, 
Toho\ai, Yokusan seiji \ai 
Political Parties' leaders, 27, 34, 37, 63; 
assessment by police, 21-2; domi-
nate Yokusan Political Association, 
141; Political Council members, 
32-3; re-assert authority in Diet, 
16-8; resilience, 152; role in Politi-
cal Council recommendations, 71, 
74-6; suitable as recommended can-
didates, 22; victors in 1942 election, 
137 
Prefectural Police Affairs Section 
Chiefs' Conference, 50, 51 
Prefectural Promotion Branch Confer-
ence, 51 
Press control, 54-5; Appendix B, 188. 
See also censorship 
Public Security Police Law (chian 
keisatsuho), 11-12, 27, 78, 140, 154 
recommended candidates, 60-1, 70-7, 
87-9; criticism of, 76-7; "new men" 
among, 87-8; selection of, 71, 171 
n. 32. See also candidate recom-
mendation system 
Reservist Association (Tei\o\u zaigo 
gunjinkai), 7, 21, 31, 34, 38, 71, 72, 
108, 117, 126, 130, 134, 139, 164-5 
n. 58 
Right Wing (Reform faction), 8-9, 
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40-3, 59-60, 64-5, 69-70, 78, 81, 94, 
96, 115, 151; definition, 8; de-
nounces government after air raid, 
99; election results, 137-8; post-elec-
tion attitude, 142-3 
Right Wing (Traditional faction), 8, 
59-60, 78-9, 95, 137-8; definition, 8; 
election attitude, 8 
Ri\\en doshi\ai (Constitutional Com-
rades Society), 129 
Ri\\en yosei\ai (Society for the Culti-
vation of Constitutional Justice), 
42,78-9, 81, 89,96, 115, 138 
Royama Masamichi, 103-06; election 
campaign, 103-06; tactics, 105 
Saito Makoto, 157 n. 5 
Saito Takao, 80, 117, 130, 147, 180 n. 
54 
Saki Tadamasa, 29, 30 
Sanjunichi\ai (Thirtieth Club), 147, 
148 
Sansui sa\ura gumi (Cherry Landscape 
Society), 147 
Sasagawa Ryoichi, 41, 95, 143, 147, 148 
Sasaki Itsucho, 95, 147 
Sato Kenryo, 24, 25, 38, 40, 42-3, 70, 
152, 154, 162 n. 16 
Satsuma Yuji, 148, 149 
secret police (\6to \eisatsii), 45, 165-6 
n .2 
Seishin \urabu (New Diet Members 
Club), 147, 148 
Seiyu\ai, 4, 11, 17, 28, 41, 54, 74, 88, 
118, 120, 129-31, 142 
Sengoku Kotaro, 29, 30, 170 n. 18 
Senryo\u zd\yo rinji \yb~gi\ai (Extra-
ordinary Committee to Reinforce 
War Potential), 146 
Sha\ai taishuto (Socialist Masses Par-
ty), 4-5, 10-11, 17-18,22,48,59, 75, 
79, 123-4, 132, 149; election results, 
137 
Shiba Teikichi, 177 n. 12 
Shikata Ryoji, 150-1 
Shimada Toshio, 16, 137, 153 
Shimomura Hiroshi, 29, 30, 170 n. 18 
Shimomura Jiro, 103; campaign of, 
125-7; interference against, 125-7; 
legal appeals, 127 
Shinagawa Yajir5, 54, 128-9 
Shiratori Toshio, 78, 121, 150 
Shisai\ai (Like Thinkers Society), 147 
shortages, 53, 59-60, 100 
Shioden Nobutaka, 79, 103, 111, 147, 
178 n. 18; anti-Semitism, 106-08; 
campaign of, 106-09; tactics, 108 
Shdwa \en\yu\ai, 9, 14, 29, 104 
Shuho (magazine), 35, 101 
Six Companies Council {Ro\usha\ai), 
55 
sonendan (adults clubs), 38 
soshi (political bullies), 122 
special higher police {to\\d) (thought 
police), 45, 55, 93, 124, 151, 169 n. 
25 
Suetsugu Nobumasa, 9, 28, 30, 41, 87, 
170 n. 18 
Susugida Yoshitomo, 151, 152 
Suzuki Kantaro, 54, 185 n. 68 
Suzuki Kisaburo, 129-30 
Suzuki Teiichi, 68 
Tagawa Daikichiro, 93, 112-3, 137 
Takahashi Sankichi, 28, 170 n. 18 
Takami Yukimichi, 74 
Takemoto Kuramae Police Station, 49-
50 
Taki Masao, 29, 30, 90, 170 n. 18 
Tanaka Sawaji, 78, 95, 115 
Tanaka Tokichi, 29, 90, 170 n. 18 
Tani Masayuki, 102 
Tawara Magoichi, 137 
Tazawa Yoshiharu, 3, 24, 25, 102 
ten\o (conversion), 9, 41 
Toa renmei doshi\ai (East Asia Com-
rades Association), 42, 95, 138 
Toh5doshi\ai, 150, 151 
Toho\ai, 4, 5, 33-4, 69, 73, 74, 79, 80-1, 
95-6, 124, 131, 136, 138, 140, 143, 
148, 171 n. 28; opposes government 
policies, 59-60, 114-5; tactics, 113 
Tojo cabinet and government, v, 21, 
26, 27, 32, 40, 54, 55, 58, 63-6, 70, 
78, 81-3, 89, 91-2, 96, 99, 101-02, 
104, 112, 115, 121, 131, 135, 144, 
146, 149, 152. See also Tojo dic-
tatorship and Tojo Hideki 
Tojo dictatorship, v, 103, 152 
Tojo Hideki, v, 15, 17, 18, 20, 32, 37, 
43, 51, 62, 80-1, 91, 94, 101, 121-2, 
124, 133, 135-6, 139-40, 148-51, 153; 
criticism of, 112, 115, 121-2, 124; 
Diet interpellations, 65-9, 148-9; 
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reasons for calling election, 21-3, 
25-8, 32, 37 
Tokutomi Soho, 29, 30 
Tomeoka Yukio, 23, 36, 52 
tonari-gumi, see neighborhood associa-
tions 
Tsugumo Kunitoshi, 11, 149, 150 
Tsukui Tatsuo, 97, 103, 178 n. 27; 
campaign of, 109-12; reasons for 
defeat, 111-2 
Toyama Mitsuru, 108, 121 
Uchida Nobuya, 142 
Wakamiya Sado, 137 
Wartime Penal Regulations Code, 149-
50 
World War Two; and censorship, 54-5, 
98, 100; and election, 61-2; Home-
front Japan, 19-21, 84, 145; and ru-
mors, 60. See also Appendix B, 188 
Yabe Teiji, 87 
Yabuki Seizo, 28, 30 
Yagi Itsuro, 74 
Yamazaki Iwao, 101, 102, 170 n. 12 
Yamazaki Tatsunosuke, 4, 22, 25, 28, 
32, 33, 71, 90, 137, 141-2, 144, 148, 
151 
Yanegawa Heisuke, 9, 20 
Yokoyama Sukenari, 20, 25, 28, 170 n. 
18 
Yo\udo} see Yo\usan giin domei 
Yokusan Diet, 28, 31, 35, 41, 53, 66, 
70, 134, 139; definition, 23 
Yokusan election, 37, 51, 87, 101; in 
Nagasaki (1941), 118, 180 n. 57 
Yo\usan giin domei (Yo\udo) (Yoku-
san Dietmen's League), 17-18, 25, 
28, 31-3, 71, 73-4, 75, 76, 78, 91, 
116, 140-1, 154, 172 n. 48; election 
results, 135-7; post election criti-
cism, 138 
Yokusan Political Structure Coopera-
tive Council (Yokusan seiji taisei 
\yogi\ai) (Political Council), 27-
34, 37-41, 48, 53, 55, 58-61, 63-82, 
86-9, 94-6, 98-9, 101, 104, 107, 109, 
114-5, 121, 122, 125, 135, 136-8; 
criticism of, 63-9, 73, 74, 77-9, 94-6, 
114-5; election results, 135; organi-
zation, 27-32; personnel, 28-9, 31-2 
Yokusan seiji\ai (Yokusan Political 
Society), 139-48, 151-4; rightist crit-
icism, 142-3; 81st Diet problems, 
147-8 
Yo\usan seiji \esshu jumbi\ai (Prelim-
inary Committee for the Concentra-
tion of Yokusan Politics), 139 
Yoshida Shigeru, 90 
Yuki Toyotaro, 28, 30 
Yushi daigishikai (Volunteer Repre-
sentatives Association), 148 
Yuzawa Michio, 20, 22, 24, 25-6, 29, 
37, 51-2, 63, 66, 68, 102, 124, 148-9, 
170 n. 12 
zaibatsu (financial cliques), 8-9, 59, 69, 
95, 107, 114, 115 
Zen\o\u rono taishuto (National 
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